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Summary  
 
This study is about the economic diplomacy of Namibia, as a small state, for the period 
1990 – 2015. Liberalism, as a theory of International Relations (IR) studies, is the 
adopted analytical framework. Namibia’s economic diplomacy is anchored in the foreign 
policy principles enshrined in article 96 of her constitution, which advocate, inter alia, 
the maintenance of mutual beneficial relations. Namibia, further enacted laws and 
adopted policies that serve as domestic instruments of economic diplomacy. The 
stakeholders in Namibia’s economic diplomacy include both state and non-state actors. 
 
The study adopts a population of 8 million as the benchmark for small states, plus one of 
the following characteristics of small states: small size of the territory; low economy and 
the perception by the government leaders and nationals. 
 
Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy covers over one hundred countries. Her major 
trade partners, in terms of export trade and inward investments are Angola, Canada, 
China, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, The United 
Kingdom and the United States. Bilateral economic diplomacy is further pursued through 
the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) exports. 
 
The Namibian Government pursues multilateral economic diplomacy with the European 
Union, as part of the Africa Caribbean Pacific states and with regional and international 
economic and trade organisations such as the Southern Africa Customs Union, the 
Southern Africa Development Community, the United Nations Conference in Trade and 
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Development and the World Trade Organisation. Namibia also adopts conference 
diplomacy as a form of multilateral economic diplomacy. 
 
The study makes an epistemological contribution to the study of IR, that the world is 
constructed under the hierarchical order that constrains power-based relations and 
minimises conflicts in international trade. A minimal trend of pursuing interests is, 
however, observed. The study further makes an ontological contribution to the study of 
IR, that the behaviour of state and non-state actors are inclined to cooperation on the 
continuum of conflict and cooperation. 
 
The study concludes that, contrary to the assumptions in small states literature, that small 
states have limitations of capacity and play an insignificant role in multilateralism, 
Namibia has skilled negotiators who have led negotiations in regional and international 
organisations.  
 
Ten key terms: 
Bilateral economic diplomacy; economic diplomacy; economic partnership agreements; 
foreign policy; liberalism; multilateral economic diplomacy; Namibia; small states 
diplomacy; trade partners; and international relations studies. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Republic of Namibia (hereafter, Namibia) is a small developing state on the south 
western coast of Africa, with a population of approximately 2.1 million (National 
Planning Commission 2012a: 2). Independent only since 1990, as a small state, the 
country is particularly vulnerable to the negative forces of globalisation. In this regard, 
Namibia’s Minister of Finance, Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila, stated in the Parliament 
that  
Namibia is a small open economy. Global economic developments therefore, have a profound 
impact on our country’s economy and fiscal policy (National Assembly 2008: 71). 
 
In contrast, Namibia has been able to use the positive forces of globalisation to assert 
herself in the international political arena. The National Development Plan (NDP) 1 
recognises that Namibia, a small country with an economy relying on international trade 
and support, will promote herself through relations that are fair and bring common 
benefits (National Planning Commission 1995: 55 – 56).  
 
1.2 Namibia in the world economy 
 
Namibia is a member of international organisations and institutions that deal with 
economic diplomacy and international trade. These include, inter alia, the Southern 
Africa Customs Union (SACU), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005a: 25 – 30; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006: 25 – 28). It is through these organisations and institutions that 
Namibia participates in the world economy and pursues multilateral economic 
diplomacy. Namibia is further part of the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) states which 
negotiate with the European Union (EU) for the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). 
 2 
 
Namibia’s foreign policy was formulated against the global political economy that, 
according to Leysens & Thompson (2006: 69), is divided into five structures, namely, 
security, production, finance, knowledge and trade. Trade has motivated an integrated 
world economy and has, therefore, played a role in the relations among states.   
 
Lee (2003: 9 – 10)  states that Africa’s economy has been subjected to neo-liberalism, 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank imposing Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to limit governments’ intervention on economic affairs 
of states and the free movement of goods and services. The free movement of goods and 
services is one of the issues of concern raised by Angola, Namibia and South Africa in 
the EPA negotiations between the ACP and the EU. Addressing the 16th Session of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, held in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, from 24 to 28 November 2008, in 
his capacity as Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, 
Natural Resources and Public Administration of the National Assembly of Namibia, the 
researcher of this study stated: 
 
We are further concerned about the free movement of goods. This will negatively affect 
agricultural procedures in our countries, which are currently protected by a ban of wheat imports 
during the harvesting period. These protective measures are in accordance with the provisions 
under SACU agreements (Mushelenga 2008).1 
 
Namibia wants to protect her local producers against competition from imports during the 
season of harvesting. These measures, which are practised by other SACU member-
states, ensure the growth of the local agronomic industry but also allows competition, 
since the ban on imports is only seasonal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  This quote, though stated by the researcher, is used as it represents a policy position of the 
Namibian Parliament.   
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1.3 Conceptual clarification 
 
It is important to define some of the concepts that are used in the study. Some of these 
concepts are old concepts but they may have different meaning within the context of this 
study. Others are relatively new concepts that this study introduces to IR studies. 
 
1.3.1 Foreign policy 
 
In modern times, where foreign policy encompasses both political and economic issues, it 
is defined as the amount of external relations carried out by independent actors in the 
international system (Hill 2003:3). Although the actors are usually states, non-state actors 
have gained prominent influence on foreign policy matters in modern times. In a foreign 
policy blueprint, a government sets the goals that it would like to achieve in international 
relations and employs the techniques to achieve these goals. Among the techniques that a 
government employs to achieve its goals is diplomacy, which involves negotiations, 
conflict resolutions and peaceful settlement of disputes (Schmidt et. al. 1991: 554). 
 
Foreign policy is determined by the domestic and external environments. Among the 
domestic environment that determines the foreign policies are the geographic location, 
economy, populace and the leadership that manages the public affairs of the state. The 
external determinants are the political and economic dynamics in the region and 
emerging trends in the international political system (Du Pisani 2000: 298 – 299). 
 
Adherents to Interdependence Theory argue that the foreign policies of states promote 
multilateralism, as states become entangled in a network of organisations, to augment 
their economic and security interests.  These organisations comprise states with common 
interest, where they share information and strategise on solutions to their respective 
problems. Interdependence leads to multilateral organisations impacting on the 
development and essence of foreign policy (Karns & Mingst 1991: 454).  
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1.3.2 Foreign policy doctrine 
 
A foreign policy doctrine is a strategic vision and belief, organised into thoughts or 
slogans, which foreign policy-makers pronounce as a guiding principle of their foreign 
policy conducts. It becomes a catch phrase that explains the dogma of the foreign policy 
of the leader concerned (Grigoriadis 2010: 4; Tierney 2012: 1).  
 
There is a distinction between foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy practice. While 
foreign policy is a broader concept that refers to the rules, principles, strategies and 
guidelines of a state’s external relations, foreign policy doctrine, is a component of 
foreign policy, as it is a philosophy of key foreign policy-makers that defines their vision 
within the broader foreign policy agenda and structure. Foreign policy practice refers to 
the culture, the forms and types of foreign policy making (Du Plessis 2006: 140). The 
practice of foreign policy can result from the influence of a foreign policy doctrine. 
 
1.3.3 Economic diplomacy 
 
Diplomacy, in general, is the manner in which a state conducts foreign policy matters (Du 
Pisani 2000: 299). Economic diplomacy refers to the techniques employed by states to 
promote economic development and prosperity in their foreign relations. It is a 
persuasive marketing strategy to attract investors to explore trade and investment 
opportunities. The objectives of economic diplomacy, as a technique, are to strengthen 
and expand economic relations between a state, other states and international  institutions, 
to yield beneficial results in areas covering economic cooperation, tourism and 
investment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 19; Institute of Foreign Affairs 2002: 11). 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, supports the essentials of economic diplomacy, as it 
is about mutual interdependence resulting from, inter alia, economic development and 
technology advancement. Liberalism’s theory of interdependence suggests that 
cooperation between states brings mutual benefits and trade relations are in the interest of 
participants. It further acknowledges the fact that mutual dependence of two states may 
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not necessarily be equal in proportion. One state may have an edge over benefits derived 
from a relationship with another state (Goldstein 2003: 317 – 318). 
 
1.3.4 Economic statecraft 
 
This concept has its limitation, in terms of this study, as it limits actors to the state. It 
will, nevertheless, be used to discuss other states’ economic diplomacies when making 
comparative analyses. Economic statecraft refers to the use of economic influence by a 
state to influence the behaviour of another state in order to achieve certain goals 
(Mastanduno 2001: 4; Wong 2005: 55).  
 
Large states have used economic sanctions to influence the behaviour of smaller states. 
They also apply economic statecraft differently with regard to large states and economies. 
This proposition is confirmed by de Wilde d’Estmael (1997: 1, 11 – 12) who writes about 
the imposition of economic sanctions against the Third World states by the EU. The 
sanctions applied only to the territories controlled by the rebel movement, the União 
Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola (The Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola – UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. However, in 1995, the EU was reluctant to 
impose sanctions against Nigeria, a large power, following the execution of nine Ogoni 
human rights activists. Similarly, when the EU imposed sanctions against the Soviet 
Union, a superpower, after she imposed martial law in Poland, it took three months 
before the sanctions were implemented and these sanctions were merely ‘symbolic’ 
entailing the ‘reduction on luxury goods coming from [the] USSR’ (de Wilde d’Estmael 
1997: 8). 
 
While literature generally focuses on negative sanctions, states may also adopt positive 
sanctions. Baldwin (1971: 23) differentiates between the concepts of positive and 
negative sanctions, explaining that positive sanctions refer to rewards, while negative 
sanctions refer to threatened punishment. He states that the US government, for example, 
views its aid programmes as positive sanctions, where countries are encouraged to adopt 
behaviours in international relations in return for aid development assistance. 
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Baldwin (1971:  26 – 27) argues that while positive and negative sanctions differ in the 
form, but their behavioural consequences are the same because either a state is punished, 
or its reward is withheld. 
 
Small states do not use statecraft in their foreign relations. This study will state 
alternative methods to the use of sanctions that small states in general and Namibia in 
particular apply pursing economic diplomacy (see Chapters Two and Five). 
 
1.3.5 Re-circling diplomacy 
 
This study introduces the concept “re-circling diplomacy”, referring to revisiting a pre-
independence diplomatic programme, in a post-independence period. As a contribution to 
IR studies, the concept “re-circling” is used by this study, instead of recycling. The term 
“recycling” could be confusing as it could mean the return of diplomacy to the same 
stage (Soanes & Stevenson 2004: 1203). However, pre-independence diplomacy was 
carried out by SWAPO but post-independence diplomacy was carried out by the 
Namibian Government, led by SWAPO Party.2 Re-circling diplomacy, therefore, means 
that Namibia’s pre-independence diplomacy, spearheaded by SWAPO that was 
circulating among countries such as the Nordic countries, for example, was going in a 
circle, now as the Namibian government’s diplomacy. The concept can further be used 
referring to revitalising relations that exist in a given region during a different period in 
modern history, for example, the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This is arguably 
so because the turning points in history could result in changing foreign policies in which 
states could possibly change allies and drift away from their old friends (Hill 2003: 11 – 
15). In re-circling diplomacy, states’ bilateral relations are based on previous foundations. 
Arguably, these foundations would maintain or strengthen relations of old friends. 
 
 
                                                 
2  For the pre-independence period, reference is made to SWAPO. For the post-independence period, 
reference is made to SWAPO Party, as SWAPO transformed itself from a liberation movement to 
a political party, governing Namibia. 
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1.3.6 Deep-pocket or cheque book diplomacy 
 
Deep-pocket or cheque book diplomacy are terms used to refer to the use of economic 
resources by a country in return for diplomatic favours by another country. Deep-pocket 
refers to when an entity has a lot of money and resources through which it is able to 
sustain itself and enough to share with others. Deep-pocket diplomacy refers to the use of 
money and resources in diplomatic transactions in order to have strategic diplomatic 
influence over others. It is a broader concept which includes resource diplomacy, 
granting aid and the backing of private sector investment by the state to boost economic 
diplomacy (Ghoshal 2010: 1; Cheru & Obi 2009). Bathromew (2012: 2) contends that 
deep-pocket diplomacy has advantaged Chinese business influence in a number of 
countries ahead of the US because of the incentives extended to those countries. 
Accordingly, when a state has a deep pocket, not only is it able to use its resources to 
give grants to other states, but it can also use its resources to support its private 
businesspersons, to pursue trade and investment. 
 
Deep-pocket or cheque book diplomacy is characterised by exerting influence to win the 
diplomatic support of one state by another using economic resources such as aid. 
Countries with strong economies apply deep-pocket or cheque book diplomacy to 
countries with weak economies. Small states generally are subject to cheque book 
diplomacy, as they are led to diplomatically align themselves with powerful states, 
resulting in the rendering of significant financial, material and other forms of support 
(Seib 2009: 11 – 12). Dobell (2007: 16) explains that cheque book diplomacy is an aid 
game used to buy diplomatic influence and this only happens when a country that uses 
this type of diplomacy has enough resources. Lack of resources results in an inability to 
spend on resources for the purpose of gaining diplomatic favours. 
 
1.3.7 Developmental diplomacy 
 
Developmental diplomacy is a type of diplomacy characterised by development 
assistance and humanitarian cooperation (Haşimi 2014: 1). Countries practise 
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developmental diplomacy by rendering donor assistance and providing priority to 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation area. Developmental diplomacy is 
based on relations between developed states, as the donor states with developing states, 
as the beneficiaries. As part of developmental diplomacy, countries allocate funds for aid 
development programmes to beneficiaries. NGOs in donor countries are sometimes 
involved in developmental diplomacy programmes, as together with the government they 
identify economic and social policies and programmes (Saner 2006: 98). 
 
The developmental diplomacy in a form of developmental assistance that Namibia 
receives will be discussed in Chapter Five in respect of French-Namibian and Chinese-
Namibian economic diplomacy. 
 
1.3.8 Public diplomacy 
 
Public diplomacy refers to the use of  media and public platforms,  articulating foreign 
policy issues, targeting large audiences with a view to achieve a diplomatic goal (Mingst 
2008: 114). Berridge (2010: 179) explains that public diplomacy is propaganda by 
diplomats and government officials working on foreign policy matters aimed at 
influencing domestic public opinion or a foreign public. He maintains that it is a form of 
white propaganda, where the true origin of such propaganda is known, as opposed to 
black propaganda, which has no traceable origin and characterised by falsified 
information. 
 
Hamilton & Langhorne (2011:  235 – 236) state that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs use 
electronic communication, like websites, to portray a positive national image and reach 
out to investors. They further state that public diplomacy takes the form of news-briefing 
and national branding, sometimes using funded radio and television programmes, or paid 
advertisements in both print and electronic media. 
 
Hamilton & Langhorne (2011: 235) propound that public diplomacy is not limited to 
government, but it also involves non-state actors like the non-governmental organisation 
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(NGOs). This is because influencing foreign public opinion does not only require 
governments, but those non-state actors who have a role to play as global actors. 
 
1.4  A historical overview of Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
 
Foreign policy is a tool that a government uses to guide relations and interactions with 
other governments, international organisations and other entities in the global arena. It is, 
therefore, an outward approach of a country to the rest of the world. Foreign policy goals 
and objectives are achieved through the use of diplomacy. Diplomacy refers to the 
manner in which international relations are managed through the process of negotiations, 
bargaining, mediation and conflict resolutions (Landsberg 2004: 10 – 11). It is arguable 
that diplomacy is a decent and civilised norm of behaviour which embodies courteous 
dialogues.  
 
Namibia has a pre-independence and post-independence economic diplomacy. Pre-
independence economic diplomacy covers the period under German colonialism, from 
1884 – 1915 and under South African colonialism, from 1915 – 1990.  
 
During the period of South African colonialism, two nationalist movements, the South 
West Africa National Union (SWANU) and the South West Africa People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO), were formed in 1959 and 1960, respectively, to fight for Namibia’s 
independence. The formation of SWAPO was preceded by the Owambo People’s 
Congress (OPC) in 1957, which became the Owambo People’s Organisation (OPO) in 
1959 and was renamed SWAPO in 1960 (Katjavivi 1988: 41; SWAPO 1981: 172). 
 
Pre-independence economic diplomacy was based more on dependency, where the 
liberation movements did not trade with partners; rather, they lived on assistance from 
friendly countries. Meanwhile, as a colony of South Africa, the Namibian economy was 
dependent on South Africa and as a result, Namibia could not trade in the global market 
independently from South Africa.  
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Post-independence economic diplomacy departed from the colonial one. Du Pisani (2003: 
17) states that Namibia’s pursuance of economic diplomacy is based on the principle and 
goal of mutual benefits and interdependence, respectively.  
 
1.5  Economic diplomacy as a foreign policy principle and objective 
 
The Namibian foreign policy is entrenched in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, 
which reads as follows: 
 
The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it: 
 
(a)  adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment; 
(b) promotes international cooperation, peace and security; 
(c)  creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations; 
(d)  fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations; 
(e)  encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting 1990: 53). 
 
The first three foreign policy principles have an impact on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy (as defined under conceptual clarification – see section 1.3.3). The non-
alignment with either the East or West Bloc puts Namibia in good stead to maintain trade 
with countries from either bloc. The East and West Blocs were a division of the 
international community along the ideologies, with the pro-communist East Bloc led by 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), while the pro-capitalist West Bloc was 
led by the United States (US). The promotion of international cooperation as a foreign 
policy objective arguably includes trade cooperation. The third principle of mutually 
beneficial relations is further elaborated in the NDP 1 as a foreign policy objective. 
Namibia adopts these foreign policy principles cognisant of the fact that the international 
economy has largely become competitive and interdependent (National Planning 
Commission 1995: 18). Namibia stands to benefit from this aspect of economic 
diplomacy, since in the context of interdependence, which is a theory of the neo-
Liberalism perspective, states mutually benefit in, among others, areas of trade, finance, 
communication, environment and technology transfer (Viotti & Kauppi 1999: 215). 
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In addition to the foreign policy principles enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, the 
first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, informed Parliament about the five 
objectives set by his Ministry, namely to: 
 
 Promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity and ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the 
off-shore islands of Namibia; 
 Promote Namibia’s national identity and counter any remnants of apartheid and colonialism;  
 Promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of 
trade for Namibian commodities;  
 Enhance peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola and the transformation of South 
Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and  
 Promote world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU 
and NAM (National Assembly 1991: 80 – 81). 
 
In elaborating the third objective which relates to economic diplomacy, Minister Gurirab 
stated that the objective was aimed at seeking additional markets for Namibian 
commodities in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Namibia further wanted to 
attract finance and foreign investment and promote economic and industrial cooperation 
within SADC and Africa (National Assembly 1991: 80). 
 
After one year of independence, in March 1991, the Government of Namibia produced a 
White Paper on National and Sectoral Policies, where, under the heading of foreign 
affairs it was stated that SWAPO, the ruling party, is committed to the equitable 
distribution of wealth both nationally and in the international arena, in the context of the 
north-south relations (National Assembly 1991: 80). The North refers to developed 
countries from America and Europe, while the South refers to developing and least 
developed (also referred to as Third World) refers to countries from Asia, Africa and 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Calvert 1986: 3 – 6; Van der Westhuisen 2006: 186). 
 
In 2004, the White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management was tabled in 
the Parliament by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya. This is a 
policy document, outlining the principles and policies governing Namibia’s foreign 
relations.  The White Paper was adopted unanimously by the National Assembly on 15 
July 2004 (National Assembly 2004b: 350). It is important to note that in Namibia, after 
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the White Paper has been adopted by Parliament, it becomes a policy document, but it 
does not necessarily mean that it will be followed by legislation. 
 
Chapter Two of the White Paper discusses economic diplomacy. Emerging economic 
issues such as the rise of globalisation, increased trade, foreign direct investment and 
technology transfer pose a challenge to Namibia’s foreign policy. Accordingly, 
Namibia’s foreign policy should focus on achieving optimal benefits in these areas. 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy, therefore, centres on attracting investment and 
promoting trade (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 17 – 19).  
 
The White Paper sets out other factors that influence economic diplomacy. Investors are 
concerned about issues of the investment climate such as peace and stability, investment 
relations and policies and transport and communications infrastructure. The essence of 
economic diplomacy, therefore, lies in the ability to address these issues in an effective 
manner. Economic diplomacy further needs skilled actors to provide sufficient 
information to investors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 19 – 20). The then Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya, explaining the White Paper at a public lecture 
held at the University of Namibia in April 2004, stated that the tasks of diplomats include 
the promotion and enhancing of Namibia’s image abroad. This is done to advance socio-
economic, scientific and technological interests to ensure economic growth and 
development (Hamutenya 2004). 
 
Addressing the conference of Heads of Missions, Minister Hamutenya informed the 
Namibian diplomats that they were required to be analytical of the environment in which 
they operated and they should become more involved in the conduct of economic 
diplomacy. The result of their active role on economic diplomacy would be discerned 
from the foreign investment output and expansion of the market access for the Namibian 
products (Hamutenya 2003).   
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1.6  Literature survey 
 
Apart from the official sources cited earlier, there is limited academic literature on the 
foreign policy of Namibia, as there are only nine3 academic publications on Namibia’s 
foreign policy which refer to economic diplomacy and its key elements. Most of the 
literature on economic diplomacy is found in the speeches of the President, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, National 
Development Plan (NDP) 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Vision 2030.  
 
Academic publications on Namibia’s economic diplomacy are limited to nine sources, 
although there are some other publications with sections related to Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy, but whose main focus is not necessarily on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
Four were published by Andre Du Pisani, Professor of Political Science at the University 
of Namibia (Du Pisani 1992, 1994, 2000 and 2002).  One is a dissertation for the Master 
of Arts (MA) degree at the University of South Africa (UNISA) which was written by the 
researcher of this study (Mushelenga 2008).  One is a thesis for the MA degree at Rhodes 
University by Amadhila (2012). Two are publications by Robin Sherbourne, a Namibian 
economist (Sherbourne 2009 and 2013). The latest publication is the one that was edited 
by Bösl, Du Pisani and Zaire (2014). Du Pisani’s publications predominantly deals with 
the same topic and, therefore, for the purpose of discussion in this section, reference will 
only be made to new insights that he contributed to the literature. Amadhila’s MA thesis 
was reproduced into a book, the same year, but for the purpose of this study reference 
will be made to the thesis. 
 
Meanwhile, some academic researches were carried out on  the foreign policy of 
Namibia’s neighbour and former colonial power, South Africa, within the first ten years 
after the first democratic election held in 1994. This resulted in literature sources like 
Landsberg (2004); McGowan, Cornelissen & Nel (2006) and Webber & Smith (2002).  
 
Du Pisani (2000: 307) states that, 
                                                 
3 They were six, when this study commenced in 2010.  
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[E]conomic considerations weigh heavily in determining the thrust of Namibia’s foreign 
policy…In an attempt to enhance trade and investment, the government has deputed commercial 
counsellors to its foreign missions in Bonn, London and Brussels. There are also trade 
representatives in Asia and the emerging markets in select Arab countries. At home, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs collaborates with that of Trade and Industry in the mounting of trade fairs. 
 
Du Pisani’s views are supported by Webber & Smith (2002: 18) who state that the 
traditional image of foreign policy, which depends on issues of national security has 
changed, giving way to new challenges in the foreign policy agenda focusing on 
economic priorities. The prominence of economic issues in foreign policy is typical of 
small states perspectives. It is stated that small states employ diplomatic and economic 
foreign policy instruments as opposed to military instruments (Hey 2003: 5).  
 
Du Pisani’s underscoring of the importance of economic consideration on foreign policy 
further corresponds to that of the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, 
who stated in the Parliament in 1991 that, 
 
By now, there is hardly an area that is not a subject of foreign policy. Areas which fell exclusively 
in the sphere of domestic politics in the broadest sense…are now just as much a  subject of foreign 
policy…For Namibia, as for other developing states, economic policy objectives are now the focal 
point of foreign policy (National Assembly 1991: 84). 
 
Mushelenga (2008: 80)4 states that although Namibia is a small state, she broadens her 
foreign policy scope to embrace economic diplomacy, which entails exploring new 
markets for Namibian commodities and enhancing opportunities for foreign direct 
investment. This is in accordance with the foreign policy objective spelt out  by  Theo-
Ben Gurirab, namely “…[the promotion] of Namibia’s economic development and 
prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities” 
(National Assembly 1991: 80). 
 
Amadhila (2012) discusses Namibia’s foreign relations with China with regard to how 
non-state actors react to government policy. She concludes that Chinese aggressive 
                                                 
4  This literature by the author is cited, as it is an academic literature that deals with the same subject 
discussed by the thesis, namely foreign policy. 
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inward investments in the Namibian construction industry which has driven out 
Namibians out of business has contributed to negative perceptions from some quarters of 
the Namibian public about Namibia’s foreign relations with China.  
 
Amadhila (2012: 74 – 75) suggests that the Namibian government needs to adopt 
decisive measures to ensure compliance with Namibian laws by Chinese investors. In the 
current state of affairs, Chinese businesses remain unfairly competitive to local 
businesses. 
 
The publication edited by Bösl and Du Pisani (2014) has chapters by different authors 
including the researcher of this study. In this publication, four other authors cited the 
researcher of this study’s MA thesis stated above. Du Pisani (2014: 121) discusses the 
construction projects by Asian companies in Namibia, from China and Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Hamutenya (2014:0 85) discusses the geographical, 
historical and political significance of Angola as a strategic trade partner for Namibia. 
Katjavivi (2014: 146 - 147) focuses on Namibia’s relations with Germany, developmental 
diplomacy and levels of personal diplomacy. Lindeke (2014: 196 – 197) discusses the 
setbacks of Namibia’s economic diplomacy with the US under the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), as it resulted in job losses after the closure of Ramatex textile 
factories in Namibia.  
 
Blaauw (2014) observes that non-state actors are not accommodated in driving the 
regional integration agenda in the southern Africa region. He refers to the role of the 
Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum in the EPA negotiations (see Chapter Six). 
 
Blaauw (2014: 406) acknowledges that in terms of regionalism in economic diplomacy 
within the southern Africa region, states play prominent roles. Since economic diplomacy 
embraces non-state actors, he advocates that there is a need to have domestic cooperation 
between states and non-state actors in pursuing economic diplomacy.  
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Hengari and Saunders (2014) contend that Namibia’s relations with South Africa have 
been characterised by differences on regional policies during the presidential tenure of 
Presidents Nujoma and Mandela. They state that this reflects acrimonious relations, 
especially after Namibia’s deployment of her armed forces in the DRC to assist 
government armed forces there, following the insurgence of rebels fighting the 
government of President Laurent Kabila (Hengari & Saunders 2014: 178). 
 
Meanwhile, Hengari and Saunders (2014: 178) state that the relationship between 
Namibia and South Africa became close during the presidential tenure of Presidents 
Pohamba and Zuma. The two countries took similar stances on regional issues, like the 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal and congratulating President Mugabe following 
disputed elections in Zimbabwe. 
 
Sherbourne (2013) discusses exports from various economic sectors like fisheries, mining 
and agriculture. These have a bearing on Namibia’s economic diplomacy, as countries 
that trade with each other forge stronger ties. 
 
White (2001: 391) states that new diplomatic trends witness intergovernmental (with 
governments only as members) and non-governmental (with private individuals and 
groups as members) entities sharing the international platform with states. Governments 
broaden the scope of their foreign policies to include the social and economic well-being 
of their respective citizens. White further emphasises that,  
 
The agenda of the new diplomacy contained a number of new issues…diplomatic activity also 
began to focus more on economic, social and welfare issues related to material well-being. These 
became known as ‘low politics’ issues in contrast to the ‘high politics’ issues associated with the 
traditional diplomatic agenda (White 2001: 391). 
 
The world economy presents an opportunity for states to have multiple channel 
communication systems characterised by formal and informal relations among 
government institutions, NGOs and MNCs. Keohane & Nye (1989: 243) term these 
relations as interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations.  
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According to Leysens & Thompson (2006: 91), the WTO operates on the basis of 
‘comparative advantage’, a theory which supposes that all states benefit from a free trade 
system in the world economy. This theory further advocates that states should allow the 
market to re-direct human, technological and capital resources, from one economic sector 
where there are constraints, to another sector where production for export will be more 
efficient. The shortage of products from the abandoned sector will be filled with imports 
from other countries. 
 
The post-Cold War global economy has witnessed the emergence of globalisation. 
Globalisation refers to the increasing level of connectivity between different entities in 
the international system, resulting in economic, social and political activities from one 
place affecting other activities in another place (Smith, Baylis & Owens 2008: 8). In the 
world of globalisation, there are no closed economic units but economies are open to 
other societies’ economies. Communication and technology are so advanced that people 
are able to observe issues in the world efficiently. Technological advancements expedite 
time and curtail distance which previously impacted on trade efficiency (Hoogvelt 
2001:135). 
 
With regard to the reduced role of the state in the economy, it is argued that industrial 
states have a control over their economies and are not bound by globalisation aspects as it 
is commonly believed (Rodrik 2000: 228; Scholte 2008: 465). Also underscoring the 
important role of the state, Strange (2003: 79) states, 
 
The role of the state, working through financial and industrial policies, is something that the 
literature from business schools, with their eyes focused on the corporation at the receiving end of 
policy, has sometimes underplayed. 
 
Slaughter (2008: 113), too, underscores the relevance of states in the international system 
when she states that a new world order has emerged, where states do not disappear. 
Instead, smaller units of a state-like agencies and departments liaise with their 
counterparts in other states and establish networks creating a transgovernmental order.   
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From the arguments of a number of writers cited above, there appears to be a general 
assertion that the global political economy cannot be managed exclusively by non-state 
actors. Thus, Strange (2003: 80) argues that the management of an international political 
economy is a combination of, among others, policies by the state and trends in the 
market. 
 
1.7  Gaps in the existing literature on Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
 
There are some gaps in the existing literature on Namibia’s economic diplomacy that 
need to be filled. Du Pisani concentrated mostly on multilateral economic diplomacy, 
which he said is guided by the belief that economic development depends on regional and 
international cooperation, as these present opportunities for common benefits (Du Pisani 
2003: 16). Aspects of bilateral economic diplomacy are minimally discussed as they are 
limited to one or two paragraphs in the publications. Du Pisani only referred to a few 
instances of bilateral economic diplomacy like the Protective Investment Agreement 
signed between Namibia and Germany in 1993; the Protective Investment Agreement 
between Namibia and the US in 1995; the financial assistance rendered to Namibia by 
Germany and Sweden (Du Pisani 2000: 308) and Namibia’s trade with South Africa (Du 
Pisani 1992: 61). Meanwhile, foreign investments in Namibia come from countries like 
Belgium, China, Germany, India, Israel, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Pakistan, South 
Africa, Spain, Russia, UK and US (Off-shore Development Company [ODC]  2008). 
These trade engagements form part of Namibia’s economic diplomacy and need to be 
broadly discussed. 
 
Although Du Pisani wrote about the interdependence of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, 
he did not write about the role of non-state actors on the conduct of economic diplomacy. 
He made a mere reference to the role of non-state actors on foreign policy issues (Du 
Pisani 2003: 19). Saner & Yiu (2003: 3 – 4) state that non-state actors are gaining a 
greater influence in economic policy debates, organising and lobbying across national 
boundaries to make impacts on international economic policy-making. In Namibia, the 
Agricultural Trade Forum (ATF), for example, has on a number of occasions engaged 
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government policy-makers and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, 
Natural Resources and Public Administration to influence negotiations on the EPAs 
between the ACP countries and the EU (Hoffman 2013: interview). 
 
The study by Mushelenga (2008) did not discuss the EPAs negotiations which have 
dominated the trade between EU member-states and ACP states. The discussion on the 
EPAs negotiations is important as this issue is among topical issues in international trade 
and essential issues of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. Further, the study has also not 
discussed Namibia’s economic diplomacy towards major trade partners like Angola, 
Canada, The Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the US (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013a; Namibia Statistics Agency 2013b). It will 
be important to conduct an in-depth study on bilateral relations with these countries and 
the performance of trade relations with the US in particular during the economic recess.  
 
The existing literature on Namibia’s foreign policy does not discuss the role of the 
Investment Centre and the Off-Shore Development Corporation (ODC in forging 
economic diplomacy. The Investment Centre and the ODC, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, are responsible for trade promotion (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 2008). The promotion of trade and investment has gained prominence in 
economic diplomacy that Namibia will endeavour to engage in trade and investment 
promotion programmes that will improve her competitiveness in the regional and global 
markets as embodied in NDP 3 (National Planning Commission 2008a: 153 – 154). 
 
1.8 Statement of the research problem 
 
Namibia’s independence came at the major turning point in the world history, namely at 
the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War changed the traditional foreign policy 
agenda of states. Shridharan (2002: 58) says that in the post-Cold war period the growing 
connection between foreign policy and economics became prevalent and states had to 
adjust themselves to intertwine their foreign policies with economic dynamics.  The main 
question that the study concerns itself with is: How does a small state, such as Namibia, 
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formulate economic diplomacy policies and effectively negotiate favourable trade terms, 
against the assumptions of small states institutional capacity limits, to comprehend trade 
settings in the international system? The main thesis of this study is that Namibia pursues 
economic diplomacy which adheres to the foreign policy principle that says she will 
create and maintain just and mutually beneficial relations among nations. Accordingly, 
she does not allow herself to be subjected to manipulation and pressures in international 
trade.  
 
Namibia is cognisant of the fact that non-state actors gained prominence in foreign 
policy-making. With the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America in the post-Cold 
War era, new players entered the world market and entities within the international 
political system adjusted themselves to forge links with new market opportunities. 
Leysens & Thompson (2006: 68) state that in the global political economy, the market 
and its actors are not easily restricted by states. There is a growing trend of 
interdependence where multinational corporations (MNC), business corporations and 
NGOs are increasingly becoming influential in economic diplomacy, to make an impact 
on international trade and investment. 
 
Therefore, the objectives of this study are to: 
 
 analyse the conceivable confrontations in pursuing economic diplomacy by a 
small state and how Namibia responds to these; 
 
 examine the role of the foreign-policy makers and institutions. This will also look 
at the broader capacity (capital and idiosyncrasies’) of the foreign policy agents 
and structures; and 
  
 attempt to determine to what extent the objectives and goals of economic 
diplomacy as set in the NDP 1, NDP 2, NDP 3, NDP 4 and Vision 2030 have 
feasibly been realised, using the theoretical approaches to the study of IR, namely 
Liberalism and Realism.  
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In this study, Namibia’s economic diplomacy is analysed within the framework of 
domestic, regional and international contexts. The first level of analysis is based on 
domestic factors, looking at the policies and regulations that are put in place to promote 
economic diplomacy and the role of policy-makers. 
 
The second level of analysis focuses on the regional multilateral diplomacy in southern 
Africa. This analysis looks at regional economic institutions like SADC, SACU and their 
impact on Namibia’s economic diplomacy.   
 
The third level of analysis includes international multilateral economic diplomacy 
focusing on trade negotiations at the WTO and the EPAs. Leysens & Thompson (2006: 
68) state that institutions like the WTO play a role in the coordination and regulation of 
trade for its member-states. In the second and third level of analysis, non-state actors 
have a role to play and influence the agenda of their country’s economic diplomacy. The 
analysis is made in the context of the dynamics of a small state. 
 
1.9  Analytical framework and research methodology 
 
The study of IR includes theories which explain state actors and their behaviours in the 
world political and economic systems. They are discussed in this section in order to 
determine the IR theories that are applicable to Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
1.9.1  Theoretical approaches to the International Political Economy and economic 
diplomacy 
  
There is enough literature on the international political economy and economic 
diplomacy in general. This literature is used to make a comparative analysis in order to 
comprehend Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
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Academically, the debate on International Political Economy (IPE) is centred on Realism 
and Liberalism as theories of International Relations (IR) studies. But other theoretical 
approaches like Constructivism and Post-Structuralism emerged in IR studies. 
 
1.9.1.1 Realism 
 
Realism argues that states are constitutive actors in the international system to which all 
other actors are subordinate and can be ruined by states. Powerful states use sanctions as 
a threatening tool, leaving their enemies with the option of complying rather than facing 
sanctions (Krasner 1999: 188 – 189). Realism-inclined foreign policy objectives are 
aimed at preserving sovereignty, safeguarding economic welfare and ensuring national 
security. Instruments such as war, diplomacy and economic actions are used to achieve 
these objectives (Holsti 1988: 124 – 127, 220 – 229, 251 – 253, 272 – 273). 
 
Realism assumptions are that the international system in which states exist is anarchical. 
There is no hierarchical authority and states therefore depend on the balance of power. In 
their actions, there are driven by the desire to pursue national interest. Realism views 
individuals as selfish political animals who are preoccupied with seeking power (Mingst 
2008: 63 – 64). 
 
Structural realists interpret the behaviours of states in terms of the international system 
structure. This means that they explain the world in terms of the circumstances that 
dictate the actions of the state (Heywood 2014: 76). 
 
This perspective will not be applied to this study as it limits the actors on economic 
diplomacy to state-actors. 
  
1.9.1.2 Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is another theory in IR studies. At the core of social constructivism theory 
is how to identify and develop ideas and change world politics. Constructivists maintain 
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that ideas play a great role in human behaviour. These ideas and identities in IR are 
influenced by transnational networks and non-governmental organisations (Kegley & 
Blanton 1914: 42). The key actors in international relations, according to Constructivism, 
are individuals and collective identity. They maintain that the behaviour of the elites 
shape the behaviour of the state. State behaviour is further shaped by collective norms 
and social identity. 
 
Constructivism avers that ideology and cultural values influence countries perception of 
the world and how they relate with each other (Rourke 2008: 31). It further argues that 
concepts like power and ethnicity are socially constructed concepts, through which 
people systematise their understanding of knowledge of IR (Burnell, Randall & Rakner 
2011: 30). 
 
Constructivism is sometimes referred to as Social Constructivism (Neo-Gramscians). The 
Neo-Gramscians are inclined to Realism, as they view the world economy as the 
embodiment of knowledge, ideas and institutions that serve the interests of dominant 
actors. The focus of this study is not on identities, but on the performance of economic 
diplomacy. Given this factor in addition to the dominant actors’ perspective which is 
inclined to Realism, this study will not adopt Constructivism as its theoretical 
perspective. 
 
1.9.1.3 Post-structuralism 
 
Post-structuralism propounds that concepts and ideas in international relations are 
embedded in power relations context. A link between the system and power is created 
through using ideas. In other words, power is created by knowledge (Heywood 2014: 77). 
Post-structuralism states that knowledge is biased because it depends of the social 
perspective of the person analysing the events. Thus, knowledge reveals the interests and 
values to which an analyst is inclined (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 234). 
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A post-structuralism approach questions the foundations of knowledge in the study of 
Political Science and suggests that the studies of political processes and institutions are 
not to be contextualised in terms of only ideas, but also the practice (Burnell et al. 2011: 
30). It differs from the positivist’s approach that says IR can be studied and explained 
better through empirical observation and reality. Post-Structuralism argues that empirical 
theory is a myth, as every theory is subjective, as long as it involves the study of human 
beings.  
 
Post-structuralism made a critical examination of dominant theories in IR studies and 
came up with its own framework of analysis. It looks at what constitutes political 
identities in order to come up with the link between identity and foreign policy 
formulation (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 238; Burnell et al. 2011: 30).  Because of the 
focus on economic diplomacy, the study apply Liberalism rather than focusing on issues 
of knowledge biasness advocated by post-structuralism. 
 
1.9.1.4 Marxism 
 
Marxism is another traditional approach to IPE which developed the Dependency Theory. 
The Dependency Theory maintains that the world is divided between the rich and poor 
nations, where the rich work hard to keep the poor weak in order to continue exploiting 
them (Rourke 2008: 378 and Woods 2008: 250 – 251). This will not be applied to the 
study. Although a small state with a small economy, Namibia does not allow her 
exploitation by the rich countries of the world as it will be discussed in the study. 
 
1.9.1.5 New theories 
 
In years, new approaches to IPE emerged, such as Institutionalism, Political Economy 
and Institutionalism.  Related to these approaches is Liberalism as a theory of IR studies; 
Liberalism considers the world economy as a base for inter-state cooperation. Political 
Economists, regard the world economy as characterised by competition among vested 
interests within different states.  
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1.9.2 Theoretical perspective of the study: Liberalism 
 
Traditionally, international relations and foreign policy are centred on the power of states 
and, thus, war and conflicts. States have been important actors in the international 
political system. This assumption is based on a theory of IR studies called Realism. This 
theory was challenged by Liberalism which argues that states prefer cooperation to 
conflicts (Hill 2003: 98).  
 
Liberalism, as a theoretical approach, argues that a number of actors, including state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), MNCs, NGOs and private foundations, have a stake in 
international trade. These actors pursue incentives and opportunities for cooperation 
(Krasner 1999: 185). Liberalism theory contends that when one state possesses natural 
resources or production capacity over another state, trade relations between such two 
states will bring economic advantages to both states (O’Brien & Williams 2007: 19 – 20). 
Since both states stand to benefit positively from their market relations, this comparative 
advantage is referred to as a ‘positive-sum’, contrasting the ‘zero-sum’ game of the 
Mercantilist theory stated above. 
 
Liberalism theory further sees the world economy as having the potential to integrate and 
allow free movements of goods. The role of governments is to ensure smooth and 
unrestricted operation of the markets. Open markets create a global economic system 
where there is equitable distribution of goods and services (Woods 2008: 250). 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, departs from Mercantilism by maintaining that 
economics determines politics but further argues that politics and economics should be 
distinctly separated. National governments and international institutions should refrain 
from interfering with the allocation of resources by the markets (Mingst 2004: 238). 
 
O’Brien and Williams (2007: 18) state that there are two views on the role of the state 
within the liberal perspective. Some Liberals feel that states have become borderless and 
their economies are increasingly integrating. They further feel that private individuals and 
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liberal institutions will dominate the global system. Other Liberals recognise the 
prominence of the state. This role is not fully tangible as it is intertwined in a network of 
interdependence and international organisations.  There are times when governments take 
a lead on issues of international trade. The role of the state on economic matters should 
not be confused with assumptions of Mercantilism that it is necessary to create alliances 
and establish hegemony. Moreover, the Economic Liberalism theory recognises the role 
of the state in ensuring basic order, facilitating the free flow of trade and maximising 
economic interactions, among others (Mingst 2008: 249). Similar perspectives on the role 
of the state are argued in the globalisation theory as discussed below. 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, further develops into neo-Liberalism theory which 
emphasises interdependence. Interdependence is a perspective of neo-Liberalism which 
refers to a system of cooperation characterised by reciprocal relations between countries 
or between actors from different countries (Swatuk 1991: 62). According to 
interdependence, states forge relations or associations in which they accrue mutual 
benefits, protect each other from potential threats, guard against imposition of costs and 
constraints from outside, uphold international law and order and agree on areas of 
cooperation that are economically advantageous to all countries involved (Hill 2003: 
175). Interdependence promotes cooperation among different entities in the areas of 
trade, finance, communication, environment and technology (Viotti & Kauppi 1999: 
215). 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, further underscores the role of non-state actors in 
international relations, as illustrated by Vincent (2006: 164) who states, 
 
Challenging realist theory’s traditional focus on the state, liberal scholars have argued that non-
state actors have a significant impact on questions of politics, morality and peace and that the 
surge in transnational activity witnessed in recent decades suggests that the state may not be the 
most important variable for explaining world events. 
 
Non-state actors are institutions outside government structures, but can make impacts on 
international relations. Activities of some of these actors include the provision of goods 
and services, lobbying, consultancy and advisory services, stimulating public dialogue 
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and mobilisation of public opinion (Vincent 2006: 169). Viotti & Kauppi (1999: 215) 
state that Interdependence is concerned with multiple channels of communications in the 
relations among states. It is about mutual beneficial relations between states and other 
entities, such as MNCs, NGOs and SOEs.  
 
Accordingly, this study will be analysed in terms of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. 
Over the years, non-state actors have assumed the role in the conduct of foreign policy 
(Webber & Smith 2002: 12). In Namibia, too, while it is mostly the government that 
takes a lead on issues of international trade, a number of non-state actors become 
involved in economic diplomacy, especially through participation in the bilateral 
commissions for economic cooperation. The study will then look to the extent of the 
involvement of non-state actors in economic diplomacy in Namibia.  
 
Meanwhile, orthodox liberalism’s main assumption is laissez-faire, where trade is 
characterised by free movements goods and services. Its main proponent, Adam Smith, 
has been opposed to protectionism and based his perspectives on interdependence, where 
states produces what they are best at producing, resulting in absolute advantage. Ricardo 
further expands on orthodox liberalism, maintaining that while a state may not have 
absolute advantage, it can still produce what it is relatively best at, resulting in 
comparative advantage (Cohn 2008: 74). 
 
Marx ([sa] 1: 4) states that market fundamentalism believes in the solution of economic 
problems through laissez-faire policies. Free trade provides opportunity to local 
businesses to benefit from market access, foreign direct investment partnerships and the 
capacity building necessary to grow their businesses. He cited the example of Eastern 
Caribbean states that are able to confront economic challenges because of the strength of 
their technical capacity which resulted from free trade arrangements. He argues that free 
trade agreements offer opportunities to governments to use them as motivation for 
promoting reforms. 
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Fauda (2012: 352) states that free trade further creates economic growth and more jobs 
are created as a result of specialisation in the production of goods and services where 
countries have a comparative advantage. He quotes Magee (1976)’s proposition that the 
benefits of free trade to a country outweighs the losses, unlike the protectionism that 
results in deadweight loss. 
 
Meanwhile, Interventionist Liberals advocates for the state to intervene in the economy 
as a result of the North-South economic divide characterised by inequalities (Cohn 2008: 
57. They advocate the removal of trade barriers by developed countries so that least 
developed counties can access the markets. Meanwhile, they propound that least 
developed states should be allowed to maintain some protectionism measures aimed at 
redistribution of wealth between the North and the South. 
 
Fauda (2012: 352) discusses protectionism from a disadvantageous perspective. There is 
no country that can supply its market entirely from its products, and when it adopts 
protectionist measures, this may result in retaliation and for small states with a narrow 
scope of economy, a development in that direction will cause damage to its economy. 
Given the retaliatory nature of protectionism, small states cannot afford to maintain 
Mercantilism, as they need large markets to export their products; they will rather 
maintain a co-existence of Mercantilism and Liberalism theories-inclined policies. They 
ask for infant industry protection measures and argue that such measures are only aimed 
at growing their industries. This means that they have a time frame since they will be 
removed when the industry grows and their production is sufficient to compete with other 
players in the global market (Kegley & Blanton 2014: 379).  The extent to which small 
states can adopt protectionism will therefore be discussed under EPA negotiations (see 
Chapter Six). 
 
The advantage of using the Liberalism theory in the study on economic diplomacy is that, 
like economic diplomacy, Liberalism is both a political and economic concept. Mingst 
(2008: 60) writes about Political and Economic Liberalism as some of the key 
perspectives that influence Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. Liberalism discusses 
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political issues of peace, democracy and security, as well as economic issues such as 
interdependence and trade (Mingst 2008: 61 – 63, 251 – 253). With regard to economic 
diplomacy, Goldstein (2003: 317) states that it has an impact on political diplomacy, 
since states that trade for mutual benefits require each other’s political cooperation. 
Multilaterally, the political cooperation of states has an impact on international trade. The 
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) (2008: 2), confirms that economic 
diplomacy (which is part of the overall foreign policy) is a political and economic 
concept when they assert that economic diplomacy has been used to influence political 
issues using foreign investments and trade. 
 
The disadvantage of using the Liberalism theory is that when discussing the entire 
spectrum and framework of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, there are elements that 
could cause confusion over the adopted theoretical framework. Strange (1992: 7) writes 
about states seeking to compete with others to have value-additions done at home. This 
aspect has an element of Realism which argues that states seek to maximise their 
economic potential versus other states (Mingst 2008: 261). Namibia’s position in the 
EPA negotiations (see Chapter Six) calls for value-addition. The idea is for local 
manufacturers to maximise their economic potential like their trade partners. This, 
together with leading businesspersons’ call for infant industry protection (see Chapter 
Four), should not be misunderstood to mean that there is an element of Realism in 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
The study will, therefore, argue that Namibia’s economic diplomacy is largely inclined to 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. 
 
1.9.3 Research methodology 
 
There are two major types of research methodologies, namely qualitative and 
quantitative. In this research, the qualitative research methodology will be applied. The 
qualitative research methodology is applicable to social science studies as it deals with 
human behaviours. It respects human beings as playing a central role in the world and 
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making a meaningful contribution to its system thereof, unlike the quantitative research 
methodology, whereby human behaviours are restricted by external law. In qualitative 
methodology, the science is based on reasoning, while the quantitative methodology 
explains science based on strict rules. The methods employed in qualitative research 
analyse issues qualitatively, with less emphasis on statistics, while the quantitative 
methods employ mathematical and statistical techniques (Sarantakos 2005: 41 – 42, 47). 
   
The research techniques employed in this study include primary and secondary collection 
of data and other relevant information and interviews. Kothari (2004:  96 – 97) states that 
interviews have a number of advantages. Information in great depth is obtained through 
interviews. The interviewer is in control of the types of questions and who will answer 
them. In this way, the language of the questions is set according to the level of 
understanding of the interviewee, thereby avoiding misunderstandings. As qualitative 
methods include the subjective assessment of human behaviour and attitudes, the study 
uses interviews as techniques for carrying out research and observations. 
 
Secondary data collection is another research technique (Kothari 2004: 111). In this case, 
the researcher should ensure the reliability of data by looking at who collected the data 
and the type of collection methods used. Moravcsik (2012: 34) states that, in most cases, 
qualitative research uses secondary data collection methods. Techniques applied in 
quantitative research include surveys. Survey results are analysed to interpret statistical 
relations of the variables (Jick 1979: 603 – 604). 
 
Mills (2008: 101) points out that qualitative research may use a comparative analysis, 
where data collected are compared and contrasted with other data. The data could be in 
the form of, among others, interviews. He propounds that such comparisons and contrasts 
are made to establish categorisation and regularities for observable phenomena. 
Comparison is further made to different societies, thereby understanding their 
behavioural aspects. 
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Types of quantitative research methodology include survey research and experimental 
research. Survey research enquires the characteristics of the subject matter, applying 
statistical analysis. They are adopted in descriptive studies and seek to describe and 
analyse existing or previously existing conditions. Quantitative researchers adopt this 
technique in field research and they adopt the experimental research in laboratories 
(Kothari 2004: 120 – 121). Respondents are randomly selected and the inquiry is carried 
out using close-ended questions, unlike qualitative research that uses open-ended 
questions. 
 
The approach adopted to explain variables in quantitative research methodology is that of 
applied estimate average (Mahoney & Goetz 2006: 229). Comparing the approaches of 
the two research methods, Mahoney & Goetz state, 
 
For instance, scholars from either tradition may start their research with a general question such as 
‘‘What causes democracy?’’…qualitative researchers will rephrase the research question as ‘‘What 
causes democracy in one or more particular cases?’’ Quantitative researchers will translate it 
differently: ‘‘What is the average causal effect of one or more independent variables on 
democracy?’’ average (Mahoney & Goetz 2006: 231). 
 
Choy (2014: 101 – 102) states that quantitative research methodology has disadvantages, 
such as that there are no human beliefs and perceptions, or depth experience descriptions. 
People’s characteristics and beliefs cannot be reduced to statistical analysis.   
 
Jick (1979: 603 – 604) explains the advantages of using a mixed qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies. He states that generally, in areas where one research 
method is weak, the other method will be able to compensate. But, he underscores that it 
is the qualitative method that plays a prominent role, as it elicits data and suggests 
conclusions to which the quantitative method will ignore. In a recent publication on 
research methodologies, Choy (2014: 101) states that in order to achieve better results of 
a research undertaking, aspects of one method may be used to complement the other 
method applied in the study, but it is advisable that the two methods should be used as a 
mixed research methodology in a single research undertaking. 
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For this study, a qualitative research methodology has been adopted. This is a new topic 
of research and Lin and Loftis (2005: 2) advise that when little has been researched 
before on a subject matter, it is better to use one method of research and not a mixed 
research methodology. Further, Moravcsik (2012: 34) states that 70 percent of the 
research projects in international relations are carried out applying the qualitative 
research method, as the use of statistical analysis is not widely adopted in the study of 
Political Science. Accordingly, this study adopts the research methodology that is 
common in IR studies. 
 
Between 2010 and 2013, structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with 
authoritative and influential high-level officials and foreign policy-makers, as well as 
stakeholders in Namibia’s economic diplomacy. The list of interviewees is appended to 
this study as Appendix 1. 
 
The interviews provided multiple viewpoints and a comparative analysis of information 
given by various interviewees was, therefore, made within the parameters of the 
qualitative research methodology (Babbie 2007: 296).  
 
The researcher, being a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2010, was able to 
access most of the envisaged interviewees and other government information on 
economic diplomacy. However, it was not possible to interview all envisaged 
interviewees as some repeatedly cancelled or postponed scheduled appointments. 
 
The study adopts the Harvard referencing style that is prescribed in (i) the UNISA’s 
research guide for masters and doctoral students by de Kock and Levey ([sa]) and (ii) the 
Technical requirements for quotations and referencing guide, also provided by UNISA. 
 
1.10  Importance of the study 
 
It has been stated earlier in this study that there is a limited number of academic literature 
on Namibia’s foreign policy. There is a significant body of literature on the foreign 
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policy of small states and how they pursue economic diplomacy. Leifer (2000: 12 – 13, 
25) wrote about a small state, Singapore, which has made strides in economic 
achievements and plays a diplomatic role in Asia. She has undergone economic 
transformation and survived the economic storms in the region. Hey (2003: 83), amongst 
others, explains how Luxembourg, despite being a small state, pursues a vigorous foreign 
policy. She compensates her foreign policy weakness of coercive instruments with 
attractive characteristics of a strong market and economic prosperity.  
 
Namibia’s independence came at a time of the changing context of international relations. 
Hill (2003: 11 – 14) states that the change in the international relations resulted from the 
end of the Cold War and thus resulted in the emergence of globalisation phenomenon. 
Globalisation brought new dimensions to trade relations because of the increased 
connectedness following the development of information technology. The year 2008 
witnessed the onset of an economic recession in the US which eventually had a spill over 
effect on other countries in the world. It is significant to study how the challenging global 
environment caused by the economic recession, impacted on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy.   
 
Webber & Smith (2002: 23) note that since the 1990s, foreign policy study approaches 
have witnessed the emergence of globalisation in international political economy 
covering issues of transnational production, exchange and communication. It is important 
to have a study focusing on these areas, such as Namibia’s multilateral diplomacy and 
bilateral diplomacy through trade missions. 
 
This study addresses economic diplomacy which is a component of the overall Namibian 
(a small state) foreign policy. Theories of small states argue that in small and developing 
states, institutions dealing with economic issues are largely involved in the execution of 
foreign policy than their counterparts in large states (East 1973: 574).  In post-Cold War 
diplomacy a number of government institutions, especially, ministries dealing with 
economic issues have gained prominence in external relations of their countries. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a leading coordinating function in this respect. Other 
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stakeholders in foreign policy come from outside government structures, like economic 
interest groups and non-governmental organisations (Barston 1997: 5). The study looks at 
the relevance of this assumption, by discussing key actors and the resources available to 
execute economic diplomacy. This study further looks at the domestic, regional and 
international sources of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
Namibia was colonised by South Africa from 1915 to 1990. South Africa was a non-
democratic state featuring racially discriminating laws until 1994 when the first 
democratic elections were held. A number of writers such as Landsberg (2004); 
McGowan, Cornelissen & Nel (2006) and Webber & Smith (2002) have written about 
foreign policy broadly covering issues related to South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
This issues have been analysed and it is important that similar analysis should be made to 
Namibia which has historical ties with South Africa. It will be important to see how 
Namibia, as a small state, pursues economic diplomacy to attract trade and investment. 
There is a general shortage of literature on Namibia’s foreign relations and economic 
diplomacy performance. This study will, therefore, contribute to the literature focusing on 
Namibia in the international political economy.  
 
This study will have a strong element of originality since the researcher, as indicated 
earlier, is among Namibia’s key foreign policy-makers, being the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and has been exposed to the foreign policy-making process in other 
capacities (see appendix 2). The researcher, therefore, has insight on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy, having participated in a number of forums related to the making of foreign 
policy and economic diplomacy. Knowing that his involvement in Namibia’s foreign 
policy may result in challenges of objectivity, the researcher has corrected this possibility 
and endeavours to maintain the study to be academic and objective. He distinguishes his 
roles of participant observation as a researcher on foreign policy and as a foreign policy-
maker and clearly indicates these roles where applicable in the study. 
 
A performance review of the role of Namibia’s diplomatic missions to attract trade and 
investment and Namibia’s performance in multilateral and bilateral economic diplomacy 
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will be made to look at the strengths and weaknesses of economic diplomacy. This will 
be useful to the foreign policy-makers to adopt policies that will improve the 
effectiveness of economic diplomacy. The review will also complement the envisaged 
review of the operations of diplomatic missions provided for in the NDP 3 (National 
Planning Commission 2008a: 273). In the present time of globalisation and economic 
recession, the study will be relevant to identify new strategies that should be employed to 
maximise optimal benefits from international trade. 
 
The study further attempts to fill the gaps in the existing literature regarding the role of 
non-state actors on foreign policy-making. In this respect, interviews were conducted 
with businesspersons to gauge their input on Namibia’s economic diplomacy and address 
the dynamics of collaboration between the government and the private sector in pursing 
economic diplomacy. 
 
Lastly, the economic diplomacy of developing states generally, and that of African states 
in particular, is a neglected area which this study intends to make some contribution 
towards. 
 
1.11  Scope and limitations of the study 
 
This study focuses on Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy-making in the context 
of global trends of interdependence. It focuses on Namibia’s pursuit of economic 
diplomacy in the southern Africa region and in the international economic system at 
large. The period under discussion covers economic diplomacy under the presidency of 
President Sam Nujoma (March 1990 - March 2005) and President Hifikepunye Pohamba 
(March 2005 - March 2015). 
 
President Nujoma’s first term of five years (1990 - 1995) was about setting the scene of 
economic diplomacy, mostly looking at western and first world countries. This was done 
through both bilateral and multilateral economic diplomacy, trade and investment, and 
foreign aid. His second term (1995 – 2000) and third term (2000 – 2005) added a new 
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dimension to diplomacy, embracing Asia, Latin America and the Third World countries. 
President Pohamba assumed the Presidency in 2005 and consolidated on the foreign 
policy built by his predecessor. 
 
There is limited literature on Namibia’s economic diplomacy, specifically, but there is 
literature on economic diplomacy in general. This literature will be used to analyse and 
evaluate Namibia’s economic diplomacy in the context of foreign policy principles set in 
primary sources such as article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 
(Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53) and the goals set in the White Paper 
on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004), NDP 
1 (National Planning Commission 1995a), NDP 2 (National Planning Commission 
2002a), NDP 3 (National Planning Commission 2008a, 2008b), NDP 4 (National 
Planning Commission 2012b), and Vision 2030 (Office of the President 2004b). 
 
1.12 Chapter outline 
 
This study consists of seven chapters. 
 
Chapter One provides the introductory chapter of the study. It gives the focus of the 
study and the analytical framework that will be applied. The chapter gives a historical 
overview of the Namibian foreign policy and clarified IR studies concepts that have been 
used in the study. Further, it spell out the significance of the study and the research 
methodologies that have been adopted. 
 
In Chapter Two, the economic diplomacy of small states, the distinction between 
political and economic diplomacy are discussed. The chapter further discusses small 
states diplomacy, both as a challenge and an opportunity, discussing small states with 
both typical and atypical small states’ foreign policies. The chapter states the typology of 
diplomacy that has been adopted in discussing Namibia’s foreign policy 
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Chapter Three focuses on the evolution, content and practice of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. The chapter also analyses how economic diplomacy as a theme in Namibia’s 
foreign policy was developed by the foreign policy and economic diplomacy decision-
makers. It analyses the economic diplomacy regimes such as the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) Act No. 9 of 19955 (Government Gazette 1995) and how Namibia established 
trade missions. The chapter concludes with a preliminary assessment of achievements 
made in the formative years. 
 
Chapter Four analyses key agents and structures pertaining to Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. It focuses on decision-makers in economic diplomacy during the term of 
former President Sam Nujoma (from 1990 to 2005) and the first and part of the second 
term of President Hifikepunye Pohamba (from 2005 to 2015). The chapter also analyses 
how key foreign policy-makers drive economic diplomacy and how the goals set at the 
initial development of Namibia’s economic diplomacy were achieved. This means that 
the chapter will also look at the role of policy implementing structures especially from 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry (including the Investment Centre) 
and other economic ministries. It will further include the role of SOEs and Namibian 
non-state actors in the country’s economic diplomacy. The chapter then proceeds to 
analyse how President Pohamba built on the foundations laid by his predecessor. This 
will reveal whether there are new major dimensions in the pursuit of economic diplomacy 
during the presidential tenure of President Pohamba. The information in this chapter is 
analysed in terms of the agency-structure debate, showing whether leaders shaped the 
foreign policy agenda of government institutions or whether institutions shaped the 
foreign policy of the leaders. 
 
Namibia’s bilateral diplomacy is analysed in Chapter Five. The chapter also analyses 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy within the context of major economic sectors and the 
importance of expanding economic diplomacy to various markets in the world. The study 
looks at the idiosyncratic (individuals and their personal characteristics) and capital 
                                                 
5  When cited the first time, the number and the date of promulgation of an Act will be provided. 
Thereafter, the short title of the Act will be used. 
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resources involved and the economic returns to Namibia arising from trade and 
investments. The chapter further discusses instances of challenges and setbacks in 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
In Chapter Six, multilateral economic diplomacy is analysed. The chapter then proceeds 
to analyse Namibia’s multilateral monetary, economic and trade relations and missions, 
looking at her membership of selected international trade institutions such as the WTO, 
and conference diplomacy such as the World Economic Forum and Smart Partnership 
dialogues. It also includes the country’s regional (southern African) economic diplomacy 
and, thus, focuses on selected regional organisations such as SADC and SACU. This 
chapter also discusses the EPAs, trends in the global trade system and how Namibia 
responds to these.  
 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter which makes an assessment of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. The chapter summarises the findings and makes recommendations 
for improvements in Namibia’s economic diplomatic policy and practice, and for further 
research.  
 
1.13 Summary 
 
There is a significant body of secondary literature on economic diplomacy discussing, 
among others, trends of economic liberalism and interdependence, globalisation and 
theories of the IPE. However, limited literature on Namibia’s economic diplomacy is 
available. 
 
The study of Namibia’s economic diplomacy is relatively new as this subject has not 
previously been broadly researched. The study will attempt to contribute to the academic 
literature on the foreign policy and economic diplomacy of small states and the 
understanding of the behaviour of small states under the emerging trends of 
interdependence, globalisation and economic recession. This research on the evolution of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy examines the dynamics of economic diplomacy such as 
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the actors, regimes and international environment in an African and an international 
context. 
 
IR studies are generally researched using the qualitative research methodology, which has 
advantages in respect of the techniques applied. Thus, this methodology has been adopted 
in this research. 
 
The next chapter discusses small states in a broader context, outlining the nature, scope, 
limitations and opportunities of the smallness of states. The chapter will further make the 
epistemological and ontological contributions to the study of IR. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE DIPLOMACY OF SMALL STATES: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS  
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
The diplomacy of small states provides the study of IR, diplomacy and the practice of 
diplomacy with new directions and makes some epistemological and ontological 
contributions to the study of IR and diplomacy. Therefore, recent years have witnessed 
the emergence of the literature on small states’ foreign relations and diplomacy. Writers 
such as Mohamed ([sa]) and Cooper & Shaw (2009) use the concept micro-states when 
referring to much smaller states whose populations fall under 1.5 million. At the 
formation of the UN in 1945, small states were not at the centre stage. Luxembourg was 
the only small state that joined the world body at its formation, followed by Iceland in 
1960 (Mohamed [sa]: 4; Baldacchino 2009: 23). The emergence of more active small 
states acting together in international relations, individually and/or collectively, has raised 
interests in the study of such states. 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the economic diplomacy of Namibia as a small state. 
In order to achieve this, this chapter presents a conceptual analysis of the diplomacy of 
small states. It will address conceptual analysis as a useful research method, define the 
concept small states, analyse diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy and apply it to 
the diplomacy of small states, analyse factors affecting the diplomacy of small states, 
identify opportunities for small states and outline the contribution of the study of small 
states to the study of diplomacy and IR. This chapter analyses inter-small state diplomatic 
relations, diplomatic relations with large states and diplomatic relations in regional and 
international organisations. The analysis focuses on how the smallness of a state can be a 
challenge and how small states can survive the limitations of their smallness. The chapter 
further analyses the economic diplomacy of small states, in respect of both bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy. In order to achieve the purpose of this chapter, comparisons 
between small states are drawn in order to illustrate the unique features of small states 
diplomacy. 
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2.2 The importance of a conceptual analysis in the study 
 
Researches result in the use of concepts that are fundamental to studies. Concepts have 
general meanings and there is a need to contextualise them within the framework of 
specific studies. Conceptual analysis, therefore, refers to breaking down the concept into 
a broader definition to give the reader a comprehensive understanding and broader 
picture of the study. Through conceptual analysis, readers get clarity and the purpose of 
specific concepts used. 
 
Du Toit (2009:  428) states that a conceptual analysis is made by constructing a model of 
small states. This is a hypothetical situation where there should be a general consensus 
and no ambiguity regarding the application of the concept. When a model is created, the 
elements that make up the concept should be analysed. For example, the characteristics of 
small states are main focus of this study. Since the analysis of concepts brings a versatile 
outline of related and contrasting meanings, it is the submission of the researcher of this 
study that the next level of analysis should be to look at an integrated approach to the 
concept, comparing and contrasting the feature of small states, such as their geographical 
location in respect of isolation or proximity to larger states. When a definition is arrived 
at by broadly breaking down the aspects of the model, elements of small states and 
comparative analysis of small states geography, it will enable the researcher to discuss 
aspects of Namibia’s economic diplomacy in the context of the stated model. 
 
McGowan, Cornelissen & Nel (2006: 17) advocate the need for conceptual analysis 
arguing that it should not be assumed that every reader has the same idea as the writers. 
Accordingly, it is imperative that writers define the concepts that they use. Concepts play 
specific roles in studies. Du Toit (2009: 425) argues that,  
Conceptual analysis is crucial for orienting oneself to one’s chosen field of research…is an 
attempt to become conversant with the basic tools of thinking and understanding, namely 
language, terms ideas and concepts. 
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In applying theoretical approaches to the study, it is important to understand concepts, as 
there are similarities for example, in the assumptions of Liberalism and small states 
theories. For example, Liberalism as a theory of IR studies, propounds that states are 
inclined to multilateralism, as it provides a hierarchical authority that prevents anarchy in 
the international system. Small states theory also underscores multilateralism, 
maintaining that small states are inclined to joining international organisations; this 
provides them with collective security (McCraw 1994: 8; Mingst 2008: 202).  
 
In this study, conceptual analysis is useful bearing in mind the scope of the research 
questions; it establishes the definition of the key concepts that are central to the study, 
like small state or economic diplomacy. Since there are various definitions of small 
states, it is important that a small state as a concept is defined in this chapter so that the 
study could be researched in the context of the definition given under conceptual 
analysis. 
 
Du Toit (2009: 435) further underscores the importance of conceptual analysis when he 
writes, 
So an important consequence of a successful conceptual analysis is that it sharpens our use of a 
concept, it leads to a normative definition of a concept and to suggestions about the use of concept 
that will clear up confusions and contradictions that may exist in the popular understanding of the 
concept ... [normative conceptual analysis] can be both critical and creative, pointing out to 
inconsistencies and disparities, but also suggesting alternative, new and innovative use of the 
concept. 
 
In a conceptual analysis of small states in this study, the researcher attempts to come up 
with a new working definition of small states which is addressed below.  
 
2.3  Small states: a definition 
 
There is no definite definition of a small state. The variables that make up small states are 
evolving. However, there are characteristics that are generally accepted to define a small 
state. These are the size of a state’s territory, the size of its population and a state’s 
economic strengths or weakness, measured in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Prasad 2009: 44). Udovič ([sa]: 12) adds that how a state perceives itself also contributes 
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to the essentials of defining a small state. McCraw (1994: 7 – 8) says characteristics of 
small states must include a low level of participation in world affairs. He further states 
that their scope of foreign policy is narrow and that they are inclined to participate in 
regional and international organisations. Part of their foreign policy focuses on economic 
issues and they greatly support the international legal system. 
 
Taymaz (2009: 3) says that during the 1960s, a population figure of 10 to 15 million was 
presented as an indicator that determined small states. By the 1990s, this figure dropped 
to 1.5 million, as the threshold that is used by institutions such as the World Bank and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, as a definition of a small state, while some academics use a 
higher threshold of up to 5 million. Scholars such as Sweeney & Derdzinski (2010: 38) 
reveal that, in some cases, a figure of 17 million or less is applied in Europe. Although 
the Commonwealth uses a threshold of a population of 1.5 million, it includes in its 
category of small states, four countries whose population are above 1.5 million, namely 
Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua New Guinea because they share many other 
characteristics of small states. These other characteristics that define small states are the 
territory size and GDP (Commonwealth & World Bank 2000: 3).   
 
For the purpose of the discussion in this study, the determining factors for small states 
classification will be a combination of at least two factors that determine small states as 
discussed above. Accordingly, if a country has a large population but its territorial size is 
small and it has a low-income economy, such a country will be categorised as a small 
state. This means that this study has come up with a definition derived from a 
combination of the author’s own defined population size, and in terms of other 
characteristics like economy, geography and own perceptions, definitions by the 
Commonwealth and World Bank and academics. The study sets the threshold of a 
population size at 8 million. In addition, the study also includes Cuba, Guinea, Haiti, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe. Despite the fact that these countries have respective populations 
of slightly over 8 million, they have other characteristics of small states in respect of 
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economic indicators and geographic size, both of which are lesser than those of Namibia. 
Accordingly, Table 1 below shows small states as per the definition of this study. 
 
Table 1: Small states of the world 
 
AFRICA EUROPE  LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARRIBEAN 
ASIA AND PACIFIC 
Botswana Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda Afghanistan 
Benin  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
The Bahamas Armenia 
Burundi Croatia Barbados Bhutan 
Cape Verde Cyprus Belize Brunei 
Central African Republic Denmark Costa Rica Cooks Island* 
Congo Estonia Cuba Fiji 
Comoros Finland Dominica Republic Jordan 
Djibouti Georgia Grenada Kiribati 
Equatorial Guinea Iceland   Guyana Kyrgyz Republic 
Eritrea Ireland Honduras Lao 
Gabon Kosovo Jamaica Lebanon 
The Gambia Lithuania Nicaragua Maldives 
Ghana  Luxembourg Panama Marshall Islands 
Guinea  Macedonia Paraguay Micronesia 
Guinea-Bissau Malta St Kitts and Nevis Mongolia 
Lesotho Moldova St Lucia Nauru 
Liberia  Norway St Vincent and the Grenadines Nepal  
Madagascar  Slovak Republic Suriname Niue 
Malawi Slovenia Trinidad and Tobago Oman 
Mauritania Switzerland Uruguay Papua New Guinea 
Mauritius   Palau 
Mozambique   Samoa 
Namibia   Singapore 
São Tomé and Principe   Solomon Islands 
Seychelles   Tajikistan 
Sierra Leone   Tonga 
Swaziland   Turkmenistan 
Somalia    United Arab Emirates 
South Sudan    Qatar 
Togo   Tuvalu 
Zimbabwe   Timor-Leste 
   Uzbekistan 
   Vanuatu 
   Vietnam 
   Yemen 
 
*  A self-governing territory in association with New Zealand. 
Sources: The Commonwealth (2000); Prasad (2009) and the World Bank (2012). 
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In Table 1, the characterisation of small states includes small islands, landlocked states 
and small states bordering with larger states. These will be discussed below to provide a 
synopsis of the impact of typical characteristics of small states on foreign policy. 
 
When small states border with large states, they cannot pursue independent foreign 
policies, because of their susceptibility to dominance (Cooper & Momani 2011: 114). 
Nedelea (2009: 338) corroborates this proposition that it is customary for small states to 
be cautious with their foreign policies when they border large states. Accordingly, small 
states will endeavour to maintain friendly relations, in order to avoid being marginalised 
by larger states and expose their inferiority.  
 
An example of small states bordering large neighbours in Table 1 above is Timor-Leste, a 
small state neighbouring a large state, Indonesia. Accordingly, Timor-Leste has been 
cautious towards offending her larger neighbour, Indonesia (Smith 2005: 16). Typical of 
a small state’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice, Timor-Leste upheld a neutral 
foreign policy and became inclined to the notion of collective security. Although Timor-
Leste has not concluded a formal military alliance with any large state, she has, 
nevertheless, welcomed the presence of Australian forces on her territory in the interest 
of collective security. Timor-Leste has been systematically postponing the end of the 
United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) mandate, so that she can 
justify the presence of the Australian forces as part of the international endeavours and 
her security. Australia made up 25 percent of the UN troops in Timor-Leste (Smith 2005: 
28 – 29). UNMISET was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 1410 of 2002 to provide assistance to the administrative structures and ensure 
stability to Timor-Leste following her independence. The mandate was initially for 12 
months (UN 2002).   
 
Another small state bordering large states in Table 1 is Nepal. Dahal, Sainju, Lohani, 
Sharma & Parajuli (2008:17) state how Nepal, for example, is a country that is 
sandwiched between two large states, namely the People’s Republic of China (hereafter 
China) and India. Nepal, therefore, has no other option than to maintain cordial relations 
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with her large neighbours. Bátora (2005: 18), too, observes that, generally, one finds 
landlocked states bordering with large states with high income economies and, arguably, 
compelled to refrain from foreign policy behaviour and diplomatic practices that will 
offend such large neighbours.   
 
In Southern Africa, small states like Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, cited in Table 1, 
are landlocked and depended on their large neighbours for their imports and exports 
(Bátora 2005: 18). This places a limitation on their economic diplomacy, as their exports 
arguably depend on, amongst others, the quantity of volume of exports that their 
neighbours with ports can accommodate.  
 
It is not always the case that landlocked small states avoid adopting foreign policies that 
offend their neighbours as stated by the literature [Bátora 2005; Dahal et al. 2008]. 
Botswana, for example,  pronounced herself against the legitimacy of the Government of 
Zimbabwe, following the 2008 presidential elections, a stance contrary to the one adopted 
by other SADC members, including, Namibia and South Africa, on whose ports 
Botswana’s exports and imports depend. At the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
Committee meetings held in Brussels in September 2008, SADC delegates called for the 
lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe, but the representative of Botswana made a 
statement that Botswana held different views. This signifies atypical small state foreign 
policy pursuit.  
 
Botswana was, furthermore, among the first countries to recognise the Government of the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya, after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi 
in 2011, a position different to that of her neighbours, Namibia and South Africa. The 
position of Namibia and South Africa was that NTC Government was not legitimate. 
Thus, at the AU’s Peace and Security Council Meeting, held in Addis Ababa, in August 
2011, chaired by President Zuma of South Africa, the Chairperson and the Namibian 
delegation, successfully persuaded the meeting, in refusing the Libyan Ambassador to the 
AU, Ali Abdallah Awidan, to attend the meeting. This was because Ambassador Awidan 
had written to the Chairperson of the AU Commission saying that he recognised the 
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Government of the NTC. Namibia and South Africa then maintained that the Ambassador 
could only attend the meeting if he represented the government under the Libyan leader, 
Muamar Gadaffi.6 
 
Neighbouring large states have their own security disadvantages for smaller states. 
Pollard ([sa]: 2) states that in South American countries like Guyana and Belize – also 
cited in Table 1 – they face the threat of territorial claims by their larger neighbours, 
Venezuela and Guatemala. He asserts that these small countries cannot face their larger 
neighbours on their own and, therefore, 
[They] are constrained to rely heavily for their national security on an appeal to the applicable 
rules of international law as a means of safeguarding their existence as sovereign states in the 
absence of capabilities to ensure their political independence and territorial integrity. 
 
It is, therefore, arguable that small states’ neighbourliness to large states sometimes 
creates a sense of insecurity, and it is not always that neighbouring large states brings a 
feeling of protection to a small state.  
 
Some states are remotely located and such geographic locations of small states further 
impact on the cost of carrying out diplomacy. This arguably obliges small states to 
embrace their neighbours in pursuing economic diplomacy. Meanwhile, Bátora (2005: 
18) suggests that small states that are not landlocked, such as Norway, have some 
disadvantages regarding making their presence felt in international relations. Norway’s 
geographical position isolates her from the larger part of the European continent and, 
even if she strives to work on her visibility, she is still only regarded as one of the 
Scandinavian states.  
 
Small islands, especially those that are located in the Pacific Ocean, are remote from 
major trade centres in the world (Commonwealth & World Bank 2000: ii). The 
transportation of goods from major markets to small islands is, therefore, a burdensome 
exercise and this hampers the enhancement of economic diplomacy of these states.  
Commonwealth and World Bank (2000: 5) further points out that, 
                                                 
6  This information is obtained through participant observation, when the researcher was attending 
the meeting also in an official capacity.  
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For many small states, like those in the Pacific, high transport costs make it harder for them to turn 
to world markets to compensate for the drawbacks of the small size of their domestic markets. 
And small domestic markets combine with large distances from other markets to reduce 
competition and its spur to efficiency and innovation.  
 
The difficulties of these small islands to access major world trade centres, arguably, make 
them vulnerable to partly depend on foreign assistance by larger economies which will 
then seek to influence the foreign policy of these small islands.  
 
Contrary to the traditional perception, however, many small states have surprised the 
international community because of their independence from large neighbours and their 
ability to chart their own course (Hill 2003: 294). The international political system has 
witnessed the perseverance of a small state, such as the island state of Cuba, which has 
remained resilient in opposition to her larger neighbour, the US, despite the latter’s 
decades of economic blockade against Cuba. Cuba retains trade relations with some other 
countries. For example, the European Parliament (2014) states that Cuba concluded trade 
agreements with 18 EU member-states, notwithstanding the fact that the EU adopted a 
common position in 1996 to restrict ties with Cuba, until the values of democracy and 
human rights are upheld. The EU is Cuba’s second trade partner in terms of exports. In 
terms of Cuba’s inward investments, the EU is the largest investor in the island country.  
 
It is construed here that the small geography, population and economy, which as 
determining features of small states, also serve as dynamics which impact on their 
relations with large states, but with some states espousing behaviours that are 
traditionally associated with large states. 
 
2.4 Middle powers and large states 
 
Literature on emerging middle powers has been produced. These are states which, 
although small in economic and population terms, are influential in their respective 
regions and the international political system and global political economy at large 
(Cooper & Shaw 2009; O’Brien and Williams 2007; Rana 2007; Smith, Baylis & Owen 
2008). 
 49 
 
Bezglasnyy (2010: 17 – 18) writes that the concept of middle power is explained by 
classical scholars to consider a state’s material possession in the international system. 
The state’s population, territory and economic position and the extent to which a state 
demonstrates political power are the determining factors. There are no clear definitions, 
as many scholars maintain that middle powers are states whose characteristics are 
between that of small and large states. Bezglasnyy (2010: ii) developed a definition 
which says that middle powers are identified by three attributes, namely medium-sized 
material capabilities, perceiving multilateralism as the favourable way to maximise 
foreign policy interests and self-perception. This definition is adapted to this study and in 
addition, this study sets middle powers’ population to be between 8 and 50 million. 
Countries discussed in this study, that are cited in the literature on middle power 
(Bezglasnyy 2010 and Cooper & Mo 2013) include Canada and The Netherlands, among 
others.  
 
The definition of large states is determined by the four characteristics, namely geography, 
economic size, population and self-perception. Writing about large states in Africa, 
Otaway, Herbst & Mills (2004: 1) use the criteria of mass land areas and sizeable 
population, without giving figures for the population. There is no clear definition in the 
literature which can be used to classify states as large states. For example, Cooper & Mo 
(2013: 1, 8) classify the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
as middle power but acknowledges that they have large economic markets. They further 
write about China and Germany as large powers with surplus economies. In Cooper, 
Antkiewicz & Shaw (2007: 675), South Africa is classified as a middle power. This study 
sets the population for large states to be at 50 million. It further classifies countries that 
are in the top ten list of the World Bank’s (2013a) ranking of GDP purchasing power 
parity (PPP) as large states, provided that they have additional two characteristics of large 
states as stated above. This means that when a country has a combination of at least three 
of the four characteristics that determine the classification of a state, it will be classified 
as a large state. Accordingly, for the purpose of this study, countries like China and 
Germany are classified as large states. Although South Africa’s population is above 50 
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million, she has been classified as a middle power in this study because, apart from 
geography, she does not possess the other two characteristics, self-perception as a large 
state and ranking in the top ten of the World Banks’s GDP PPP.  
 
2.5 Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy 
 
Diplomacy refers to the technique that is used to explain, exercise and advocate a foreign 
policy of a given country. Barston (2006: 1) states, inter alia, that the methods of 
diplomacy include the exchange of views, correspondence, lobbying and talks, among 
others. The objective of diplomacy is to shape the foreign policy into a specific direction 
in order to advance a country’s national interests.  
 
Political diplomacy is about articulating policies with a view to winning political support 
from other countries or actors who matter on political issues locally and internationally. 
Political diplomacy is conducted through discussions, summits and consultations over 
issues of security, governance, democracy and related political developments. In the 
conduct of diplomacy, one party would endeavour to influence another, for example, a 
way of presenting its aspirations and articulating its position on an issue, with a view that 
the other party supports or adopts such a position.  
 
Figure 1 below is based on the typical diplomacy of large states which is inclined to 
Realism as a perspective of IR studies. This research supposes that small states whose 
foreign policies are largely based on Liberalism theory have diplomacy practices as 
instruments of their respective foreign policies which differ from the one propounded by 
Du Plessis (2006: 136). For small states, there is no linear escalation. When political 
diplomacy and economic diplomacy are unable to be used as diplomatic instruments, 
small states resort to specialised forms of diplomacy. This entails seeking alternative 
allies rather than imposing economic sanctions against their adversaries. For example, 
relations between the EU and Zimbabwe turned sour in the 2000s following the land 
reform programmes which resulted in many whites of European descent, losing their 
farms through expropriation by the Government of Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the EU 
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imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. As a small state, Zimbabwe sought alternative 
diplomatic allies as a diplomatic instrument to send a message to her adversaries that she 
remains independent from them in continuing her relevance in the web of the world 
politics and economy. The Zimbabwean Government adopted the Look East Policy, 
embracing Asian states, such as Malaysia and China. In this respect, Youde (2007:4) 
observes that, 
In essence, Mugabe uses the Look East Policy to reassert Zimbabwe's role on the international 
stage to gain greater prestige and legitimacy at home and abroad…This project… contributes to 
the growing literature on the use and deployment of state identity as a foreign-policy tool for 
states. 
 
The diplomacy adopted by Zimbabwe in response to the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Zimbabwe does not correspond to the linear escalation illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1: Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy 
 
A) LINEAR ESCALATION 
Suasion 
          Coercion 
POLITICAL    ECONOMIC     MILITARY 
Diplomacy   Aid, sanctions   Use of force 
     
 
 PROPAGANDA  
B) UTILITY MATRIX 
COOPERATION 
(order and peaceful change)  
 
 INFLUENCE     DETERRENCE 
Latent suasion (deference)   Balance of power 
Active suasion (persuasion)  Projected threats 
Preventive diplomacy    1       2 Preventive deployment 
          DIPLOMATIC MODE         MILITARY MODE 
    COERCION                                      4        3 COMPELLENCE 
Diplomatic sanctions   Use of force 
Coercive diplomacy   Levels of force projection 
Gunboat diplomacy   Types of force projection 
 
 
CONFLICT 
(disorder and violence) 
 
 
 
Adopted from: Du Plessis (2006: 136) 
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Small states, furthermore, do not use coercion, deterrence or compliance as it appears in 
Figure 1. They are inclined to use influence which is discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
The conduct of economic diplomacy is the same as that of political diplomacy but the 
objectives of economic diplomacy are the advancement of a state’s economic interests. 
Economic diplomacy is characterised by striving for gainful relations that bring economic 
returns. Barston (2006: 134) describes economic diplomacy as the process of aligning a 
state’s commercial interests with its foreign policy. In economic diplomacy, country A, 
for example, will negotiate with country B on issues related to trade, investment, 
financial assistance or technological advancement from which it stands to benefit. The 
purpose is primarily for country A, in this exercise, to create economic opportunities for 
its citizen and grow its economy.  
 
The actors in political diplomacy are predominantly government leaders and officials, 
with the Head of State, usually, assuming a leading role in diplomatic undertakings. 
Other role players are Ministers, senior government officials, heads of diplomatic 
missions, diplomatic and Foreign Service officials. As reflected in the typology by Du 
Plessis (2006: 140), in Table 2 below, these actors conduct diplomacy through high-level 
visits, among others. The practice of public diplomacy gives an opportunity to the wider 
members of the general public to have an impact on their respective countries’ 
diplomacies. Under public diplomacy, leaders gauge public opinion and solicit the 
support of their people in order to pursue given external policies. Rourke (2008: 273) 
contends that leaders endeavour to create an image to the public, both at home and 
abroad, that enables the country to attain diplomatic success. Table 2 below outlines a 
typology of diplomacy that is used in the study. 
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Table 2: Typology of diplomacy 
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent 
FORM 
Bilateral Multilateral 
Resident mission in receiving state 
Diplomatic, consular and specialized 
representation such as attachés  
Resident missions at inter-governmental 
organisations (IGO) such as the UN, EU 
and AU 
Inter-governmental 
(state – state / state  -  IGO / IGO – IGO) 
 
DURATION 
 
 
                                                   TYPE AND LEVEL 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporary 
Inter-governmental 
(state – state / state  -  IGO / IGO – IGO) 
High level and ministerial visits (by heads 
of government and state, ministers) 
Ad hoc personal diplomacy 
(at ministerial and trans-governmental 
level not involving diplomats) 
Serial summits (Summits of the AU 
heads of state and government) 
Ad hoc summits and/or conferences 
Parliamentary diplomacy (UN General 
Assembly) 
Conference diplomacy on specific issues 
such as climate change and racism 
 
 
Non-governmental 
(at least one actor is non-governmental) 
 
 
Bilateral                                                                                            Multilateral                                                  
Multitrack and two-track diplomacy, involving non-governmental and transnational 
actors such as interest and pressure groups, multilateral corporations, NGOs, national 
liberation movements, terrorist groups) 
Adopted from: Du Plessis (2006: 140) 
 
 
In economic diplomacy, it has become mandatory to include non-state actors as role 
players. Du Plessis (2006: 122), for example, recognising the role of MNCs, NGOs and 
multilateral organisations in foreign policy-making, states, 
Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive prerogative of and targeted at states and governments but 
has moved beyond the ‘world of states’ to the mixed-actor environment of the multi-centric world. 
 
Non-state actors are also reflected in Table 2. The mixed-actor environment, especially in 
the world economy, enables multinational institutions to emerge as one of the strong 
actors in the international economy. The role of multinational institutions in global trade 
could be discerned from the increasing foreign direct investment. National economies are 
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becoming integrated in four main areas such as trade, finance, production and a growing 
network of treaties and institutions (Sachs 2000: 218). 
 
Generally, in the conduct of diplomacy, states are guided by norms of behaviour in the 
international political system. Norms are the standards and beliefs that countries uphold 
in their foreign relations. Norms emanate from International Law such as the UN Charter 
(Hill 2003: 178). Checkel (2008: 72) confirms this assumption and added that the social 
identities of foreign policy actors, too, determine the interests and goals of foreign policy 
and there is, thus, a causal link between norms, actors, identity and interests. The 
hypotheses are also part of the constructivists’ approach to IR. The issue of International 
Law and interests is not reflected in Du Plessis’ (2006: 136) figure on the instruments of 
diplomacy (see figure 1). Meanwhile, the assumption of Liberalism as a theory of IR 
studies is that the interests of a state are generally many (Mingst 2008: 72). This is 
arguably due to the fact that the plurality of actors results in those actors identifying a 
number of interests that the state should pursue.  
 
According to Liberals, the identity of foreign policy actors is that they embrace 
cooperation (Mingst 2008: 63). The identity of small states inclines them to comply with 
International Law (Papadakis & Starr 1991: 428). Accordingly, small states’ foreign 
policies conform to Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, since International Law upholds 
values of justice, peace and cooperation, among others.  
 
The assumption made on diplomacy, in this section, is that diplomacy, as an instrument 
of foreign policy, is aimed at achieving economic cooperation. Small states economic 
diplomacy, in particular, is inclined to Liberalism as a theory of IR studies as states 
endeavour for mutual beneficial relations without offending each other. Actors in small 
states diplomacy are cognisant of the limited capacity of their respective countries and 
they, therefore, generally embrace norms and behaviours conducive to sound economic 
partnership. Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy is interest-driven and, 
therefore, in pursuing economic diplomacy, a country will try to compete for economic 
prosperity advantage.  
 55 
 
2.6 Nature and scope of small states 
 
Proponents of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies have confidence in institutions such as 
the WTO as they maintain that international organisations serve to regulate the 
international market and ensure an efficient allocation of resources. Liberals want to see 
all states served justly in the international economic system and are disinclined to a 
different treatment of small and large states (Cohn 2008: 72). After all, international 
economic agreements and regimes serve the purpose of maintaining economic order that 
promotes cooperation (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 20). There should, thus, be no state 
that uses its economic and trade strengths to the detriment of other states.  
 
The diplomatic instruments preferred by small states are those that are inclined to 
peaceful methods. Small states, generally, avoid conflicts largely because they lack the 
capabilities to force other states to behave, both in bilateral or multilateral relations. 
Consequently, the interests of small states also differ from those of large states. This is 
also because their resources are different; the goals of their diplomacy differ too. 
(Papadakis 1991: 420 – 423). Small states, therefore, uphold Liberalism-inclined 
diplomacy. Yet, their diplomacy also illustrates elements of Realism as these states, like 
large states, do strive to enhance their national interests. 
 
The inclination of small states to join multilateral organisations arises from what 
Liberalism theory argues that is the desire of small states to be provided with security 
(Mowle 2003: 568). Kuchins & Zagorsky (1999: 10) share similar views. International 
organisations create a sense of collective security and they foster peaceful solutions to 
disputes. When small states join military alliances, it should not be seen in terms of 
Realism’s perspectives, about the quest for power but it is more an effort, on the part of 
these countries, to boost their security. Such a trend corresponds to the theory of 
Liberalism’s assertion that multilateral institutions guarantee national security.  
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However, the pursuing of economic diplomacy through multilateralism also has its own 
challenges. It is the proposition of Liberalism theory that in multilateral institutions, or 
any form of alliance, individual states should follow the positions of other states, even if 
such position is not necessarily its ultimate policy (Mowle 2003: 569). 
 
It is a considered proposition of Liberalism’s perspective of interdependence that states’ 
behaviours are largely determined by a surrounding environment (Moravcsik 1997: 520 – 
522). A state acts within the international political or economic system, taking into 
account the preferences of other states. Arguably, small states, surrounded by large states, 
would want to maintain interdependent economic diplomacy with their larger neighbours.  
 
The susceptibility created by trade relations between large and small states is rejected by 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. This is illustrated by Nichols (2004: 746) who 
stresses the need to adhere to the Charter of the WTO. He states that when a country 
disadvantages another with regard to the benefits provided by a trade agreement, the 
aggrieved state should be assisted by the WTO to be restored to its gainful position. He 
criticises the inflexible dispute settlement system of the WTO that it is unlike its 
predecessor, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which allowed for 
panel decision negotiations and where an aggrieved member state can exercise its power 
to vote against the panel report. He concludes that in this respect, the current settlement 
system does not promote the values of Liberalism theory. 
 
The imbalance in trade power relations between large and small states is discouraged by 
advocates of Liberalism theory. Cohn (2008: 74), for example, submits that even when 
one country enjoys pre-eminence over another, in terms of production means, the 
relationship between the two countries should, nevertheless, remain advantageous to both 
countries. This intrinsically points to the principle of the equality of states as sovereign 
entities. The dictating of trade terms by one trading partner to the other partner espouses 
virtues of Realism as a perspective of IR studies. Thus, Cohn (2008:74) further 
denounces unilateral trade policies and calls on the state to protect its citizens against 
such forms of biased trade patterns.  
 57 
 
It has been stated earlier in this study that small states lean on multilateral diplomacy to 
achieve their goals. This section discusses that aspect and the vulnerability arising from 
the smallness of states, as well as how they, too, can turn their smallness into 
opportunities.   
 
2.6.1 Small states diplomacy and multilateralism 
 
Another way to overcome their limitations is that small states are inclined to practise 
multilateral diplomacy. Accordingly, Barston (2006: 215) states that, 
Other small actors have sought security through a deliberate policy of joining as many regional 
and international organisations as possible, e.g. the Baltic States. The new central Asian states 
have joined, for example, both the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), despite the dual membership clauses that 
limit duplicate economic benefits. 
 
The above-mentioned scenario demonstrates how, in their search for economic 
development, small states pursue multilateral diplomacy with many international 
economic institutions to advance their financial and economic strengths. Small states 
further form alliances with other small states to address issues of common concern. For 
example, many small islands that face the threat of climate change effects come together 
to voice their concern against the emission of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Barston 
2006: 215).   
 
Some small states adopt associative diplomacy where they come together to speak with 
one voice on issues of common interests. Cooper & Momani (2011: 114) assert that when 
small countries voice their concerns at the UN as a group, for example as the Group of 77 
(G-77), they attract the attention of the world community. East (1973: 56) and McCraw 
(1997: 7) state that large states have initiated international activity on a larger scale 
compared to small states and when they carry out activities; they do so through inter-
governmental organisations. 
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Haughton (2010: 5) states that association with supra-national institutions give small 
states a sense of being part of economic integration. He further argues that these 
institutions provide prestige and security to small states. It is stated that Slovakia, for 
example, felt insecure outside the EU and her nationals did all they could to convince 
Europe that they were eligible for the EU membership. The Czech Republic felt that she 
had to shift from pro-Communist ideology to the West in a post-Cold War era. The 
suitable place to realise these aspirations was, accordingly, in the EU. This is because the 
EU provides not only political and military security, but also economic security to 
members. In this way, these states which as small states were previously aligned with the 
Soviet Union, are able to adapt to their international environment in the post-Cold War 
era. Ultimately, small and poor countries of Europe now belong to a strong monetary 
system (Haughton 2010: 23 – 24). 
 
The economic diplomacy of small states is also characterised by alliances and coalitions 
when it comes to issues pertaining to trade negotiations. A number of small countries that 
depend on agriculture, for example, have formed an unofficial alliance in the WTO to 
address the issue of agricultural trade liberalisation, especially as it relates to the WTO’s 
Doha Round of negotiations (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 161 – 162). This issue remains 
of particular interest to these small and developing states, as they experience the impact 
of an unlevelled field, with their developed partners who subsidise agricultural exports. 
Many small states such as Myanmar, Liberia, Somalia and the Central African Republic 
(CAR), have a high GDP share of more than 50 percent in the agricultural sector. 
Accordingly, they formed a multilateral coalition as an instrument of their economic 
diplomacy to advance their interests in global agricultural trade.  
 
2.6.2  Distinct diplomatic behaviour and preference for multilateralism  
 
The smallness of states has a bearing on their behaviour in the international political 
system. Small states are generally averse to conflicts. For many years Ireland, for 
example, had refused to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to 
participate in the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (Sweeney & 
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Derdzinski 2010: 42 – 43). Another example is the reluctance of the Danish Parliament to 
join NATO. This could also be attributed to the notion advanced by Thapa (1997: 12) 
that, while alliances can work to the advantage of small states that they become equal 
partners with large states, they also create a dilemma for small states. Small states will 
subsequently be turned into enemies, since by defending state A against state B, as part of 
the alliance, a small state inevitably becomes an enemy of state B.  
 
Denmark joined NATO in 1949 but she has been disinclined to the Alliance’s support for 
nuclear weapons. Doeser (2010: 6 – 8) observes that during the period of 1982 to 1987, 
the opposition in the Danish Parliament forced the government to adopt a foreign policy 
that was incompatible with NATO policies. Since the Danish opposition held strong 
views against missile deployment, whenever NATO issued communiqués that supported 
the missile deployment, the Danish government included in such communiqués 
dissenting footnotes, expressing their country’s opposition. Footnotes were further 
included in the NATO communiqués that supported the US Strategic Defence Initiatives. 
The purpose of such foreign policy behaviour was to keep nuclear weapons from the 
territory of Denmark both during the times of war and peace.  
 
Hey (2003: 84) states that because of her smallness, Luxembourg, for example, depends 
on the EU to air her voice. Her leaders admit that, was it not because of multilateralism 
through the EU, Luxembourg could not persuasively articulate her interests in the WTO.  
 
Apart from multilateralism, small states are also inclined to align themselves with great 
powers, in order to survive politically and economically. When The Gambia, for 
example, became isolated in the international community following a coup d’ etat in 
1994, she found an ally in a great power, Nigeria, and even defended Nigeria in the wake 
of international criticism, resulting from the killing of the Nigerian human rights activist, 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, in 1995. To advance his country’s economic diplomacy, The Gambian 
leader, Jahya Jammeh, invited the Imam of Mecca to officiate at the opening of a mosque 
at the State House in 1995. The underlying reasons were that The Gambia wanted to 
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establish sound economic relations with oil-producing Arab countries (Saine 2003: 124 – 
125).  
 
As a precautious measure to avoid conflicts, small states avoid offensive behaviours 
against large states. Brighi and Hill (2008: 128) maintain that such moderation on the part 
of small states’ foreign policy behaviours keep such states away from international 
conflicts. They further argue that small states, who behave to the contrary, invite 
complications and are bound to fail in their foreign policy endeavours. 
 
2.6.3 Dependence and limitations 
 
The foreign policies of small states espouse dependency. Bernal (2012: 10) notes that 
China and Taiwan have used development aid to win support from small islands. For 
example, China constructed the US$ 17 million cricket stadium and further promised 
$122 million economic assistance to the Dominican Republic, when she changes her 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favour of China. Other small states such as St Lucia, 
Grenada and Nauru adopted their respective foreign policies towards China and Taiwan, 
depending on where they stood to receive better aid. 
 
When small states depend on large powers for the supply of goods, it compromises their 
independence and they are, therefore, bound to be cognisant of political implications 
arising from economic relations. Ultimately, small powers would accordingly be limited 
in their foreign policy formulation (Vital 1967: 57). 
 
2.6.4 Scarcity of human resources 
 
There is a problem of the scarcity of capable idiosyncratic resources among small states. 
Both Cross-Mike ([sa]: 4) and Nedelea (2009: 335) corroborate that this limitation 
impacts on small states’ effectiveness and negotiating capacity. This is, however, 
required in economic diplomacy as the negotiating capacity is crucial in determining 
success. States must possess the capacity to influence the agenda of economic diplomacy 
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with other states and international organisations if they are to achieve the objectives of 
their economic diplomacy. Rashid (2005: 3) asserts this: 
To pursue economic diplomacy presupposes that there must be a pool of skilled persons in the 
government and private sectors to understand and negotiate key economic and trade issues from 
national perspective. Economic diplomacy will fail if there is dearth of skilled persons who are 
able to negotiate from position (sic) of understanding and strength. 
 
The pursuance of economic diplomacy by small states will arguably be constrained by 
the lack of skilled human capacity. This assertion will be applied in Chapter Three in 
respect of the first group of Commercial Counsellors who were sent to Namibia’s 
diplomatic missions. 
 
For states to be successful in economic diplomacy, it is claimed that they are required to 
have the capacity to gather and analyse economic and trade opportunities in other 
countries. Small states in Africa, in particular, have a high share of trade and are 
increasingly becoming integrated in the world economy (Dömeland & Sander 2007: 3 
and 7). The demand for core competencies in the areas of trade marketing and 
negotiations is, therefore, apparent. Diplomats involved in economic diplomacy should 
have the ability to make sound judgements on foreign trade issues and be able to 
communicate with both business leaders and government leaders of their sending and 
receiving states.  In the event of bilateral or multilateral disputes, they must possess the 
necessary diplomatic skills in order to negotiate for a gainful solution. Those that are 
involved in multilateral diplomacy should have the ability to pursue their respective 
countries’ causes within international organisations. Accordingly, Dahal et al. (2008: 2) 
states, 
Economic diplomacy is concerned with the prediction of outcomes of future trade regimes and 
therefore, it will need an understanding of market factors at work in a given global economic 
environment and in that process, a country will involve itself in making decisions in advancing 
economic interests. 
 
The problem of limited human resources capacity has reduced small states to being more 
reactive than pro-active in the international political system. Large states such as the US, 
China and Brazil, among others, influence the rules and institutions that impact on the 
global economy. Arguably, this means that large states have a remarkable status in the 
international economic diplomacy (Woods 2008: 255; Zahariadis 1994: 648). Small 
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states further depend on foreign capital to boost their trade, where they are not net 
contributors but rather beneficiaries (Haughton 2010: 21 – 22). 
 
The idiosyncratic sources of foreign policy and diplomacy are relevant to Liberalism as a 
theory of IR studies which propounds that the actions of individuals, whether leaders, 
private or masses matter in foreign policy-making (Mingst 2008: 159 – 160). This, 
arguably, includes bureaucratic individuals who formulate policies for the leaders. Thus, 
their exposure to issues as well as training is fundamental because of the stake that they 
have in the making of foreign policy being inherently allowed to make their 
contributions. 
 
2.6.5 Preference for negotiations rather than conflicts 
 
Liberalism as a perspective of IR studies is concerned with, amongst other concerns, the 
protection of others in the international political system and views the use of forces as 
mostly illegitimate. Liberalism is against aggression and the use of force by members of 
the international community (Mowle 2003: 568). Literature on small states supports this 
proposition of Liberalism theory which does not support the use of force (Papadakis 
1991; Sweeney & Derdzinsk 2010; Brighi & Hill 2008; Russette 2010). The refusal of 
Ireland to join NATO, for example, and the reluctance of Denmark to support NATO’s 
nuclear policies, as stated earlier in this section, arguably correspond to both Liberalism 
and perspectives on small states’ foreign policy behaviour. 
 
Papadakis & Starr (1991: 429) assert that it is imperative for small states to endeavour 
creating a good rapport with large states. It is in the similar context that the afore-said 
relations with oil-rich and powerful states such as Nigeria and Arab states were courted 
by The Gambia.  Liberalism as a theory of IR studies argues that state cooperation arises 
from the convergence of values (Moravcsik 1997: 525 – 528). This means that when 
states share common values such as the similarity of assumption of power between The 
Gambia and Nigeria, then there arise an opportunity for cooperation between such states. 
By aligning with oil-rich countries which are economically stronger, The Gambia’s 
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foreign policy behaviour confirms the relevance of the discourse of Abd Alaziz (2003: 
11). He says that a great proponent of Liberalism theory, Robert O. Keohane, claims that 
the desire for prosperity is one of the considerations of states. 
 
2.6.6 Limited use of economic statecraft 
 
Economic statecraft is an instrument predominantly used by large states which have 
enough resources at their disposal (Mingst 2008: 114). It comes in a form of economic 
embargoes, or in a form of boycotts, where there will be no imports from the targeted 
states. Some states apply tariff discrimination measures to treat imports from the targeted 
state less favourably and others may freeze assets of the targeted state (Hill 2003: 149 – 
151). 
 
This instrument is not always employed by small states as they are inherently weak. 
Mingst (2008: 124 – 126) states that economic state-craft is a technique advocated by 
Realism. Liberalism as a theory of IR studies encompasses a broad range of instruments 
in which a state can exercise influence on others and, therefore, it advocates non-coercive 
measures. Small states do not have the capacity to use economic statecraft, as this 
requires both political and economic power which small states generally lack. 
 
2.7 Factors affecting the diplomacy of small states 
 
Taymaz (2009: 4) cites four factors that negatively impact on the economy of small 
states. These are the limited size of their national market, a limited domestic resources 
base, vulnerability and a limited scope for public policy. Arguably, these have an impact 
on the states’ effectiveness in pursuing their economic diplomacy. A fifth factor, namely, 
identity (as a small state) can be added to this list of factors affecting the diplomacy of 
small states. 
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2.7.1  Identity 
 
Identity in international relations is identified with, inter alia, Constructivism theory, 
which propounds that identities of states and political actors within the states are shaped 
by universal norms, in the international political system (Reus-Smit 2009: 220). Identities 
are further driven by interests of states. For example, states that are inclined to democracy 
will have their actors identify themselves with the promotion of democratic values in the 
international political system. The norms of behaviour of democratic states will dictate to 
individual actors how they should behave to enhance their power. Checkel (2008: 72 – 
73) concurs with this when he says that identity and international relations are about how 
actors imagine the world as it ought to be and how they identify themselves and their 
states as who they are, what their interests are and how to achieve the interests within the 
framework of the norms as a determining factor for foreign policy behaviour. 
 
Reus-Smith (2009: 220) discusses the three mechanisms through which the identity of a 
state and its actors can be shaped. In the first instance, actors are shaped by how they 
think they should act in the international political system and what measures they need to 
employ in order to attain their objectives. In the second instance, actors appeal to the 
conventions as norms of behaviour which justify their actions when they take a position 
on a specific issue. Third, the normative structure in the international political system in 
itself serves as a constraining factor to the behaviour of state actors. This means that the 
foreign policy behaviour of a state and its actors are constrained by accepted universal 
normative principles to which a state subscribes. 
 
One of Liberalism theory’s main proponents, Immanuel Kant, supposes that individuals 
have an obligation to follow moral law which is the International Law. Kant further 
argues that states come together and bind themselves to International Law, upholding the 
convention and treaties governing the international political system (Viotti & Kauppi 
1999: 398 – 400).  
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2.7.2 Size of national market and a limited domestic resources base  
 
The territorial size of a country determines the availability of resources. This also impacts 
on the capacity of available resources within the country’s territory. Taymaz (2009:5) 
asserts that a limited resource base forces such a state to import goods when production 
and services are not locally available. This means another additional cost for cross-border 
transactions will be incurred. 
 
Limited resources render small states unable to mitigate the effects of external shock. 
Meanwhile, large states mitigate the effects of external shocks, as Taymaz (2009: 6) 
opines: 
Larger countries are better able to reduce the negative effects of imperfectly correlated external 
shocks to different sectors and regions. If a sector or region is negatively affected by a shock, 
larger countries can reallocate resources from other sectors / regions to the affected ones, or to 
move people from the affected sectors / regions to others. Small countries, of course, would not be 
able to apply these policies because of the lack of sectoral / regional diversification. 
 
Small states often have limited economic diversifications which compel them to often 
rely on trade and tourism. Prasad (2009: 47 – 48) states that unlike large countries, small 
states need to work on business strategies that augment their economies of scale. Thus, 
export promotion becomes relevant to their economic diplomacy. Because of their 
membership in the ACP, small islands, except Maldives, which is not a member, have 
survived, thanks to the yields from foreign trade. Accordingly, in their foreign policy 
behaviours, small states will be mindful of the dependence of their economies on foreign 
trade – it should be noted that large states use economic sanctions as a diplomatic 
instrument against small states (see Figure 1) (Du Plessis 2006: 136).  
 
2.7.3 Vulnerability 
 
Small states also have limitations because of their vulnerability. This is discussed by 
Narlikar (2001: 135 – 136) who suggests three major causes for small states’ 
vulnerability. The first is that they are bound to be part of the integrating economy. Schiff 
(2003: 3) also supports this assertion, when he says that small states become vulnerable 
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to trade balances, especially when it is larger states that are exporting to small states 
under non-competitive conditions. In such cases, large states will benefit from the 
removal of tariffs. 
 
The second cause of small states’ vulnerability results from the transformation of the 
international political system since the end of the Cold War. The presence of two great 
powers during the Cold War provided a balanced power broking, where small states 
could ally to one of the powers. In the post-Cold War system, the source of balance for 
small power’s relevance had diminished (Narlikar 2001: 136).  
 
The third cause of small states’ vulnerability is the development of emerging economies. 
Emerging economies are countries with fast growing economies whose governments 
favour trade liberalisation policies and embrace free trade policies. These countries use 
these policies as engines for economic growth (Hoskisson et. al. 2000: 249). Countries 
such as India and Brazil, previously organised themselves alongside small states to 
bargain for better terms of trade in the international trade system. In recent years, the 
emerging economies have their own bloc such as the BRICS grouping. In this 
configuration, they prioritise their interests as described by Narlikar (2001: 136): 
Today, there is a danger that as rising powers make their way into the club of Great Powers, they 
will no longer regard it as worthwhile to fight the cause of the smaller countries ... Small states  
now risk finding themselves friendless and alone. 
 
Emerging economies are increasingly invited to attend meetings of stronger economic 
groups such as the Group of 20 (G20) and the Group of 8 (G8). There is a growing 
concern whether emerging economies attending such forums do so to pursue the cause of 
small states or their own cause. This means that small states are vulnerable in respect of 
the world economy integration (Narlikar 2001: 135 – 136). 
 
The vulnerability of small states is further exacerbated by differences in their approaches 
to issues, especially when some countries maintain that negotiations are damaging the 
image and reputation of their benefactors. This is illustrated by, for example, the 
behaviour of some African states who received aid from the West during the meeting of 
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the AU PSC as stated above. Similar trends prevail during discussions on political 
situations in the ACP member states during the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
sessions.   
 
Environmental issues such as climate change, too, have an impact on the vulnerability of 
small states. With, for example, unpredictable rainfall patterns resulting from climate 
change, the agricultural production of small states is negatively affected. This assumption 
is supported by Cordina & Farrugia ([sa]: 7), who allude to the natural shocks on 
agricultural output. Moreover, islands states as small states are affected by rising sea-
levels due to climate change. In some cases, predictions state that these island states will 
literary sink which will result in the loss of their territories, livelihoods, lives and their 
sovereignty. In an effort to counter these challenges, some small states in the Pacific 
Ocean have concluded cooperation agreements with their large neighbour Australia.  
 
2.7.4 Limited scope of public policy 
 
Due to their weak and moderate economies, small states tend to have a narrow scope in 
their international relations. This results from the fact that most of these states are not 
able to maintain many diplomatic establishments due to, inter alia, the cost of 
maintaining diplomatic establishments. The narrow scope of foreign policy further results 
from the size of the bureaucracy. Generally, small states have smaller diplomatic corps 
compared to large states. Sometimes they try to complement this limitation with external 
advisors. This has its own potential danger as relying on officials outside the 
establishment does not necessary ensure that decisions will be taken on the basis of 
sincerity and, therefore, informed basis. Papadakis & Starr (1991: 427) contend that 
under such circumstances, small states are unable to judge their environment accordingly 
and are bound to act slowly when responding to issues.  
 
Capital and human resource constraints of small states arguably impact on the limited 
areas of focus and the efficiency of their foreign relations.  
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2.8 Limitations of small states’ diplomacy 
 
Large states often extend the horizons of their power and influence at the expense of 
smaller states to the extent that they threaten the security of small countries. This 
vulnerability, at the hands of large states, limits the decision options of small states. They 
have to weigh the consequences of their behaviour in the region and the international 
political system at large. 
 
2.8.1 Attitudes of large states 
 
Despite the advantages associated with multilateral economic diplomacy, it also poses 
some challenges to some small states. De Rosa (2000: 2) argues that Eastern Caribbean 
states, for example, face the threat of being marginalised in the global economy. These 
states lack massive production capacity and, therefore, rely mostly on imports. Due to 
their limited economic diversification, small states become subjected to unilateral trade 
liberalisation. Their production of commodities such as banana and coffee, is relatively 
costly and is only sustainable due to the concessions they receive from the EU as part of 
the ACP group.  It is argued that should the EU decide to extend similar concessions to 
non-ACP countries, this will impose further strains of the trade of Caribbean states. Thus, 
De Rosa (2000:2), accordingly, emphasises, 
The Eastern Caribbean states are accustomed to receiving trade preferences – extended by the 
major industrial countries (principally under the EU Lomé Convention, US Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, and Canadian CARIBCAN program), and extended by Caribbean countries to one 
another under the regional integration and economic cooperation arrangements that crisscross the 
Caribbean region. However, these trade preferences contribute to greater reliance on traditional 
exports, and, ironically, subject the Eastern Caribbean states to unwanted vulnerabilities. 
 
Bátora (2005: 8) states that the international political economic system is inherently 
characterised by stereotyping of small states by large states. Some large states are 
uncompromising in their perceptions towards the capacity of small states. This means 
that even when they conduct economic diplomacy with small states, large states will 
always behave in a manner that they are negotiating from a position of strength versus a 
weak partner. Often, large states dictate terms of trade to their small partners and expect 
these partners to accept their proposals, without much questioning. This does not augur 
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well for the sovereignty of small states. They are, therefore, challenged to strive to 
overcome the belittling attitude of their large counterparts. 
 
Qatar as a small state diverges from the stereotyping of small states. Cooper & Momani 
(2011: 114) state that Qatar is a small state, but it is a unique crossbreed diplomatic actor 
that focuses on diplomacy beyond the region. Her resilience amidst differences with large 
states and her visible presence in international relations will be discussed below. 
 
2.8.2 Constraints in influencing the international agenda  
 
While multilateral diplomacy provides security for small states, large states dominate the 
setting of the agenda of multilateral institutions. For example, the proportional 
representation of EU member-states in the European Parliament advantages large states 
over small states. Some Members of the European Parliament (MEP) from large states in 
institutions like the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, where the researcher of this 
study has been a member, tend to dominate discussions and behave typical of 
representatives of large states. However, one can convince these MEPs on an issue they 
can persuasively argue in one’s favour. For example, they have argued in favour of small 
states in the EPA negotiations. This aspect will be analysed in detail in the next chapters. 
 
Small states are often also constrained by public policy. They have no capability to 
influence terms of trade in the international economic system (Cordina & Farrugia [sa]: 
7). Similarly, small states have no choice over the agenda of international economic 
relations, rather they are obliged to conform to those agendas set by large states. Instead 
of shaping the agenda of their environment, small states would rather adjust themselves 
to follow the direction of the environment in which they find themselves. This means that 
their input in making a difference in the international political system is minimal. Large 
and powerful states are, therefore, described as ‘rule-makers’ while weak ones are ‘rule-
takers’ (Woods 2008: 255; Zahariadis 1994: 648).  
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2.8.3 Invisibility and weakness in the international political system 
 
Small states are challenged to concentrate their limited resources in strategic areas where 
they can yield some advantages. Melissen (in Gregory 2006: 1 – 3) supports the 
assumption that small states, with limited resources, are challenged in their aspirations to 
be noticed for the accurate cause. Leaders want to use public diplomacy to influence the 
thinking of the public in the interests of the system. Public diplomacy serves the purpose 
of understanding attitudes and behaviours, requiring strategies that ensure convincing 
influence. The dialogue between the leader and the public at various levels is, therefore, 
crucial. It is, therefore, suggested, that through their public diplomacy, small states 
should endeavour to attract attention and create their own visibility in the international 
political system. They should improve media management so that their achievements in 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy are known, both domestically and internationally. 
 
The smallness of a state is often associated with diplomatic weakness. When the UNSC 
resolved to impose a no fly-zone on Libya in 2011 (United Nations 2011), for example, 
NATO forces went beyond the framework of UNSC Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 
(2011) and carried out air strikes on Libya. Most African states, including small states 
such as Namibia and Zimbabwe, among others, condemned the attacks maintaining that it 
was clearly a violation of the UNSC Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), which 
authorised the imposition of a no-fly zone. At the meeting of the AU PSC, in Addis 
Ababa, held in April 2011 and 26 August 2011, African states voiced their concern. The 
position of the AU did not change the behaviour of NATO.  
 
Qatar assumed a non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council from 2005 to 2007. She 
maintained her independence and pursued issues which some of her neighbours shied 
away from. During that time, there was a conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Arab 
countries that lean to the west, like Egypt, Jordan and Syria, conveniently remained quiet 
and did not speak out against the onslaught of Lebanon. Qatar used her UN Security 
Council membership, criticising Israel and castigating the UN Security Council for 
standing idle as the battle went on (Cooper & Momani 2011: 120). 
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2.9 Diplomatic opportunities for small states 
 
Large states are conscious of their limitations; they are aware that they cannot always 
wield influence and patronise small states.  This is propounded by Keohane (1971: 162) 
who points out that,  
Possession of superior military or economic force cannot guarantee small-power compliance with 
big-power interests…lesser allies have not only been able to act independently; they have also 
been able to use alliances to influence American policy. 
 
Keohane (1971: 167) states that the influence of small states on the foreign policy of a 
large state, such as the US, generally depends on a number of scenarios. Among them, 
domestic politics of a small state should be able to support its strategy to deal with large 
state. Arguably, therefore, influential persons and institutions in a society should be able 
to make a contribution to the foreign policy-making process. 
 
2.9.1 Asserting the role of small states  
 
Positive self-perception is important for small states. It boosts their zeal to make their 
presence known in the world system. The Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, 
stated in 2005 that his country was a relevant centre in Asian affairs, albeit a small power 
(Chowdhury 2010: 9). Singapore’s foreign policy and diplomacy have been geared 
towards widening the web for her relations, in order to maintain close relations with large 
states and through such relations, play a meaningful role in the international political and 
economic system. This is contrary to the traditional perspective that small states have a 
narrow scope in world affairs. 
 
In response to the G20’s role in the international political and economic system, a small 
state, Singapore, organised other small states to address the concern of small states and 
safeguard their interests against flattening by large states. The process was started by her 
Foreign Minister, George Yeo, at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, 
Switzerland, in 2009. Subsequently, these small states established the Global Governance 
Group later called the 3G. Subsequent to that, the Singaporean Ambassador to the UN, 
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Vanu Menon, worked hard to win the cohesion of small states and expanded the 3G to 28 
small states from South East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East, Africa and Europe. The 
3G submitted a document entitled Strengthening the Framework for G20 Engagement of 
Non-Members, to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, where they called for a more 
transparent and consultative decision-making process within the G20 (Chowdhury 2010: 
6 – 8). 
 
Rana (2007: 122) confirms that Singapore is a small state that maintains assertiveness in 
its pursuit of diplomacy. Singapore’s foreign policy advocates innovation adopts 
proactive diplomacy, thereby increasing her role in geopolitics. Singapore ensures that 
her smallness does not manifest weakness when dealing with large neighbours like 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
Small states are increasingly conscious of their importance in the management of public 
international affairs. At the Global Governance and Security Council Reform conference 
held in Italy in May 2011, small states called for a democratic and representative UN, one 
that espouses values of inclusiveness, accountability and transparency. The conference 
was convened by the President of the UN General Assembly, Joseph Deiss, who called 
for a considerate and inclusive reform, cautioning that if some stakeholders (the 
vociferous of which are small states) are not satisfied with the process, it will backfire on 
the UN, as an organisation. Deiss (2011) cautions that, 
[T]he United Nations will lose its credibility. Our organization will be marginalized, and 
important issues will be discussed in other forums and groupings which are considered more 
efficient and more representative of the realities of the day. 
 
Deiss wanted a consensus between large and small states in the UN reforms and 
accordingly underscored that the role of small states on international affairs could not be 
wished away. At the meeting, it stressed that the size of a country does not matter for the 
purpose of partaking in global governance, but what matters is equitable representation, 
taking into account geographic dimensions. Small countries of Eastern Europe, for 
example, maintain that the number of countries in this region has expanded in numbers 
over the past years and that they deserve a representation on the enlarged UNSC, at least 
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for a non-permanent member seat. It is a common cause that small states will adopt 
alternative strategies when they feel that their interests are not adequately addressed in a 
given forum. 
 
2.9.2 Macro-economic stability 
 
The smallness of a state does not necessarily results in an inability to perform well 
economically. In this case, Taymaz (2009: 2) argues, 
 
Our analysis shows that small states may suffer from certain size-related disadvantages, but they 
could overcome most of these disadvantages by taking appropriate measures. Moreover, the 
empirical evidence suggests that small states, on average, do not perform worse than large states 
do, i.e., the size of the state/country does not matter for economic performance. There is no 
evidence to claim that the de facto independent states of the Caucasus could not establish viable 
economies because of their small size. 
 
The smallness of a state can also favour its policy’s efficiency. Vital (1967: 29 – 30) 
notes that against the background of a narrower scope of issues and a small number of 
bureaucracy, small states can focus fully on issues and come up with a coherent foreign 
policy. 
 
Botswana and Mauritius are small African states which manifest good leadership and 
stable economies. These aspects create an enabling environment for institutions in these 
states to grow and advance (Rotberg 2008: 1). This view is collaborated by Dömeland & 
Sander (2007: 3 and 7) who add Seychelles and Gabon to Rotberg’s list. They further 
argue that because of their ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), small states 
in Africa have diversified their export arrangements and are, thus, not susceptible to 
terms-of-trade shocks. They further state that if export services are to be considered, then 
the export diversification of The Gambia, for example, will be larger. The Gambia is a 
small state which exports tourism and financial services. 
 
It could be argued that, if a small state has put in place road infrastructure for smooth 
transport of goods and services, this will also enhance its economic diplomacy. On the 
contrary, if a large state does not have an efficient road network, its economic activities 
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will remain hampered by transport inconveniences and cost. Goods that are produced will 
make detours before they reach a final destination, where they could be traded. The time 
spent on transportation of goods is relevant to the turnover of exports. The efficient 
system of transport ensures high economic returns. 
 
There is an opportunity for small states’ economic growth arising from the tourism 
sector, for example. Tourists from large states and economies spend money on holidays 
and conferences which create affluence in the small states that are being visited. Thus, 
Taymaz (2009: 7) states that income from the tourism industry fast tracks a country’s 
economy considerably, in comparison with the economies of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, for example. 
 
2.9.3 Resilience of small states 
 
Qatar departed from the Arab states’ traditional relations with Israel and she started trade 
relations with Israel in 1996. While the Arab governments called for economic boycott of 
Israel, Qatar hosted the Israeli trade Minister at the fourth annual Middle East and North 
Africa Economic Summit held in Doha 1997 (Cooper & Momani 2011: 117 – 118). 
 
Being a small state does not deter Qatar to differ with her neighbours. In 2006, she broke 
ranks with the Arab Leagues in support of Ban Ki-Moon, the South Korean candidate for 
the position of the UN Secretary General which was also contested by Prince Zeid from 
Jordan (Cooper & Momani 2011: 119). Qatar further sought to broker peace between 
Israeli and other Arab states. In 2003, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheik 
Hamad met his Israeli counterpart, Silvan Shalom, in Paris, to discuss matters related to 
peace in the Middle East.  
 
Cooper & Momani (2011: 23 – 24 and 118 – 119) argues that Qatar maintained a 
balanced diplomatic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She used her regional 
influence to mediate between Israeli-Arab tensions. These tensions resulted from the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory of Gaza and the quest of the Palestinian 
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people to establishing their statehood. However, at the same time, Qatar remained 
committed and firm towards her support for the cause of Palestine. For example, when 
Israeli attacked Gaza in 2008 and 2009, Qatar asked the Israeli office to leave the 
country. While maintaining friendly relations with the US and Israeli, Qatar also 
maintained close relations with their enemies, Syria and Iran and she donated money to 
Hamas and Hezbollah, organisations that are enemies of Israel and classified as terrorist 
groups by the US. 
 
2.10 The contribution of the study of small states to the study of diplomacy and 
International Relations 
 
Epistemological questions in IR studies examine the knowledge of what we know and the 
ontological question refers to what is it that we are trying to explain, for example the 
inquiry of social actors in international relations (Devetak 2009: 163 – 168). It is further a 
critical look at the world order in which we contextualise knowledge in terms of the 
interests and the conditions relevant to ideological influence on IR studies.  
 
Epistemology refers to the knowledge and truth about knowledge. Accordingly, 
epistemological questions fundamentally examine what is and how do people come to 
know about IR. Epistemological debates focus on the analysis of objective knowledge of 
facts, knowledge of goals and the knowledge of the social and political world (Burchill & 
Linklater 2009: 5). Epistemological contributions to IR studies thus look at how we 
understand the way the world is constructed (Shibasaki 2001: 160).   
 
The epistemology of IR is discussed by, among others, rationalist theories such as 
Realism and Liberalism. Baldwin, in Smith (2000: 380), provides six areas in which Neo- 
realists and Neo-liberals differ in their views regarding the truth and knowledge about IR. 
He surmises that (i) neo-realists see anarchy as placing constraints on states, which is not 
the case with neo-liberals; (ii) Neo-liberals sees international cooperation as achievable, 
unlike neo-realists, who argue that it is hard to achieve and it further depends of state 
power; (iii) neo-liberalism advocates absolute gain, whereas neo-realists advocate relative 
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gain; (iv) while agreeing on the importance of security and economic issues, neo-realists 
focus on security, while neo-liberals focus on political issues; (v) neo-realists emphasise 
the capabilities of states, whereas neo-liberals emphasise the intentions of states; (vi) 
Neo-liberals emphasise the ability of institutions and regimes to manage anarchy, 
whereas neo-realists, feel that the capability of institutions and regimes in this respect are 
being over-emphasised. 
 
Realism makes epistemological assumptions about power whereby the world is to be 
understood in the context of the underlying power factors and the interests of nation-
states (Smith 1999: 48). Some positivists maintain that the knowledge of IR is based on 
reality and truth of history primarily through observation. This presupposition has, 
however, been criticised in IR studies. Wight (2006: 28) maintains that it is an error to 
assume that human cognition is an important element of truth and reality. Realism, too, 
does not subscribe to the causal relation between the social phenomena and the 
understanding of the world. Realists acknowledge that structural phenomena that cannot 
be directly observed are essential for explaining behaviours in IR (Marsh & Furlong 
2010: 30). They, therefore, claim that the world does exist independently from our 
knowledge of it. It has been posited that while empirical knowledge is essential for 
knowledge, it is just an element relevant to knowledge but knowledge cannot entirely be 
dependent upon empiricism (Wight 2006: 35). 
 
Scholars in IR argue that there can be no one theory of IR studies that explains the 
epistemology of IR study (Shibasaki 2011: 159). Scientific realism maintains that there 
should be no prioritisation of one method of inquiry to establish knowledge, but rather, a 
pluralistic approach should be employed in the inquiry (Kurki & Wight 2010: 26). This 
means that various methods of gathering data and information are welcome to establish 
knowledge and truth about IR. Thus, Realism uses both quantitative and qualitative data 
methods for causal relationships that are observable and, therefore, qualitative methods 
for causal relationships that are not observable (Marsh & Furlong 2010: 21). 
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Smith (2000: 375), however, maintains that the epistemological position of IR is that of 
positivism and it remains a dominant position with other epistemological assumptions 
taking a peripheral place. Positivism argues that the social world is open to the same 
analysis methods that are applied to the natural world. They further maintain that in 
analysing, these world values should be differentiated from facts so that knowledge is not 
influenced by normative outlook (Smit 2000: 383). 
 
Epistemology under Liberalism as a theory of IR studies includes debates over factual 
questions. Liberals argue that the knowledge and establishment of truth requires that 
different propositions are advanced and then scrutinised. This creates divergent views of 
factual matters. Within the framework of these divergent views, the truth will be 
established. A great proponent of Liberalism theory, Immanuel Kant, has done great 
work on the epistemological foundations of Liberalism as a theory. Kant claims that the 
knowledge of the world stems from the human understanding (Wight 2006: 25). 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies has a neo-liberal perspective anchored in rationalism 
whereby knowledge is created by aligning the inquiry to the interests of the state or the 
dominant group (Hunter 2002: 129). This study makes an epistemological assumption 
that, accordingly, in respect of Institutional Liberalism theory knowledge will be created 
by explaining and understanding the ideological interests of dominant groups, which are 
the institutions, such as SACU, SADC or WTO, for example. These institutions manage 
anarchy in the international economic system. They bring in place regulations that 
address disagreements and conflicts in international trade. 
 
Under neo-liberalism theory, epistemology concerns itself with who ought to know and 
how he ought to know (Hunter 2002: 129 – 130). It is maintained that anyone using 
scientific method objectively in gathering information has the right to know. Knowledge 
is created by addressing the problem question, by identifying variables and gathering data 
objectively that will be interpreted within the theoretical rubric which the researcher set 
to test. This study uses Namibia’s trade data (see Tables 7 and 8) to create knowledge on 
Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy and explain the data thereof (see Chapter Five).  
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Ontological explanations of IR focus on understanding the behaviour of the states and 
actors in the world (Burchill & Linklater 2009: 12). In ontological metaphysics, the prime 
component of analysis is an individual (Fierke 2010: 180). 
 
Smith (2000: 380) argues that both Realism and Liberalism, as theories of IR studies, and 
as part of rationalism, share ontological similarities. Accordingly, four issues in which 
Neo-liberal and Neo-realists agree on the world are that: (i) they do not present the world 
as revolving around statecraft; (ii) states seek to maximise their values; (iii) states are 
primary actors in IR; and (iv) both theories move beyond the dichotomy between conflict 
and cooperation. 
 
Realists make an ontological claim, that individuals, in the international system, are 
preoccupied with power (George 2007: 33). Philosophical Realism supposes that social 
objects in IR depends on persons that they do not exist independently (Wight 2006: 26). 
Accordingly, this interrelation makes the behaviour of individuals an important aspect of 
scientific enquiry. 
 
Realism’s ontological claim is that individuals are driven by power and security. The 
fundamental elements of the Realists’ world are contextualised within the framework of 
striving for power (George 2007: 33). Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz treat states as 
individuals that are pre-occupied with self-interest and survival (Fierke 2010: 180). 
  
Immanuel Kant, a proponent of Liberalism theory, makes an ontological claim that 
individuals in the international system do possess rational and moral judgements that 
incline them to justice (George 2007: 33). Liberals further argue that social structures in 
the international system cannot exist independently from actors within the system. 
Further, the agents in the structure have a clear mind of the activities that are governed by 
the social structure (Wight 2006: 53). Thus, when diplomats are engaged in trade 
negotiations, they would have a concept of what brings mutual benefits to their states. 
Mutual benefits create justice among trade partners, especially in respect of Liberalism 
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theory’s proposition of absolute advantages as opposed to relative gains (Cohn 2008: 
196; Burchill 2009: 67). 
 
Neo-liberals maintain that individuals have ideas that are poised toward problem-solving 
(Fierke 2010: 180). Accordingly, they will embrace cooperation and will not always 
adopt deterrence, coercion and compellence as methods of diplomacy (see Figure 1). 
 
The contribution that this study makes to IR studies is to discuss small states foreign 
policy behaviour within the framework of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. Whilst it 
is acknowledged that there is equality of sovereignty, there exist hierarchical relations 
among small and large states that large states tend to dominate the interactions with small 
states, both in terms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Some small states have 
demonstrated qualities of large states by turning their smallness into opportunities with 
respect to asserting their role in international relations and adopting foreign policies, 
independent from influence by large states (see section 2.9 of this chapter). 
 
Liberalism theory’s perspective on small states diplomacy is that these states tend to 
embrace cooperation rather than conflicts. There are no aggressive or hegemonic 
intentions towards each other. They espouse multilateral diplomacy as this gives them a 
sense of security and it boosts the trends of cooperation which is vital for their growth in 
international trade. Non-state actors are allowed to participate in the direction of the 
flows of trade, both nationally and internationally (Tavora [sa]: 5 – 7). 
 
This study is about economic diplomacy of Namibia as a small state. It is construed under 
this chapter that the determining factors of the smallness of a state are geography, 
population, economy and own perception of being small. A combination of three of these 
characters, namely the population size, economic capacity and perception by Namibian 
leaders, makes Namibia a small state, albeit geographically, she is larger than countries 
like Belgium, for example. Ordinarily, the smallness of states invariably impacts on their 
behaviour which includes avoiding tensions and differences with large states and leaning 
towards multilateralism, among others. This study will establish whether Namibia’s co-
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existence in the international political and economic system with large states espouse 
behavioural trends of small states or demonstrates some traits that are beyond small states 
diplomacy. 
 
Globalisation is another theme IR studies focus in the recent years and it is relevant to 
this study. Its contribution to economic diplomacy is discussed by Williams (2007: 239), 
who writes about the three features of contemporary globalisation, namely the broadening 
and accelerating worldwide interconnectedness, the multifaceted nature of globalisation 
covering many spheres of political and socio-economic studies and the normative 
dimension that it brings to IR. Globalisation gives rise to the role of multilateral 
economic institutions in the integrated world economy. 
 
The contribution of globalisation to normative IR studies is illustrated by trends to 
advocate justice, fairness and equity in the global trade system. These come mainly from 
globalisation critics. Stiglitz (2006: 82 – 83), for example, contends that there is a need to 
manage globalisation since the rules governing it are set by the developed countries for 
their own interests. Globalisation essentials such as agricultural products subsidies have 
been censured because of the unequal competitive edge that it has on the agricultural 
products from developing countries. This study will look at these issues in Chapter Six, 
when it discusses multilateral economic diplomacy, especially the EPAs negotiations and 
WTO. 
 
Stiglitz (2006: 62) further posits that there are calls for trade liberalisation to ensure that 
developed countries’ economies are opened up to exports from developing countries.  
This comes after inequalities resulting from free trade, whereby, developing countries 
had opened their economies to developed countries. However, it has been difficult for the 
products from developed countries to access the markets in developing countries as the 
latter remained with some obstacles in place, such as trade barriers.  
 
Globalisation is better discussed by Liberalism as perspective of IR studies than by 
Realism. Williams (2007: 240) asserts that Liberalism theory recognises the role of 
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multilateral economic institutions on economic integration through the promotion of 
cooperation. They believe that these institutions were created to address the economic 
vulnerability of states and, therefore, they promote mutual benefits of member-states.  
 
2.11 Summary 
 
Economic diplomacy is a distinct form of diplomacy as its objectives and interests differ 
from other forms of diplomacy. Although all types of diplomacy involve a number of 
actors, the degree of influence by non-state actors on economic diplomacy is larger than 
the influence of non-state actors on political diplomacy. This is due to the fact that 
government leaders are more interested in shaping political diplomacy. Barston (2006: 9) 
states that Heads of State become involved in central foreign policy issues, enhancing 
their personal diplomacy, while overshadowing their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This 
trend is, however, not prevalent in economic diplomacy, as this exercise is left more to 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Trade, their officials and a number of influential 
businesspersons.  
 
The economic diplomacy of small states is subjected to challenges resulting from, 
amongst others, geographic location and economic abilities. They are, therefore, in most 
cases, likely to avoid alienating their neighbouring large states and calculate their 
behaviour in the international political and economic system. Unlike large states, small 
states do not use statecraft in their economic diplomacy. This is a trend observed only in 
respect of large states. It comes in a range of economic sanctions such as an embargo, 
where a ban on trade or exports to a targeted state is imposed. For example, the US had 
imposed embargoes against Cuba for many years which the US has now undertaken to 
lift.  
 
Because of their inherent nature of avoiding conflicts, small states refrain from using 
statecraft except when acting in a group such as the EU, but they mostly employ such 
measures against other small states and unlikely against large states. Russette (2010: 105) 
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postulates that it is the contention of Liberalism theory that weaker states generally 
refrain from conflicts because of their vulnerability.  
 
Many of the small states would rely on multilateral institutions such as WTO to address 
their trade grievances. This gives the economic diplomacy of small states a posture of 
Liberalism theory. Small states can, however, use this posture to their advantage, for 
example, by forming partnerships and coalitions in order to speak with one voice in trade 
negotiations. Large economies conduct a Realism-inclined economic diplomacy towards 
small economies, including threatening them with sanctions.  
 
The smallness of state does not always mean vulnerability. Small states also use their 
smallness as opportunities, playing large powers against each other and allying with 
opposing large states as the dynamics of changing foreign policy unfolds. For example, 
when faced with threats of economic statecraft, small states can outsmart such a 
diplomatic predicament by aligning with a large economy to mitigate the disadvantages 
that arise from strained economic relations with another large economy which has turned 
into an adversary. 
 
Some small states have macroeconomic stability that enables them to enhance economic 
diplomacy because of the attractive infrastructure that they have put in place. They 
further use tourism among other sectors to attract capital and promote FDIs. 
 
Small countries maintain resilience, taking centre stage in international affairs and 
making their presence visible. Resilient small states further pursue independent foreign 
policies that are unfettered by large neighbours. Botswana and Qatar are examples of 
such small state that remain firm to their positions irrespective of the positions taken by 
other states in their respective regions. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the evolution of Namibia’s economic diplomacy during the 
country’s formative years, from independence, against the background of this chapter’s 
conceptual and theoretical framework. It will cover the foreign policy setting for 
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economic diplomacy in respect of agenda and purposes, the instruments of economic 
diplomacy, their advantages and disadvantages and the successes and failures of 
economic diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF NAMIBIA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, 1990 
TO 1995  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The foreign policy-making process of a pre-independent Namibia did not focus on 
economic diplomacy. Prior to independence, SWAPO, which had been recognised by the 
UNGA Resolution 31/152 (1976) as the “sole and authentic representative of the 
Namibian people” (United Nations 1976), did not have programmes related to forging 
diplomatic ties for economic reasons. However, since its formation in 1960, SWAPO, as 
a liberation movement fighting for Namibia’s independence, established diplomatic 
relations with a number of countries and opened offices in countries including the USSR, 
the US, the UK, and France, who are Permanent Members of the UNSC. These relations 
were mainly to solicit political solidarity and campaign for material support to assist with 
waging the armed liberation struggle and further to garner diplomatic support to isolate 
South Africa within the international community (Gurirab 2010: interview).  
 
The only element of economic diplomacy which featured during the pre-independence 
foreign policy-making process was during the conference that was convened by the 
Nordic countries in 1988, to discuss Namibia’s independence. During this conference, 
Nordic countries discussed possible areas of cooperation with Namibia when she became 
independent (Gurirab 2010: interview). These areas were later to serve as the basis of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with the Nordic countries and these are discussed below. 
 
This chapter analyses the evolution of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, starting from the 
country’s independence on 21 March 1990 until 1995. This period is referred to as the 
‘formative years’ of the country’ early economic diplomacy. The year 1995 was chosen 
as that is when the term of the first government ended. The government term covers a 
period of five years. Chapters Four to Six will extend the period of the practice of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy to 2013. Where relevant, references to earlier examples 
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of SWAPO and South Africa’s economic diplomacy will be made to contextualise the 
evolution of Namibia’s early economic diplomacy. The chapter discusses the agenda 
setting and purposes of economic diplomacy, the introduction of economic diplomacy, 
the promotion of manufacturing industry and regional economic diplomacy and 
instruments of diplomacy, like legislation and policies. The chapter further analyses the 
evolution of Namibia’s economic diplomacy in the context of the framework of the 
typology of Du Plessis (2006: 140) (see Chapter Two). These are permanent diplomatic 
forms by way of opening embassies and temporary forms such as high level visits, 
summits and conference diplomacy. Added to temporary diplomacy is a mode of 
diplomacy that Du Plessis (2006) did not state (see Figure 1), namely re-circling 
diplomacy. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the successes and failures of 
Namibia’s early economic diplomacy. 
 
3.2 Namibia’s economic status at independence 
 
Several aspects determined Namibia’s economic status at independence. These include 
the smallness of its economy, the colonial-type nature of the economy, foreign debt, low 
development indicators and economic sanctions – the latter being a legacy of its 
dominance by apartheid South Africa.  
 
The Namibian economy at independence in 1990 was described by the first post-
independence Minister of Finance, Otto Herigel, as a siege economy with huge disparities 
where the colonial government neglected areas such as industrialisation, agriculture and 
food sufficiency (National Assembly 1991: 137). At independence, the economy was not 
diversified, but the GDP was largely generated by three main sectors - agriculture, 
mining and government (Sherbourne 2009: 14). 
 
At independence Namibia was classified by the IMF and the World Bank as a lower 
middle income country. The economy has improved over the years and as of June 2010, 
she has been classified as an upper middle income country (Ministry of Finance 2015). 
Table 3 shows Namibia’s indicators at independence and in the recent years. The purpose 
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is to indicate how the primary and secondary industries have performed since 
independence. The difference with one number in the total figure in a given sector is a 
result of the figure’s round-off.  
 
Table 3: Namibia’s Gross Domestic Product by activity (1989-2011) (current prices 
– N$ millions) 
 
Industry   1990 1991 1992 1995 2010 2011 
Agriculture and Forestry 
                  Commercial 
                  Subsistence 
Fishing 
Mining and Quarrying 
                   Diamond mining 
                   Other mining and quarrying 
    500 
    329 
    171 
    154 
1, 071 
    554 
    517 
    601 
    378 
    223 
    224 
1, 085 
    722 
    362 
     402 
     273 
     129 
     291 
  1 079 
     775 
     304 
     872 
     517 
     355 
     491 
  1 058 
     763 
     295 
  3 360 
  1 805 
  1 555 
  2 539 
  6 882 
  4 042 
  2 840 
  3 770 
  2 146 
  1 607 
  2 709 
  8 659 
  6 567 
  2 092 
Primary industries 1, 724 1, 910   1 772   2 421 12 781 15 139 
Manufacturing 
Meat processing 
Fish processing 
Other food products and beverages 
Other manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
    750 
      77 
    146 
      - 
    527 
    138 
    146 
    786 
    100 
      99 
      - 
    587 
    136 
    153 
     975 
     112 
     197 
   - 
     666 
     207 
     228 
  1 461 
     123 
     390 
     539 
     409 
     260 
     360 
10 582 
     181 
       60 
  4 410 
  5 930 
  2 077 
  2 712 
11 034 
     189 
     548 
  4 790 
  5 506 
  2 509 
  3 229 
Secondary industries 1, 034 1, 074 1 409   2 081 15 370 16 772 
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 
Hotels and restaurants 
Transport and communication 
Finance, real estate, business services 
Community, social and personal service 
activities 
Producers of government services 
Other producers 
    492 
      78 
    438 
    771 
       
      48 
1, 242 
    138 
    550 
      96 
    474 
    888 
      
      58 
1, 574 
    157 
     680 
     123 
     555 
  1 077 
 
       65 
  1 987 
     188 
  1 077 
     217 
     851 
  1 555 
     
     114 
  2 780 
     264 
  9 711 
  1 467 
  4 526 
10 625   
   
  2 503 
17 729 
     597 
10 538 
  1 593 
  4 533 
11 881 
   
2 740 
19 418 
     643 
Tertiary industries 3, 207 3, 796   4 655   6 857 47 158 51 347 
Less: FISIM (Financial services indirectly measured)  - -       162   1 180   1 261 
All industries at basic prices 5, 966 6, 780   7 856 11 251 74 130 81 996 
Taxes less subsidies on products     578     637      840   1 455   7 006   8 846 
GDP at market prices 6, 544 7, 417   8 696 12 706 81 136 90 842 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2013) 
 
While there has been a decrease in the primary industries in the first years of 
independence, largely due to a decline in mining, resulting from currency exchange 
fluctuations, there has been a growing increase in the secondary and tertiary industries. 
However, from 2010 to 2011 there has been stable increase in the primary industries. 
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Namibia inherited a substantial foreign debt from South Africa, which was regarded as 
her colonial government, amounting to ZAR 726.5 million (National Assembly 1990b: 
205). Accordingly, the new government as the successor to the colonial administration 
had to assume responsibility of the said debt and the burden of sanctions of the colonial 
administration. Article 143 of the Namibian Constitution states that international 
agreements that existed by the date of independence shall remain in force until the 
National Assembly decides otherwise (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 
71). Therefore, economic agreements such as those relating to the sale of uranium to 
Japan and Karakul products to Europe, among others, continued unhindered after 
independence. 
 
Since Namibia was under South Africa’s colonial rule and South Africa was under 
economic sanctions from some quarters, the sanctions had a negative effect on a post-
independent Namibia. It should be noted that the legal position of the mandated territories 
was that they were ruled as integral parts of the colonial power. This is embodied in 
Article 2 of the League of Nations which says, 
There are territories, such as South-West Africa … which, owing to… their geographical 
contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory and other circumstances, can be best administered 
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory (League of Nations 1919). 
 
Given that position of being administered as an integral part, the application of sanctions 
on colonial power included the administered territories. Therefore, the Government 
needed to campaign for the lifting of sanctions as that did not come automatically 
following Namibia’s independence on 21 March 1990. Namibia’s first Ambassador to the 
US, Tuliameni Kalomoh (2011: interview), stated that it was necessary to first have 
sanctions lifted in some federal states within the US such as California. The issue of the 
challenges on lifting sanctions against Namibia was confirmed by Minister Gurirab who 
informed the Parliament in 1991 that the Ministry was making efforts to address US 
sanctions against Namibia (National Assembly 1991: 90). Sanctions varied from country 
to country. They included a ban on imports on agricultural products, textiles and minerals 
such as steel, iron, coal and uranium. The impact was, however, severe as sanctions by 
the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union 
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(EU), had reduced South Africa’s exports by 27 percent, while the US reduced it by a 
third (Evenett 2002: 560, 572). It is against this background that Namibia’s post-
independence economic diplomacy took shape. 
 
3.3  Independence and economic diplomacy 
 
One of the first tasks of the new Namibian Government was to establish diplomatic, 
political and economic diplomatic relations. The SWAPO leadership recognised that 
there was a growing need to address trade and investments for an independent Namibia. 
In response to this, SWAPO hosted a pre-independence conference with international 
investors in London in 1989 where it spelt out its economic programme when it assumed 
power in Namibia. At the conference SWAPO rebutted the perception that independent 
Namibia would adopt an economic policy where the state controlled the means of 
production (Gurirab 2011: interview).  
 
As independence was approaching, the then President-Elect of a future independent 
Namibia, Sam Nujoma, invited the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), to draft the Investment Code for Namibia. Therefore, 
immediately after independence, a consultative process driven by the then and current, 
Prime Minister Hage Geingob, ensued, with the involvement of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Ben Amathila, Attorney-General, Hartmut Ruppel and UNCTAD experts. The 
purpose was to craft a new commercial framework which instilled confidence among 
foreign investors (Gurirab 2011: interview). With the assistance of UNCTAD experts, the 
country’s first post-independent investment law was drafted and passed into the Foreign 
Investment Act (No. 27 of 1990). The Act is discussed below. 
 
It is typical of small states to rely on technical experts’ assistance because of the 
challenges of limited human capital that small states are confronted with. It is also typical 
of states undergoing political transition as the South African case, amongst others, 
illustrates. Namibia’s request for technical assistance from UNCTAD should not only be 
viewed in the context of small states’ inclination to multilateral institutions, but also 
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because she had confidence in UN institutions resulting from a historical relationship of 
the UN’s support of and solidarity with SWAPO and Namibia. Therefore, this section 
focuses on selected major aspects of the country’s economic diplomacy immediately after 
independence as listed above (see section 3.1). 
 
To attract FDIs and broaden the market for Namibian commodities, the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry issued 910 import permits valued at ZAR 624 million dollars within the first 
year of Namibia’s independence. These permits exceeded the 799 permits valued at ZAR 
147 million that were issued in the preceding year. Similarly, 53 export permits, valued at 
ZAR 992 million were issued, representing a remarkable improvement from 29 permits 
valued at ZAR 361 million issued in the previous year (National Assembly 1991: 138). 
By issuing these permits, the new Namibian state wanted to broaden its trade capacity to 
reach out to the outside market for Namibian commodities and bring to Namibia foreign 
commodities for use by Namibians. The fisheries sector has been added to the major 
sources of the economy with the introduction of total allowable catches in pilchard, hake, 
horse mackerel, juvenile horse mackerel fish species and crabs and rock lobster. There 
were new exports like grapes and further in 1994 Namibia negotiated 13 000 tons of beef 
quota export to the EU (Sherbourne 2009: 101). Export trade and inward investments will 
be discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
3.3.1 Economic diplomacy as a new post-independence phase struggle 
 
Following Namibia’s independence, the then President, Sam Nujoma, stated that the first 
phase of SWAPO’s political struggle had been completed and that the next phase of the 
post-liberation struggle entailed an economic struggle (Gurirab 2010: interview). 
President Nujoma underscored the importance of economic diplomacy for the newly 
independent state. One example of this occurred during his address to the first diplomatic 
training course for Foreign Service Officers that was held two months after independence 
in May 1990 (Office of the President 1999: 15). President Nujoma stated that among the 
primary objectives of any foreign policy is the promotion of economic and social 
progress through interactions with other states. He further stated that it was through the 
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efforts of diplomats that Namibia would yield benefits from international trade and 
investments. 
 
Namibia’s first post-independence Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, shared 
similar sentiments. Accordingly, he stated in the Namibian Parliament, 
[T]he traditional functions of foreign service (sic) have been broadened by the addition of new 
tasks in the past few decades. The world has become truly a global village, an ever inter-dependent 
world, in which economic issues plays, an exceedingly or crucial role than political or ideological 
preferences (National Assembly 1991: 84). 
 
The new Namibian Government was cognisant of the fact that economic issues were at 
the fore of the foreign policy-making process and the conduct of diplomacy. It resolved 
to make economic policy objectives the ‘focal point’ of Namibia’s diplomacy (National 
Assembly 1991: 84). The first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-
Ndaitwah, informed the Parliament when she introduced the Budget Vote of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that her Ministry adopted its motto for the year 1992 to be “Diplomacy 
with a purpose, the economic development of Namibia”. Explaining the rationale for the 
motto, Nandi-Ndaitwah explained: 
 
[The motto] is an attempt at encapsulating our vision about the kind of diplomatic service, i.e. 
economic diplomacy we aspire to provide for our nation. Since its inception the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, has committed itself to practise economic diplomacy, and therefore, the principle 
preoccupation of our diplomacy is to increase mutually beneficial co-operation with the 
international community especially in the fields of investment, trade, tourism and development co-
operation (National Assembly 1992: 33). 
 
Nandi-Ndaitwah further stated that it was necessary to start advocating Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy in order to focus on trade and investment and avoid becoming 
permanently dependent on foreign donor aid (Nandi-Ndaitwah 2011: interview). Since 
the pronouncement by Deputy Minister, Nandi-Ndaitwah, ‘economic diplomacy’ became 
a referral point and familiar phrase in Namibia’s foreign policy discussions. 
 
A few years later, Minister Gurirab informed the Namibian Parliament that the country’s 
diplomats are required to solely concentrate on economic diplomacy (National Assembly 
1994c: 136). Their tasks, according to Minister Gurirab, included improving Namibia’s 
international trade and securing foreign investment as well as soft and free-interest loans. 
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The Minister also acknowledged that economic, financial and trade issues had moved to a 
prominent place in foreign policy-making. Though it was conceptualised during the 
formative years, economic diplomacy was given prominence by Minister Hamutenya 
during his brief stint of 19 months at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2002 to 2004 
(see Chapter Five). 
 
In the context of Table 2, discussing Du Plessis’ (2006: 140) typology, Namibia too, 
conducted economic diplomacy in the form of bilateral and multilateral missions, through 
establishing permanent diplomatic establishments. The type is that of inter-governmental 
diplomacy by way of state-to-state or state-to-international governmental organisation 
relations. 
 
Namibia’s conduct on economic diplomacy corresponds to Liberalism as this theory 
supports mutual beneficial relations. This principle, which is central to Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy, is underscored in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution (see 
Chapter One) and as further explained by Deputy Minister Nandi-Ndaitwah. Liberalism, 
as a theory of IR studies, propounds that in the course of conducting economic diplomacy 
there will be absolute advantages to both states, although it is also acknowledged that 
sometimes there will be comparative advantage, resulting from differences in labour, 
capital, natural resources and productivity among others (Cohn 2008: 196). The main 
issue, however, is that each of the two states engaged in bilateral economic diplomacy 
stands to benefit from the relations. This is the gist of Deputy Minister Nandi-Ndaitwah’s 
remarks on economic diplomacy cited above. 
 
3.3.2  Promotion of manufacturing industry 
 
In line with the principle of mutual beneficial relations, Namibia encouraged investors 
not only to extract mineral resources, but also to assist with the development of Namibian 
industries. This is illustrated, amongst others, by former President Nujoma’s address to 
the Afro-Belgo Chamber of Commerce in 1994. During his address, President Nujoma 
emphasised the need to link primary production investments with secondary productions 
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(Office of the President 1999a: 402). According to President Nujoma, the rationale for 
this link was that the Namibian Government wanted to broaden the base of employment 
to ensure that Namibians did not get employment in primary production sectors only 
while raw materials were exported and created employment in the secondary industries of 
the countries where investors came from. The Government wanted to ensure that 
secondary industries, too, were established in Namibia to create employment for 
Namibians. The Namibian Head of State asserted, 
With regard to the fishing industry, my Government is encouraging those investors who want to 
establish fishing fleets or shore-based fish processing facilities in Namibia...I would like, 
therefore, to take advantage of this opportunity to personally extend an invitation to all Belgian 
investors to come and participate in Namibia’s economic and industrial development and wealth 
creation for our mutual benefit (Office of the President 1999a: 403). 
 
Another illustration of Namibia’s focus on the development of the country’s 
manufacturing sector is President Nujoma’s remarks at the opening of the Wernhil Park 
Shopping Centre in Windhoek in August 1990. He urged the private sector to concentrate 
on the local manufacturing industry. He also stated that Namibia has large reserves of 
minerals and metals that could be refined and processed locally for the export market. 
The export of these products was important to the Namibian economy since it would 
produce a good balance of payments to the country. The business sector should, thus, 
endeavour to improve exports as opposed to the imports. Investment in the secondary 
industries grew from N$ 1.03 billion in 1990 to N$ 2.08 billion in 1995 (Ministry of 
Finance 2013). South Africa is a major investor in secondary industries. For example, in 
the banking sector, three out of the four major banks comes from South Africa and three 
out of four major insurance companies come from South Africa. Investment in the 
primary industries grew from N$ 1.79 billion, in 1990, to N$ 2.4 billion, in 1995 
(Ministry of Finance 2013). The UK, Canada and Spain were the main investors in 
industrial manufacturing machinery. 
 
The issue of mutual benefits is embodied in the assumptions of Liberalism, as a theory of 
IR. Burchill (2009: 65), amongst others, argues that mutual dependence created by 
commerce promotes interdependence. This discourages unnecessary hostile competitions 
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that trigger aggressive behaviour towards one another. Within the framework of mutual 
benefits, states prioritise on the spirit of cooperation. It is propounded that, 
Mutual benefits arising out of cooperation are possible because states are not always pre-occupied 
with relative gains – hence the opportunities for constructing regimes around issues and area of 
common concern (Burchill 2009: 67). 
 
The promotion of industrialisation to create employment that Namibian political leaders 
underscore is anchored in Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. Gilpin (2008: 238) argues 
that states need to address the economic expectations of their citizenry and employment 
is one of these. The development of local industries creates local employment since the 
processing of goods requires additional labour force. When raw materials are exported to 
be processed outside, then employment will favour the countries importing the raw 
materials. 
 
The promotion of manufacturing industries is not unique to Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. There were similar trends in other small states in the southern Africa region. 
Dömeland & Sander (2007: 9), for example, state that in addition to Namibia, other 
countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland had increased their 
manufacturing value and contributed to Africa’s manufacturing exports. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that two issues drove independent Namibia’s economic diplomacy in 
its early years. One issue relates to ideology (‘economic diplomacy as the second 
struggle’). The second issue is more practical, namely the development of the country’s 
manufacturing sector. In order to achieve the objectives of its economic diplomacy, 
Namibia engaged with other actors at the regional and international level.  
 
3.4 Regional economic diplomacy 
 
In applying the typology of diplomacy, as outlined by Du Plessis (2006:140) (see Table 
2), early independent Namibia’s economic diplomacy agenda revealed characteristics and 
results primarily focused on the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference 
 94 
(SADCC).7 This agenda took the form of inter-governmental relations of state-to-state 
relations type manifested through short-term diplomacy at the high level visits. This was 
confirmed by President Nujoma, who stated that when Namibia decided to open her first 
full diplomatic missions, her immediate neighbourhood was identified as the focus of her 
first missions (Nujoma 2001: interview). Thus, after the missions in Luanda (Angola) and 
Lusaka (Zambia) were opened in 1990, missions were opened in Gaborone (Botswana) 
and Harare (Zimbabwe) and later in Pretoria (South Africa), after the latter’s first 
democratic elections were held in 1994. 
 
Underscoring the importance of regional economic diplomacy, President Nujoma 
observed at the 10th Commemorative Summit of SADCC, in April 1990, barely a month 
after independence, that intra-regional trade in SADCC would enable the region to 
survive the unfavourable competition with South Africa and the region. He advocated 
that it was only through regional trade and economic cooperation that southern Africa 
could relate to the EEC, when it became a single market as it was envisaged at the time. 
President Nujoma further asserted that the region’s natural resources should be utilised 
for the benefit of the region. To improve intra-regional trade, the region’s transport 
infrastructure should be developed to improve the mobility of products in the region. 
President Nujoma, also stated, that he was disturbed by the fact that intra-SADCC trade 
represented less than 5 percent of the overall trade with SADCC member-states. He 
undertook that Namibia will explore possibilities to work out a formula that will increase 
intra-regional trade (Office of the President 1999a: 4). 
 
President Nujoma also encouraged the Namibian private sector to focus on regional trade. 
When he opened the Wernhil Park Shopping Centre in August 1990 as mentioned earlier, 
he stated that the SADCC market had 80 million people; a sizeable consumer market for 
Namibian products, as Namibia only had a population of below two million at the time 
and it could not consume all that she produced (Office of the President 1999a: 34). 
 
                                                 
7  SADCC was the precursor to SADC as discussed below. The member-states of SADCC were 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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In October 1990, the Windhoek Show Society held its 32nd annual Windhoek 
Agricultural and Industrial Show, its first in an independent Namibia. Historically, an 
annual showcase of Namibian products, economic opportunities and its economy, the 
1990 Show presented an opportunity for intra-regional trade. Accordingly, President 
Nujoma commended the Windhoek Show Society for the role that it played in promoting 
intra-SADCC trade. He further expressed the hope that the Show would grow and expand 
in the future to become one of the catalysts of commercial relations in the SADCC region 
(Office of the President 1999a: 46). 
 
Echoing the President’s position on the importance of Namibia’s neighbours to her 
economic growth and prosperity, Minister Gurirab stated in the Parliament, 
Namibia has been seeking to forge closer regional links with its neighbours. The fact that ten Co-
operation Agreements, were signed and a Permanent Joint Commissions of Cooperation, 
established with our neighbours, underscores the importance we attach to close co-operation in the 
region within the framework of SADCC (National Assembly 1990b: 205). 
 
The Minister cited countries like Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe with whom Namibia 
had established Joint Commissions of Cooperation, as being crucial to strengthening 
economic relations among the region. It should be noted that by that time, there were no 
similar Joint Commissions that were established with countries outside the region. This 
means that priority, in terms of establishing Joint Commissions of Cooperation, was 
given to countries from the region.  
 
During his first state visit to Botswana in September 1990, President Nujoma informed 
his Botswana counterpart, President Quett Masire, that Namibia wanted to increase trade 
relations with Botswana. Accordingly, the two countries should cooperate on the 
construction of the Trans-Kalahari Project which connects Namibia and Botswana by 
road. This would not only be utilised for the transport of goods between the two 
countries, but it would also boost intra-regional trade, as the project would be of use to 
other SADCC member-states. President Nujoma also suggested to his counterpart that 
Namibia and Botswana could cooperate on filling their respective quotas of beef export 
to the EEC. If one country was short in filling its quota, then the other would fill it 
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(Office of the President 1999a: 39; 41). Stressing the importance of transport in boosting 
trade, President Nujoma further stated, 
[P]ossibilities exist in promoting joint tourism packages by improving transport and 
communication links amongst our countries. Transport and communication are vital because in 
their absence, trade and commercial relations cannot take place (Office of the President 1999a: 
40).  
 
President Nujoma talked about the harsh economic environment in the international 
market which poses a challenge to the region when he addressed the Zambian 
Agricultural Show, in Lusaka, Zambia, in August 1990. The Zambian Agricultural Show, 
like the annual Windhoek Agricultural and Industrial Show, is that country’s economic 
showcase. Namibia wanted to see a strong and economic viable SADCC bloc. It was, 
thus, imperative that these countries cooperate economically and trade within the region 
(Office of the President 1999a: 32). 
 
In May 1991, President Nujoma was a guest Speaker at the Zimbabwe International 
Trade Fair in Harare, Zimbabwe, which is similar in purpose to the Windhoek and 
Zambian shows. President Nujoma expressed his concern to his Zimbabwean counterpart, 
President Robert Mugabe, about attempts in the global market to suppress trade from 
developing countries in the form of introducing protectionist policies. In view of these 
restrictive trade measures, President Nujoma called for the two countries to reconsider 
their trade relations to improve their bilateral trade. He emphasised that it was important 
for Namibia and Zimbabwe to expedite the removal of trade barriers to ensure 
voluminous exchange of goods between the two countries. He also encouraged the 
Zimbabwean business community to engage their Namibian counterparts and trade with 
each other continuously, rather than waiting for the annual trade fair. Mindful of the 
foreign policy principle in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, President Nujoma 
underscored the mutual beneficial nature of the trade relations between Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. He repeatedly referred to this principle and invited Zimbabwean businesses to 
explore business opportunities in Namibia and set up ventures with their Namibian 
counterparts for the mutual benefit of both countries (Office of the President 1999a: 94). 
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It is common for small states to be inclined to regional integration. Cross-Mike ([sa]: 5) 
states that the Caribbean states, for example, are bound together in their regional 
grouping by a common colonial past. Countries in the southern Africa region, too, have a 
shared colonial history. Many of the SADC member-states were British colonies. 
Namibia, too, was entrusted to Britain as a League of Nations, C-Mandate territory, after 
the First World War (WWI).8 Other C-Mandates included Papua New Guinea, Western 
Samoa and Nauru (Matz 2005: 73). 
 
Regional economic diplomacy has advantages and disadvantages. Cross-Mike ([sa]: 5) 
cites the pooling of resources to address technical and financial resources as one of the 
advantages of regional economic diplomacy. SACU, in southern Africa, has been able to 
benefit member-states in this respect. Namibia’s Minister of Finance, Saara 
Kuugongelwa-Amadhila, informed the Parliament, during her Budget Speech in 2006, 
that Namibia had yielded a favourable revenue collection, largely due to a windfall from 
SACU (National Assembly 2006: 55). 
 
Namibia’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy is not typical of a small state. In this 
respect, Gurirab (2011: interview) stated that the first Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andreas Guibeb, often stated that the fact that Namibia is a 
small country did not mean that Namibians think small. She is, therefore, able to 
influence global issues. Accordingly, although she was a newly independent state, 
Namibia was able to make her presence felt in the region. Gurirab (2011: interview) 
further stated that at the SACU Summit, held in Maseru, Lesotho, in 1993, Namibia was 
the only country with the draft paper on the SACU structure, especially on revenue 
sharing. She was thus, influential in determining the formula used by the regional Union 
on revenue sharing. 
 
Namibia has also played a role in changing the agenda of SADC. It was in Namibia that 
SADCC was transformed into the present day SADC in 1992 following the adoption of 
Windhoek Treaty. The agenda of SADC was largely political, focusing on the liberation 
                                                 
8  C-Mandates were colonies that were to be administered as integral parts of the mandatory powers.  
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of the region. With the transformation of SADC, its agenda focuses on regional economic 
integration (Gurirab (2011: interview). 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, favours regional trade as it argues that in a small 
group of states, with commonalities such as similar levels of earnings and development, it 
is easy to agree on issues. This is unlike in the case of a diversified large group in 
multilateral negotiations, for example. It was due to a growing interdependence among 
states in a given region that enhanced regionalism and, therefore, intra-regional trade. 
Liberalism theory further argues that regional trade makes up for the areas where the 
international trade regime, the WTO, has failed to address the concerns of states (Cohn 
2008: 243). Liberalism theory asserts that regional integration fosters political 
cooperation, in addition to economic collaboration.  For example, with the emergence of 
regional trade in the EU, nations that had otherwise been on periodical confrontation 
changed such tradition (Burchill 2009: 66). 
 
3.5 Selected instance of re-circling diplomacy: the Nordic outreach 
 
Whereas the previous section focused on regional economic diplomacy, this section 
provides a background as to what, among others, informed the post-independent agenda 
of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. It presents a continuity of Namibia’s pre-
independence economic diplomacy.  
 
Among the countries that pre-independent SWAPO enjoyed cordial relations with are the 
Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland. These 
countries discerned the need to set the agenda for cooperating with an independent 
Namibia, in a number of economic fields such as agriculture, fisheries and energy. In 
1988, these countries organised a meeting attended by the leadership of SWAPO in exile, 
and included businesspersons from Namibia, especially from the white community 
(Gurirab 2010: interview). This conference is the only instance of a conference on 
economic diplomacy in the pre-independence history of Namibia. 
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Following her independence, Namibia followed up on the cooperation agenda of the 
Nordic countries, by way of re-circling diplomacy. In applying a typology of Du Plessis 
(2006: 140) (see Table 2), Namibia’s re-circling diplomacy took a form of bilateral 
relations, carried out through high level visits at the Head of State level. Between October 
and November 1993, President Nujoma visited Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Iceland. The inclusion of businesspersons in the delegation, to have discussions with their 
Nordic counterparts was, arguably, aimed at fostering trade relations. President Nujoma 
was, thus, spearheading economic diplomacy. During these meetings, he assured Nordic 
investors of Namibia’s favourable investment legislation, efficiency of trade and good 
infrastructure (Office of the President 1999a: 329 – 336). 
 
In Norway, President Nujoma pointed out that Norway and Namibia could jointly 
develop sustainable relations emanating from their cooperation in the processing 
industries in Namibia. The two countries could also explore opportunities for joint-
ventures in other areas (Office of the President 1999a: 334). President Nujoma further 
underscored the importance of joint-ventures during his visit to Iceland when he 
announced the joint-venture between the government-owned Namibian fishing company, 
the National Fishing Corporation of Namibia (FISHCOR), and a privately-owned 
Icelandic company, Saeblom. The joint-venture resulted in the establishment of the 
privately-owned company, Seaflower White Fish Cooperation Limited.  
 
The participation of Namibian businesspersons in important, high-level, bilateral 
discussions between Namibia and Nordic countries corresponds to Liberalism as a theory 
of IR studies. Its proponents suggest that a state cannot act unilaterally on foreign policy 
issues and it needs input from other stakeholders in the society and should, therefore, 
represent multiple sectors’ interests (Viotti & Kauppi 1999: 202).   
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3.6 Domestic instruments of Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
 
During the formative years of its economic diplomacy, the Namibian Government 
adopted policies and laws to regulate decision-making and the practice of economic 
diplomacy. These, amongst others, included the: 
 Promulgation of export-oriented laws such as the Foreign Investment Act and the 
EPZ Act, to regulate the conduct of economic diplomacy; 
 
 Adoption of policies such as the White Paper on National and Sectoral Policies 
(1991) and the NDP 1 (1995); and e 
 
 Establishment of diplomatic institutions and appointment of diplomatic specialists 
such as Commercial Counsellors and Honorary Consuls (ongoing).  
 
While these domestic processes were underway, the country also engaged in various 
forms of economic diplomacy, such as bi- and multilateral economic and conference 
diplomacy. In this sense, Namibia, is another example of Robert Putnam’s, so-called ‘two 
level game’, i.e. making foreign policy, practicing diplomacy whilst also aligning 
domestic institutions to support the country’s foreign policy and diplomatic objectives, 
and vice versa (Putman 1999).  
 
3.6.1  Investment and export-related legislation  
 
The tabling of laws in Parliament provided an opportunity for legislators to debate 
economic diplomacy issues, thereby contributing to public debate on Namibia’s trade and 
investment matters, i.e. economic diplomacy. 
 
The Namibian Government passed the Foreign Investment Act in 1990. Motivating the 
Bill that resulted in the aforesaid Act in Parliament, the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Ben Amathila, stated that the Act would provide an environment conducive for foreign 
investors, as it sought to address three main concerns. Firstly, the Government would not 
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nationalise foreign investors’ investments. In the second instance, investors were 
guaranteed the privilege to repatriate the profits on their Namibian investments. Finally, 
when a dispute arose between an investor and the Namibian Government, an independent 
arbitrator would assist in the resolution of the dispute (National Assembly 1990c: 116).   
 
Section 3 of the Foreign Investment Act that deals with the nature if business entities 
states: 
 
No foreign national engaged in a business activity or intending to commence a business activity in 
Namibia, shall be required to provide for the participation of the Government or any Namibian as 
shareholder or as partner in such business, or for the transfer of such business to the Government 
or any Namibian: Provided, that it may be a condition of any licence or other authorisation to or 
any agreement with a foreign national, for the grant of rights over natural resources that the 
Government shall be entitled to or may acquire an interest in any enterprise to be formed for the 
exploitation of such rights (Government Gazette 1990). 
 
Section 9 of the Act, which deals with the repatriation of profits states: 
 
 
[T]he Bank of Namibia shall ensure that there is available for purchase by the holder of a 
Certificate, at the request of that holder, convertible foreign currency which the holder may use 
without any restriction - 
 for the transfer out of Namibia of the profits of the enterprise or, where the enterprise is 
carried on as a branch operation by a company which is a foreign national, for the payment to 
the head office of the company of remittances out of funds representing the branch profits, 
after deduction or retention in either case of any tax due. 
 where an investment to which a Certificate relates is an investment in a company, for the 
payment to shareholders or stockholders ordinarily resident outside Namibia of dividends out 
of the profits of the enterprise, after deduction of any tax due (Government Gazette 1990). 
 
Foreign investments above US$ 200 000 or more that contribute to Namibia’s socio-
economics will receive a Status Investment Certificate which entitles the holder access to 
foreign currency to finance the investments in Namibia. The Minister responsible for 
trade may further endorse on the Certificate that the holder can retain the foreign 
currency proceeds of the goods that they produce and are exported from Namibia. This 
means that they are exempted from the laws that require such proceeds to be brought 
back to Namibia. Minister Amathila, however, made it clear that privileges of investors, 
in return, had to meet certain obligations (National Assembly 1990c: 157, 161; National 
Assembly 1993b: 103). 
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During the debate on the Bill, opposition parliamentarian Eric Biwa of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) hailed the Bill as ‘meticulously prepared’ (National Assembly 
1990c: 129). He advised that for the Investment Centre, proposed in terms of the Bill, 
attention should be paid to its staffing, which should include professionals such as 
economists and engineers. He suggested that the Government should provide better 
incentives to investors who will invest and develop poor, rural communities. Biwa further 
called for special incentives to investors who invest in the manufacturing industry. This 
sector needed development since the previous colonial government deliberately did not 
help it to grow. 
 
Following its establishment in 1990, the Ministry of Trade and Industry had two major 
departments, the Department of International Trade (which started as a Division) and the 
Department of Investment. The Department of International Trade’s mandate included 
international trade relations. The Department of Investment’s mandate was to attract DFIs 
to Namibia (Gurirab 2011: interview). Following the enactment of the Investment Act, 
the Department of Investment was reorganised and transformed into the Investment 
Centre, provided in the Act. The main functions of the Centre was to provide information 
to prospective investors about business opportunities that exist in Namibia. The Centre 
further coordinates and assesses investment proposals. 
 
The enactment of the Foreign Investment Act enabled Namibian leaders to market 
Namibia as an ideal hub for foreign investment. When President Sam Nujoma visited 
Norway in 1993, he invited Norwegian businesspersons to invest in Namibia, informing 
them of the protection of foreign investments in terms of the Foreign Investment Act 
(Office of the President 1999a: 334 – 335). He informed Norwegians that in addition, the 
Government had maintained peace and stability, democratic governance and an 
encouraging market economy. 
 
President Nujoma also alluded to the attractive investment legislation when he addressed 
the Afro-Belgo Chamber of Commerce in Belgium in 1994 (Office of the President 
1999a: 402 – 403). He stressed that the Namibian Government was committed to 
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allowing the private sector to lead the process of growing the economy. The President 
also impressed upon the investors that the private sector was able to take up challenges of 
investments given the investment law which is ‘liberal, non-discriminatory and highly 
accommodating’ (Office of the President 1999a: 403).  
 
In October 1994, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Hidipo Hamutenya, tabled the 
Economic Processing Zone (EPZ) Bill in Parliament which was passed into the EPZ Act 
(No. 9 of 1995). The Act provides for the creation of EPZs. Motivating the Bill in 
Parliament, on behalf of the Minister of Trade and Industry, the then  Minister of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources, Helmut Angula, stated that the purpose of the EPZ was, 
among others, to promote industrial and foreign direct investment, increase the export of 
manufactured goods and create employment (National Assembly 1994e: 263 – 264). 
 
The definition of the EPZ is found in section 2 of the Act which states that the Minister 
may, 
 
 establish in any area, or declare any area as, an export processing zone; and 
 determine the location and extent, and define the physical characteristics or boundaries of an 
export processing zone … 
 An export processing … may consist of a developed, partly developed or undeveloped area of land 
or may comprise a single-factory unit or a group of factory units (Government Gazette 1995). 
 
In terms of the Act, EPZ companies manufacture goods for exports and such goods are 
exempted from the General Sales Tax (GST) and Additional Sales Tax (AST). Namibia’s 
Offshore Development Company (ODC) (2013) found out that Namibia’s EPZ features 
differ from the traditional EPZs in that they have restrictive fenced-in zones. In the case 
of Namibia, it has both the fenced-in zone and single factory enterprises, operating 
independently outside the demarcated area of the EPZ. To instil confidence in the 
markets, the management of the EPZ vests in the private sector. The Namibian 
Government established the ODC as a state-owned enterprise that advises the line 
Minister on EPZ matters. The ODC further approves applications for EPZ status. It 
promotes and markets the EPZ as an attractive regime for export-oriented industries 
(ODC 2008). 
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The ‘Founding Fathers’ of the Namibian Constitution included a clause that says Walvis 
Bay falls within the Namibian territory (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 
53). Walvis Bay was annexed and incorporated in the Cape Colony of South Africa in 
1884 under the Walvish Bay and St John’s River Territories Annexation Act No. 35 of 
1884. In 1922, South Africa transferred the enclave to Namibia, then South West Africa, 
by passing the South West Africa Affairs Act, No. 24 of 1922 and treating it as an integral 
part of Namibia until 1977.  In 1977, by Proclamation R 202, South Africa reversed the 
transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibia (Akweenda 1997: 303 – 313). The Walvis Bay 
enclave was finally re-integrated into Namibia on the evening of 28 February 1994. 
 
While this was primarily an issue of sovereignty, it was also known that the Walvis Bay 
enclave would be significant to Namibia’s economic diplomacy. The Founding President, 
Sam Nujoma, stated:  
The port of Walvis Bay was very important...Today the harbour of Walvis Bay is accommodating 
large cargo ships and even the Queen Passenger Line docks there. Walvis Bay is the only harbour 
that can accommodate larger cargo ships and passenger ships on the west coast of Africa, with the 
exception of Cape Town (Nujoma 2011: interview). 
 
The Founding President said that it was in the mind of the Namibian leaders that projects 
such as the territorial reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia, should be pursued 
because of their significance to the Namibian economy. Namibia’s only EPZ, at the time 
of writing (March 2015), is found in Walvis Bay. 
 
The passing of the aforesaid Foreign Investment Act, with favourable concessions for the 
foreign investors and convening the investors’ conference, soon after independence, 
arguably works for the speedy trade and investment development for a newly-
independent state. It is common for small states to offer trade and investment incentives 
for FDI. Cohn (2008: 295) refers to the conciliatory approach of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), by welcoming investors and encouraging joint-venture partnerships 
with local entrepreneurs. Following her independence, Namibia obtained the “as if an 
LDC” status (Du Pisani 1992: 61). Accordingly, Namibian leaders advocate the 
promotion of partnerships as it will be discussed in the next sections.  
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Liberalism as a perspective of IR studies supports FDIs. It propounds that FDIs help with 
the development of the host because of the inflow of external capital and new 
technologies. These compensate, inter alia, foreign aid, tax revenue and insufficient 
savings in the local finance industry (Cohn 2008: 291 – 292). While Liberalism theory 
generally advocates limited state intervention in economic matters, one proponent, 
Burchill (2009: 79), acknowledges that governments have a role to play in formulating 
economic policies that attract foreign direct investment. In any case, the state will only 
play a minimal role since it would not want to scare away potential investors. 
Governments prioritise on efficiency and profits of investors to ensure their meaningful 
contribution to economic development (Burchill 2009: 80). Thus, as cited above, the 
Namibian Foreign Investment Act is considerate of the investors’ profit aspect. It is for 
that reason that the act has provisions that ensure a fair resolution of the investors’ 
grievances whenever they arise. 
 
The independence of the private sector, in respect of EPZs, manifests an approach 
anchored in Liberalism theory which supposes that people have the ability to decide 
without interference from governments (Viotti & Kauppi 1999: 201). Liberalism theory’s 
assumption argues in favour of individual businesspersons to be afforded an opportunity 
to determine the pursuance of their economic diplomacy.  
 
3.6.2 Policies 
 
In March 1991, the Namibian Government released the White Paper on National and 
Sectoral Policies. In the document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets five objectives.  
The third objective states, 
[T]o promote Namibia’s prosperity by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibia’s 
commodities (National Assembly 1991: 80). 
 
It was stated earlier that Minister Gurirab said that to achieve the aforesaid objective, 
Namibia was exploring markets in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East (see Chapter 
One). The Government was also improving the country’s ability to attract FDI and trade. 
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Economic and industrial cooperation in SADC, in particular, was of paramount 
importance to Namibia (National Assembly 1991: 80). 
 
In 1995, the Namibian Government adopted the NDP 1, a strategic plan for the next five 
years. NDP 1 echoes the principles of foreign policy enshrined in article 96 of the 
Namibian Constitution which states that: 
 
For a small country, whose economy relies on international trade and support, in an increasingly 
competitive and interdependent international economy, it is important that Namibia promotes 
itself through just and mutual beneficial relation with other countries (Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting 1995: 18). 
 
One of the objectives of the NDP 1 was that Namibia should play an influential role in 
the international arena that would yield the greatest benefits from its international 
economic relations. This, according to the NDP 1, was to be achieved through, inter alia, 
charging Namibian diplomatic missions with the task of promoting trade and investment 
(National Planning Commission 1995: 55). The aspirations of Namibia to play a greater 
role in international affairs, as stipulated in NDP 1, shows that the country did not want to 
be just a typical newly-independent and small state that had low participation in 
international affairs, as stated in small states literature (East 1973: 557; McCraw 1997: 
7). Instead, Namibia wanted to contribute to the management of public international 
affairs. The new Namibian Government expressed this objective in its NDP 1, mindful of 
the limitations on small states influence on decisions pertaining to the international 
economy. But, as a state existing within the global trading system, Namibia was 
determined to rise beyond the level of a spectator who allows others to set the agenda for 
her. 
 
The policy documents of the Namibian Government reflect the ambitions of a small state 
to excel in foreign trade. This affirms President Nujoma’s stance that Namibia should 
focus on a new post-independence phase of economic struggle. Namibia was a small and 
new state that knew how others countries had established themselves in the global 
political economy. Thus, she wanted to embark upon the new phase of the economic 
diplomacy struggle. In order to keep up with the pace of others and achieve her objectives 
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of the new struggle, Namibia then set her focus on the large scope of trade and 
investment in the regional and international economy. 
 
3.7 Specialised economic diplomacy: conference diplomacy 
 
In the typology of diplomacy by Du Plessis (2006: 140) (see Table 2), it is stated that 
states adopt conference diplomacy as a form of multilateral diplomacy of the inter-
governmental type. While small states participate in general conference diplomacy, 
Namibia has expressed a preference for specialised conference diplomacy. These 
conferences are not of a general nature, but focus exclusively on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. For example, in February 1991, Namibia convened her first Private Investors 
Conference which was attended by investors from many parts of the world. The purpose 
of this presidential initiative was to encourage foreign investors to interact with their 
Namibian counterparts and explore opportunities for partnerships. The conference 
included visits for participants to the Namibian countryside, to appreciate how the local 
people lived in order to determine where and what type of business activities they could 
venture into. In his address to the conference, President Nujoma repeatedly reiterated the 
importance of partnerships. This boils down to the foreign policy principle of mutual 
beneficial relations. He did not want investors to just invest and repatriate their capital 
out of Namibia; rather, he wanted them to enter into partnerships with Namibians in order 
to develop the Namibian business sector and ensure that some capital accruing from such 
business ventures is retained in Namibia. The conference further presented an opportunity 
for discussing aspects relating to the Namibian business environment (Office of the 
President 1999a: 68). 
 
Referring to the outcome of the Private Investors Conference, Minister Amathila reported 
to the Parliament that, 
I am pleased to note that already our efforts seem to bear fruit, with the recent investment by 
Pescanova, ENERKOR and the interest shown by Citroes (National Assembly 1991: 146).9 
 
                                                 
9 These firms are respectively from Spain, the US and France. 
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In March 1993, Namibia convened the Conference on Mineral Investment in Namibia. 
The conference was a platform to showcase mining opportunities in Namibia. It 
promoted the mining climate investment available in the country and marketed Namibia’s 
mining potentials to the outside world. Over 300 mining investors attended the 
conference. The conference was further attended by over 100 mining executives and 
financiers from major financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (National 
Assembly 1993a: 187; Office of the President 1999a: 269). Three months after the 
Conference, by June 1993, a major mining investor, Diamond Fields International, a 
Canadian company, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), invested in Namibia. It 
established a local company in Namibia, Diamond Field Resources, as its vehicle for 
mining activities in Namibia and purchased Angra Pequena Diamond Company, to mine 
diamonds offshore, near Lüderitz, a coastal town situated in the south of the country 
(Sherbourne 2009: 132). 
 
Although specific conferences stated in this section were not repeated during the first 
term of the Government, investment related conferences continued to be held after 1995 
(see Chapters Five and Six). 
 
Conference diplomacy is ideal for the participation of non-state actors in diplomacy. 
These actors have the opportunity to participate in conferences and make contributions to 
conference outputs. Liberalism theory, especially its perspective of Pluralism, supports 
the inclusion of various stakeholders other than state bureaucrats in the making of foreign 
policy and, therefore, economic diplomacy (Mingst 2008: 127). The inclusion of 
businesspersons in government delegations and the participation of non-bureaucrats in 
trade and investment conferences, therefore, manifest a Liberal approach of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. 
 
3.8 Establishment of diplomatic actors and institutions 
 
Newly-independent states often have to establish diplomatic institutions, ab initio, whilst 
complying with certain international legal obligations, as outlined earlier in this chapter. 
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Namibia is no exception in this regard. Once independent from South Africa and 
recognised as a sovereign state, Namibia’s efforts to establish formal diplomatic ties 
occurred almost simultaneously with the establishment of domestic diplomatic 
institutions. Some of these domestic and international diplomatic efforts included the 
appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of a diplomatic training 
programme and formal diplomatic relations and the appointment of diplomatic 
representatives.   
 
3.8.1 Specialised diplomatic training 
 
Within the first two months of Namibia’s independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
hosted an internal diplomatic training programme in May of 1990. The training lasted for 
three months and was attended by political officers who included Directors, Deputy 
Directors and Desk Officers. The content of the course focused on general diplomatic 
practice, where participants were taught how to open diplomatic missions, write a Note 
Verbale and mission reports, among others. After the training, officers were sent to open 
the first diplomatic missions stated earlier in this study. 
 
Officiating at the opening of the training programme, President Nujoma highlighted the 
importance of economic diplomacy and the importance of skilled Namibian diplomats to 
achieve the country’s foreign policy objectives (Office of the President 1999a: 15). 
Commenting retrospectively on the training programme, Namibia’s first Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo-Nandi Ndaitwah, reiterated the importance of having 
diplomats skilled in the art of economic diplomacy in the country (Nandi-Ndaitwah 2011: 
interview). 
 
Once posted abroad, Namibian diplomats commenced with the daunting task of 
promoting Namibia’s investment opportunities. They first adopted wholesale economic 
diplomacy, where they sought all possible areas of trade, from which Namibia could 
benefit. Heads of Missions were told that their primary task was to ensure that they 
brought investment to Namibia. The areas covered generally were mining, fishing, 
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agriculture, land, tourism and manufacturing (Asheeke 2011: interview; Schimming-
Chase 2011: interview). 
 
3.8.2 Opening of embassies 
 
Literature on small states’ diplomacy explains that given limited resources, small states 
accredit their diplomats to more than one country and, thus, have non-resident 
ambassadors in many countries. They can also not cover all strategic multilateral 
economic centres, such as Brussels, which hosts the headquarters of the EU and Geneva, 
which hosts the headquarters of the WTO and so many ended up only having missions in 
Brussels (Negut & Gagea 2011: 34). Namibia’s diplomacy adopted a similar form which 
established diplomatic missions accredited to a number of countries that had diplomatic 
and consular services and later expanded with the deployment of Commercial 
Counsellors. This added specialised functions to such missions. 
   
President Nujoma informed the Namibian Parliament, in July 1990 that Namibia intended 
to open full diplomatic missions in several states (see Table 4). He reiterated that the 
primary purpose of these embassies were to secure investment, technology transfer and 
scientific expertise for Namibia. Similar remarks followed during the President’s first 
New Year Message to the Namibian nation on 31 December 1990 when he highlighted 
the promotion of trade by diplomats as a fulfilment of Namibia’s policy of developing the 
Namibian economy (Office of the President 1999a: 26, 58). The statements of the 
President have been firmly anchored in the country’s foreign policy principle, that of 
striving for mutual beneficial relations (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 
53). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
Table 4: Namibia’s first post-independent diplomatic missions (1990) 
CONTINENT CITY COUNTRY 
Africa  Addis Ababa Ethiopia 
Lagos Nigeria 
Luanda Angola 
Lusaka Zambia 
Europe  Bonn Germany 
Brussels Belgium 
London UK 
Moscow  USSR 
Paris France  
Stockholm Sweden 
America Havana Cuba 
New York US 
Washington US 
 
Source: National Assembly (1991: 83 – 84). 
 
Minister Gurirab explained to the Parliament the considerations that were taken into 
account when opening the first diplomatic missions. Some of the capitals selected as 
Namibia’s first missions host international organisations. One reason was, therefore, the 
importance of multilateralism which is explained below. Another reason was economic 
consideration. The Minister explained that the events in some countries have impact on 
Namibia and that some capitals 
[A]re important for the improvement of our material welfare, as we have major economic 
interests, such as trade, financial, investment, tourism and other economic services in those 
capitals. Others are important because there is potential for future economic opportunities 
(National Assembly 1991: 84). 
 
The considerations for opening diplomatic missions listed in Table 4 above were both 
political and economic. Politically-motivated missions are those that hosted multilateral 
organisations such as the UN (New York) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
(Addis Ababa). The mission in Brussels, for example, was regarded as economically 
strategic to interacting with the rest of the European countries, especially where Namibia 
had not opened diplomatic missions (Gurirab 2010: interview; Nujoma 2011: interview).  
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The personnel of a typical Namibian embassy, at the time, included an Ambassador or 
High Commissioner (for missions in Commonwealth countries), Minister-Counsellor, 
Counsellor, First Secretary, Second Secretary and Third Secretary (Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 2010). Some missions had only Ambassadors with the next diplomatic official 
being the First Secretary. Minister-Counsellors and Counsellors were initially posted to 
missions in large powers, such as France, Nigeria, the UK, the US, USSR, and former 
SWAPO allies, such as Cuba, East Germany (later Germany), Sweden, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. This was partly due to availability of the personnel as the positions of 
Minister-Counsellor and Counsellor were filled by Directors and Deputy Directors, 
respectively. The role of staff on economic diplomacy will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
As inferred too, at the beginning of this section, the diplomatic missions, opened by 
Namibia, after independence, follow a trend of small states. Small states generally 
maintain few representations abroad. They include primarily neighbouring states, major 
trade partners and major world powers (Mohamed [sa]: 18). Limited diplomatic 
representation, arguably, disadvantages small states, as they conduct diplomacy with their 
large counterparts, through unilateral diplomatic representation (Cross-Mike [sa]: 20). 
This means that when a large state sends a resident diplomat to a small state and the latter 
is unable to reciprocate, the diplomatic relations of the two countries will be channelled 
through that representative of the large state. Unilateral diplomatic representation, 
arguably, favours the large state since diplomats invariably prioritise the interests of their 
sending states. 
 
3.8.3 Commercial Counsellors and Honorary Consuls 
 
From 1995 the Ministry of Trade and Industry appointed Commercial Counsellors to the 
Namibian embassies in Brussels, Bonn and Washington DC (Gurirab 2011: interview). 
Unlike other countries, Namibia does not have stand-alone trade missions. With limited 
resources, Namibia cannot employ teams of local staff such as secretaries, accountants, 
clerical officers and drivers for separate diplomatic and trade missions. For this reason, 
Commercial Counsellors are an integral part of diplomatic missions. The Namibian 
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diplomatic missions are, therefore, unique in that they combine political and economic 
diplomacy since political staff and Commercial Counsellors share the work. 
 
Initially, the work of Commercial Counsellors faced some challenges. Namibia’s first 
Ambassador to Germany, Nora Schimming-Chase (2011: interview), explained that at the 
beginning, most of the Commercial Counsellors were not trained as diplomats and this 
affected their performance. There was also no clearly formulated and published mandate, 
in respect to the roles and functions of Commercial Counsellors and how they related to 
other diplomatic officials at each embassy. As a result, all diplomatic officials at missions 
were involved in economic diplomacy. This unintended consequence contributed to the 
improvement of the country’s economic diplomatic skills base. Despite these initial 
uncertainties, Commercial Counsellors soon became acquainted with their roles and 
functions. 
 
For some missions the deployment of Commercial Counsellors brought a new dimension 
in the functioning and operation of the Missions. For the first time, the staff compliment 
of the respective Namibian diplomatic missions, included officials from outside the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Commenting on this development, Namibia’s first 
Commercial Counsellor to the Namibian mission in Washington DC, Paulo Shipoke 
(interview: 2011), observed that, although their mandate was not clearly defined as stated 
above, Commercial Counsellors were expected to promote trade and investment. He 
further stated that the Namibian Ambassador in Washington DC was very supportive of 
the Commercial Counsellor. Accordingly, Ambassador Kalomoh often took Commercial 
Counsellor Shipoke along when he was meeting members of the US business community, 
rather than taking the First Secretary who dealt with economic matters. This is an 
illustration of diplomatic specialisation (i.e. a preference for economic diplomacy) of the 
new Namibian government. One of the consequences of the appointment of Commercial 
Counsellors to the Washington Embassy in 1995 was that Namibia started to participate 
in international trade fairs in the US. One such example is the Detroit Trade Exhibitions 
(Detroit, US) in 1996.  
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Given their limited sources to have wider diplomatic representatives who promote trade 
relations, small states stand to benefit from the services of Honorary Consuls. Honorary 
Consuls are citizens of a receiving state, mostly from the business sector, who are 
appointed by the sending state (Berridge 2010: 127). For example, an Honorary Consul 
of Namibia in the US would be a US citizen. They are appointed to work for the sending 
state in promoting trade and investment between the sending and receiving state. They 
further serve to safeguard the welfare of the citizens of the sending state. These 
diplomatic officials are not paid by the sending state, but make use of their own funds to 
carry out their duties. They also assist in coordinating visits from Ministers from their 
sending states. Accordingly, states do not incur expenses by appointing Honorary 
Consuls, yet they benefit enormously from the services of these diplomatic officers. 
Honorary Consuls are useful actors on economic diplomacy, as they know the business 
environment of the receiving states. 
 
Economic policies and, therefore, economic diplomacy of states are embedded in 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies, which emphasises on cooperation among states 
(Cohn 2008: 71 – 72). It follows logic that diplomatic establishments serve the purpose of 
cooperation between various states and their agents aimed at strengthening economic ties, 
among others. Since these institutions are guided by the foreign policy principles of their 
respective states, it is arguable that Namibia’s diplomatic establishments are Liberalism 
theory-oriented. 
 
3.8.4 Budgetary allocations 
 
One indicator of a state’s commitment to a particular policy objective is the budget 
allocated to achieve the objective. A sizeable portion (about N$ 3.4 million, representing 
48 percent) of the first Budget Vote of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 1990 was 
dedicated to trade activities covering international trade, commercial representation 
abroad and  activities related to securing markets and business for Namibia (National 
Assembly 1990b: 137). Having taken outbound missions to secure markets in the EU, 
Asia and Latin America, by 1995 the budgetary allocations to international trade had 
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reduced to 13.5 percent of the total budget of the Ministry of Trade, although the figure 
remains almost the same (N$ 3.3 million). 
 
3. 9 An assessment of Namibia’s economic diplomacy during its formative years 
 
This chapter will analyse Namibia’s economic diplomacy during its formative years from 
1990 to 1995. Earlier, reference was made to policies, presidential initiatives and 
diplomatic specialisation to attract investment to Namibia and stimulate Namibia’s 
exports. These efforts produced some results for a newly-independent Namibia. 
 
3.9.1 Establishment of diplomatic missions as well as bi- and multilateral trade 
agreements 
 
Namibia established 13 diplomatic missions within the first three years of her 
independence. Apart from this, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, 
informed the Parliament in 1991 that within the first year of independence, Namibia had 
signed 156 agreements, out of which 61 were economic cooperation agreements. In 
addition, there were other agreements not specified in the number that dealt with Trade 
and Investment Promotion (National Assembly 1991: 86 – 87).10 The fact that over 40 
percent of these agreements related to economic cooperation demonstrates that Namibian 
foreign policy decision-makers highly prioritised economic diplomacy in order to achieve 
the country’s foreign policy and development objectives. Diplomatic establishments are 
discussed by Du Plessis (2006: 140) (see Table 2). He writes about a form of permanent 
bilateral relations signified by the presence of diplomatic establishments in the receiving 
state. 
 
 
                                                 
10  Available records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have only 91 agreements and further show 
that the economic cooperation and trade agreements signed during that period were with Cuba and 
Finland. The rest of the agreements were sectoral technical agreements, development cooperation 
agreements and agreements establishing diplomatic relations.  
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3.9.2  Creating a market for Namibian commodities, product diversification and 
increased exports 
 
Soon after independence Namibia adopted a strategy to concentrate on marketing her 
products globally (Nujoma 2011: interview). In the first year of independence, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry embarked upon a campaign for marketing Namibian 
commodities such as Karakul products, minerals, beer and beef to, amongst others, 
European markets (National Assembly 1991: 139). These efforts produced significant 
results in Namibia’s formative years and beyond (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Total export value (N$ billions) (1989-2012) 
 
Year Total export values (N$) 
1989 N$          2 934 – 00 
1990 N$          2 815 – 00 
1991 N$          3 256 – 20 
1992 N$          3 739 – 80 
1993 N$          4 225 – 56 
1994 N$          4 688 – 20 
1995 N$          5 144 – 72 
2011                                     N$      970 244 
2012                                     N$ 44 117 880 
 
Sources: Bank of Namibia (1994) and Namibia Statistics Agency (2012) 
 
Table 5 reflects the achievements and success of Namibian commodities. For example, 
the export earnings for manufactured products were valued at N$ 474. 8 million in 1990 
and by 1995 they had tripled to N$ 1.45 billion. Diamond sales earnings were N$ 849.0 
million in 1990 and by 1995 they had doubled to N$ 1.76 billion (Bank of Namibia 
2013). 
 
With the sanctions against Namibia as a South African colony having been lifted with the 
dawning of Namibia’s independence, Namibia was able to enter the Eastern Europe 
market. Countries in Eastern Europe were historically adversaries of South Africa as a 
result of the polarity created by the Cold War politics. These countries further supported 
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SWAPO and the struggle for Namibia’s independence from South African colonialism. 
The then Minister of Trade and Industry, Ben Amathila, informed the Parliament that 
soon after independence,  the Namibian Brewery, which was the largest brewery in 
Namibia, won a contract to export the Namibian beer to Poland, amidst tough 
competition from other producers around the world (National Assembly 1991: 139).  
 
With the opening of new markets, there has been remarkable increase in Namibia’s 
exports. Apart from Karakul, minerals and beer, Namibia is also a major producer of 
beef. By 1990, Namibia exported beef predominantly to South Africa. Minister Amathila 
informed Parliament that Namibia could not afford to continue with the trend of 
exporting 80 percent of her beef to South Africa, but needed to look to the European 
markets in an effort to diversify the country’s exports (National Assembly 1991: 139).  
 
Namibia’s accession to the Lomé Convention, membership of SADCC (and later SADC) 
and SACU further contributed to the creation of markets for Namibian commodities and 
increased exports. It was stated earlier in this chapter that Namibia also successfully 
lobbied for the status of ‘as if’ it was an LDC. This put exporters at ease because they did 
not have to meet the threshold required for their export products to the EEC member-
states when Namibia experiences low production years. 
 
In summary, from the time of independence to the end of the first term of the 
government, Namibia’s total export increased with about 82 percent. This nearly doubled 
figure signifies a successful international trade on the part of Namibia. This is partly 
attributed to the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe which were previously not 
open to pre-independent Namibian goods. Namibia’s international trade was further 
boosted by her accession to the Lomé Convention. The Lomé Convention is a multilateral 
treaty by which the EU gives preferential treatment to goods from ACP member-states 
that were colonies of EU member-states. 
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3.9.3 Attracting foreign investment to Namibia 
 
One of the main objectives of economic diplomacy is to attract FDI. Namibia is no 
exception in this regard. Table 6 shows the Namibia’s FDI in the first five years of 
independence.  
 
Table 6: Foreign Direct Investment to Namibia (1990-1995) (N$) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
270 million 1.08 billion 1.06 billion 495 million 882 million 1.4 billion 
 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry (2013) 
 
The figures in Table 6 were achieved through various efforts. For example, Namibia 
appointed Commercial Counsellors and succeeded in attracting investors from both 
developed and developing countries. In the US, for example, Namibia was able to attract 
investors in the construction industry which resulted in American investments through a 
construction company, Hanover, which constructed houses in Ongwediva and 
Swakopmund (Kalomoh 2011: interview).  
 
Namibia was also successful in attracting investors from another developed country, 
Germany. Namibia’s first Ambassador to Germany, Hinyangerwa Asheeke (2011: 
interview), explained that Namibia’s economic diplomacy with Germany was successful, 
especially in the tourism sector. While figures from the first five years are not available, 
as the Namibia Tourism Board only has statistics from the year 2002, the available 
statistics reveal that from 2002, Germany has always topped the list of tourists from 
European countries. For example, in 2010, German tourists accounted for the highest 
number of European tourists, recording 61 236 tourists in 2002 and 87 072 in 2010. 
Many of the tourist establishments in Namibia are owned and/or operated by Germans. 
This could also be attributed to the fact that the Namibian Embassy in Germany worked 
closely with the offices of the Namibia Tourism Board (NTB) and Air Namibia, 
Namibia’s national carrier, which have offices in Germany. 
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Namibia’s economic diplomacy with India, a developing country, also produced results. 
Subsequent to President Nujoma’s state visit to India in 1992, an Indian company, the 
Mahindra Group, established a car assembly plant in Namibia. Inaugurating the plant, 
President Nujoma referred to the benefits to Namibia’s FDI, such as employment 
creation, boosting the construction industry and technology transfer (Namibia 1999: 374). 
 
The agenda of Namibia’s economic diplomacy is not of a typical small state. East (1973: 
557) and McCraw (1997: 7), for example, presuppose that small states have a limited 
foreign policy scope. Namibia’s economic diplomacy, however, encompassed a wide 
range of issues within a short period. Namibia has covered a large market and attracted 
investors from various parts of the world stretching from America to Asia.  
 
Liberalism theory, through its perspective of Pluralism, has broadened the agenda of 
international relations, encompassing economic issues (Viotti & Kauppi 1999: 200). The 
foreign policies of states in contemporary history cover a wide range of issues. 
Accordingly, Namibia places on its foreign policy agenda economic issues such as 
market access and attracting trade and investment. This makes her foreign policy and 
conduct of economic diplomacy to be Liberalism theory-inclined. 
 
3.10  Challenges to early economic diplomacy  
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy during the formative years did not only record successes. 
There were some challenges that resulted in poor performance and, in some instances, in 
controversial failures. Comparative studies reveal that new states have some challenges 
and controversies in foreign policy-making. Meidijainen (2009:  230 – 231), for example, 
writes that in the early years of the founding of Estonian diplomacy in 1917 when 
auditors requested reports on foreign relations expenditure, it caused embarrassments as 
there were irregularities in the form of unaccounted or unexplained use of funds.  
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3.10.1  Lost business opportunities due to attitudes and perceptions 
 
Some of the early investment programmes and projects did not materialise. For example, 
Namibia’s first High Commissioner to Nigeria, Ndeutapo Amagulu (interview: 2011), 
admits that a number of investments from Nigeria could not materialise as Namibian 
businesspersons appeared not to be keen on them. Consequently, these investments went 
to South Africa. The then President of the Association of Nigerians in Namibia 
(ANINAM), Emmanuel Obafemi Alamu Bajomo, said to the Nigerian Head of State, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, during a state visit to Namibia in 2002, 
We are not saying that we do not, now and then, have among us a few Nigerians that continue to 
project the country’s image in bad light (Nigerian High Commission 2002: 28). 
 
Reluctance from the side of the Namibian businesspersons could, therefore, arguably be 
attributed to negative perceptions about their Nigerian counterparts. The negative 
attitudes and their resultant loss of business opportunities for Namibia were confirmed by 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, who informed the Parliament, in 
1993, that when Michael Kennedy and his business delegation visited Namibia for 
prospective investments, they were told by local businesspersons that the Namibian 
market was too small. Michael Kennedy is the son of Robert F. Kennedy, the 64th US 
Attorney-General and brother of John F. Kennedy, the 35th President of the US. Local 
businesspersons even further suggested that the Kennedys should rather invest in South 
Africa. This also happened to investors from Malaysia and Italy (National Assembly 
1994c: 209 – 210). Gurirab’s assertion was confirmed by Asheeke (2011: interview), who 
stated that there was a negative attitude towards government initiated trade and 
investments in the early years. He maintained that some companies, especially those that 
are family-based, do not see the need to engage in investments that the government 
endeavour to campaign for. But, as Namibia’s economic diplomacy evolved over the 
years, the private sector and the Government eventually worked together to attract trade 
and investment (see Chapter Four). 
 
Namibia further faced numerous challenges in the process of establishing herself as a US’ 
trade partner. In this instance, Namibia could not succeed in becoming a trade partner for 
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meat products. Namibia further tried to have her beer enter the American market, but 
American beer, in particular Budweiser, proved to be more popular among the consumers 
(Kalomoh 2011: interview). Despite the challenges, Namibia eventually succeeded in 
securing the US market for her products and the US became her major trading partner 
(see Chapter Five). 
 
The process of deploying Commercial Counsellors to Namibia’s diplomatic 
establishments took longer than expected. While the budget of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry made provision for commercial representation in 1990 (National Assembly 
1990b: 137), it was only in 1995 that Namibia deployed Commercial Counsellors. The 
absence of Commercial Counsellors meant that there was no dedicated focus on trade and 
investment in the embassies; this function was performed by officers who had other 
responsibilities, such as political diplomacy and consular matters.  
 
Some of the failures were caused by the locations of the commercial representatives. 
Some countries have different political and commercial capitals. For example, Shipoke 
(2011: interview), argues that while the political capital of the US is Washington DC, the 
country’s economic centres are in New York State, Texas and California. Commercial 
Counsellors reside in political capitals and operate directly from the embassies. Given the 
constraints of resources, which are common to small states in general, Namibia’s 
Commercial Counsellors who are stationed at the embassies in political capitals have not 
always been able to travel to commercial capitals.  
 
3.10.2 Lack of support for Honorary Consuls 
 
There were instances when the Government did not make good use of the services of 
Honorary Consuls in pursuing economic diplomacy. Former Commercial Counsellor at 
the Namibian embassy in the US. Paulo Shipoke (2011: interview) observes that some 
Honorary Consuls worked hard in promoting trade and investment, but they did not 
receive enough support from the Namibian Government. This would include smooth 
 122 
facilitation of their travels to sending states and providing them with the appropriate 
protocol courtesies when they visited. 
 
Honorary Consuls facilitate trade and investment between the host countries and the 
countries that they represent. However, they work on a voluntary basis, in return of 
minimal diplomatic privileges. Therefore, if an Honorary Consul does not receive the 
necessary support, he or she might be reluctant to continue in that position, or he or she 
may neglect his or her diplomatic duties. 
 
Since Liberalism as a theory of IR studies propounds the importance of economic 
matters, it is important that actors who promote economic diplomacy should be 
supported. 
 
3.10.3 Controversial investment projects 
 
Another failure of Namibia’s early economic diplomacy is the fact that some promised 
investments have never materialised. For example, the Pidico (Projects Industrial 
Developments Investment Company) project which came to Namibia from Egypt 
promised that it would launch an EPZ which would have resulted in large-scale 
employment and agricultural projects. Pidico also promised to provide N$ 100 million to 
establish a printing business in Namibia which would not only print Namibian school text 
books but also Zimbabwean school text books (The Namibian 3 (374) 1994: 1; Amupadhi 
2004: 3). In the end none of the Pidico projects materialised.  
  
While Pidico’s owner, Mohamed Hassan, an Egyptian businessman, has claimed that he 
is a well-established businessman who is involved in other projects such as a N$ 120 
million project in Egypt’s western desert, there has been media reports that Hassan is 
questionable as a credit worthy investor (The Namibian 3 (374) 1994: 1; The Namibian 
12 November 2004). Accordingly, in 1993, during the Budget Debate in Parliament, 
when the issue of Pidico’s failed investments was reported, Hans Eric Staby, a Member 
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of Parliament for the Official Opposition, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), 
stated, 
There are, nevertheless, certain basic things which have to be established and assessed before the 
initial decisions concerning investment and concerning the important investment. Does the 
Ministry as a matter of policy consider it necessary to obtain information on the financial standing 
of investors...it may prove fruitful to obtain credit rating, for instance, in the case of less well-
known operators (National Assembly 1994c: 201).  
 
Staby argued that some of the projects were not economically viable. He said a project 
like Pidico, where an amount of N$ 285 million was to be expended, should not have 
been announced as it had raised the expectations of the people. 
 
When the opposition parties questioned the viability and credibility of the Pidico project 
in Parliament, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Hidipo Hamutenya, was evasive 
and never addressed the substance of the questions. For example, Geoffrey Mwilima of 
the DTA asked about the environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the proposed 
agricultural projects of Pidico, but Minister Hamutenya said that the pro-DTA media had 
already propagated about Pidico being broke and it was ironic for the DTA 
parliamentarian to ask questions about a broke company (National Assembly 1994b: 323 
– 324). When the allegations of Pidico’s bribery involving him were made in Parliament, 
Minister Hamutenya refused to comment on the allegations. This invited interjection 
from the House after which he threatened, “Just repeat that nonsense outside this door 
and I will get you locked up immediately” (National Assembly 1994a: 369).  
 
During the parliamentary debate on the EPZ Bill, Eric Biwa of the UDF cautioned 
against doing businesses with companies like Pidico when he stated, 
Talking of the establishment of the EPZ’s (sic) in Namibia reminds me of one of the first mistakes 
made by our government right at the outset. The Government made a bad start by trying to involve 
some dubious foreign investors in the development of the EPZ’s (sic) in Namibia...And while on 
this score, I would like to know from the Minister what place the so-called Pidico company 
currently occupies in the setting up of the EPZ’s (sic) in Namibia (National Assembly 1995a: 50). 
 
Parliament provided a platform to lawmakers to effectively contribute to debates on 
issues of trade and investment, thereby making their contribution to economic diplomacy. 
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In summary, the controversial Pidico project reflects a failure in Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. The company had no credible history as an investor and its project in 
Namibia have not materialised. With the Minister of Trade being evasive in answering 
questions, it rendered the scheme dubious. Meanwhile, Parliament asserted its role as a 
co-author of economic diplomacy, an aspect that will be discussed in Chapter Four of this 
study. 
 
3.11 Summary 
 
From independence in 1990 to 1995 the status of the Namibian economy changed in that 
the economy became diversified. By 1995, Namibia, however, still had foreign debts 
inherited from the colonial government. These were written of two years later in 1997 
(Sherbourne 2009: 12, 72).  
 
With the dawning of Namibia’s independence on 21 March 1990, the country’s economic 
diplomacy started unfolding. Namibia’s diplomacy was conducted by inexperienced 
diplomats, most of whom were freedom fighters barely a year previously. It was these 
officers who were charged by the President to pursue economic diplomacy as another 
phase of economic struggle. But by the end of the first term of the Government in 1995, 
these officers had grown into experienced diplomats. Furthermore, by that time 
diplomatic establishments were not only staffed by political officers, but also by 
Commercial Counsellors who were solely dealing with specialised diplomacy, i.e. trade 
matters. 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy during the formative years focused on the southern 
Africa region. By 1995, she had five diplomatic missions in Angola, Botswana, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, thereby fostering good neighbourliness. The mission in 
South Africa was opened after the first democratic elections in that country in 1994. 
Namibia further forged relationships with allies who had assisted Namibians in the 
struggle for liberation as well as other middle to superpowers in the international political 
and economic system. In pursuing economic diplomacy, the Namibian Government 
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embraced the private sector in the making of economic diplomacy, providing 
opportunities for the Namibian entrepreneurs to have joint-ventures with their 
counterparts from other countries. The Government further included the private sector in 
government delegations to missions aimed at promoting economic relations (see Chapter 
Four).  
 
The Government has put in place legislation and policies that are attractive to investors 
and do not place unnecessary burdens on them. By 1995 the Government had passed the 
Foreign Investment Act and EPZ Act as important pieces of legislation that regulate how 
to conduct economic diplomacy in respect to trade, investment and exports. These 
instruments present a favourable opportunity to foreign investors. For example, investors 
who contribute to the creation of manufacturing industries receive tax incentives through 
the creation of EPZs. By the end of its first term the Government had also adopted its first 
master policy document, the NDP 1. This is in addition to other policy documents, one 
example being the White Paper on national and sectoral policies which underscores 
economic diplomacy.  
 
The Government further made use of conference and multilateral diplomacy methods as 
instruments of economic diplomacy. Mere hosting of conferences does not mean that a 
country has an effective tool for economic diplomacy. The measurement of conferences’ 
successes is when they bear fruit. Namibia’s conference diplomacy was effective because 
it attracted investors to invest in the Namibian fishing and diamond industries, for 
example. 
 
In concluding this chapter, Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of the elements of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy during the period 1990 to 1995.  
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Figure 2: Namibia’s economic diplomacy during the formative years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
 
An adaptation of Du Plessis (2006) and Table 2, Figure 2 summarises the 
interconnectedness between the actors, goals, instruments, forms and outputs of the 
country’s early economic diplomacy. Actors are placed at the centre as they are the 
primary drivers of economic diplomacy because they enact laws, formulate policies, 
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carry out short-term bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and set the goals for Namibia’s 
diplomacy. 
 
Namibia’s evolving economic diplomacy is primarily based on mutual gainful relations, 
as embodied in the Namibian constitutional principles of foreign policy (Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53). In this respect, Namibia wanted to ensure that 
her natural resources benefit the country through industrialisation, thereby creating jobs 
for Namibians. The President and Ministers advocated this approach. 
 
Namibia’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy was built on previous relations 
established by SWAPO as a liberation movement. These relations with the Nordic 
countries, for example, were renewed under a new framework of government to 
government relations and continued on the cooperation programmes which were decided 
upon prior to independence.  
 
Although Namibia is a small country, the scope of her economic diplomacy is broader 
and covers a relatively larger market. With the end of the Cold War which brought trade 
opportunities in Eastern Europe, Namibia did not hesitate to extend her economic 
diplomacy to that region. Overall, the trade and investment activities that flowed to 
Namibia signify an achievement of her economic diplomacy, albeit there were also some 
instances of failed trade and investment ventures.  
 
The period during which Namibia’s economic diplomacy commenced, 1990, coincided 
with the end of the Cold War which marked political hostilities between the countries of 
the East and West Bloc. The end of the Cold War gave rise to the prominence of 
economic issues and this corresponds to the assumptions of Liberalism theory (Gilpin 
2008: 239). Accordingly, the essence of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, namely mutual 
benefits between partners and other trends in her economic diplomacy, such as 
multilateralism, are inclined to Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. Therefore, Namibia 
opened diplomatic missions in countries that were traditionally friends and erstwhile 
opponents.  
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Namibia also adopted specialised diplomacy during the formative years. The Commercial 
diplomats added value to the functioning of the Namibian embassies. They 
complemented the work of other diplomats and formed a strong team to pursue 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy in their receiving states. 
 
Namibia’s formative years of economic diplomacy were also marked by challenges. As a 
small and new state with limited resources, Namibia had inexperienced diplomats and 
government leaders who could not always adopt calculated measures to win strategic 
investments. This resulted in investments opportunities being lost to other countries and 
further resulted in venturing into failed investments shrouded in controversies. Namibia 
further failed to extend the necessary support to the Honorary Consuls who are important 
for marketing Namibian products and bringing investors to Namibia. 
 
Chapter Four, discusses the actors involved in the making of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. These are state and non-state actors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACTORS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THE PRACTICE OF NAMIBIA’S 
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A number of both state and non-state actors are involved in the foreign policy-making 
process and the conduct of diplomacy in general. The making of Namibia’s foreign 
policy and the conduct of her economic diplomacy is no exception. Namibia’s first 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah (2011: interview), stated 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not hold monopoly over the pursuing of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy; this is a responsibility of all citizens. Thus, a number of 
government institutions and the private sector are involved in the practice of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. 
 
This chapter discusses actors in Namibia’s economic diplomacy. They include the 
Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government Ministries, the Parliament, 
regional governments, local authorities, public enterprises and the private sector. The 
private sector, in the context of Namibia, refers to the business sector and does not 
include the rest of the civil society like the media and NGOs, for example. Thus, the City 
of Windhoek’s foreign policy that will be discussed below differentiates between the 
private sector and the civil society. This study focuses on the private sector because, 
although civil society is involved in foreign policy matters, in general, their involvement 
is on political diplomacy (see Mushelenga 2008: 226 – 228). 
 
4.2  Constitutional provisions on foreign policy and diplomacy  
 
Rourke (2008: 82) notes that state actors’ role on foreign policy is determined by the type 
of government, the situation, the type of policy, the type of power given to the leaders 
and the capabilities of the leaders. The Namibian Constitution grants foreign policy-
making powers to the Executive and Legislature. Article 32 empowers the President to 
negotiate agreements or delegate such power and appoint diplomatic representatives 
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(Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 23). Article 63 grants foreign relations 
powers to the Parliament in terms of ratifying bilateral agreements concluded between 
Namibia and other states and multilateral agreements to which Namibia should accede 
(Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 37). 
 
The foreign policy principles in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution (Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53), provide for the fostering of relations with 
countries in the world, to accrue benefits to Namibia and her friends. This requires public 
participation on matters of foreign policy. Secondly, Namibia is founded on the principles 
of democracy, where people should be allowed to freely participate and air their views on 
matters of public governance.   
 
The capabilities of the Namibian Government leaders determine their involvement and 
strategies of economic diplomacy. Capabilities enable leaders to choose the agenda of the 
country’s foreign relations and methods to be adopted in pursuing economic diplomacy. 
Rourke (2008: 82) submits that sometimes leaders have informal powers over foreign 
policy matters. Accordingly, in pursuing economic diplomacy the general public will 
look upon their leaders for direction. Leaders become the embodiment of the nation’s 
foreign policy and they are expected to shape economic diplomacy programmes. 
 
4.3 State actors and economic diplomacy 
 
Foreign policy, in general, is largely, but not exclusively, the domain of state actors. Hill 
(2003: 56) observes that foreign policy is conducted at the highest level by the Head of 
Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs and other economic ministers who can 
collectively be referred to as the ‘foreign policy executives’. Foreign policy issues evolve 
over time and some issues arises unexpectedly. It is, thus, important that a small group of 
executives are involved in the conduct of a country’s foreign policy.  
 
With regard to the pursuing of Namibia’s economic diplomacy,  these actors include the 
President as the Head of State, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
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of Trade and Industry and their respective staff, other government Ministers and their 
staff, the Parliament, regional governments, local authorities and SOEs. 
 
4.3.1 The President as an economic diplomacy actor 
 
Barston (2006: 74 – 76) writes about the Heads of State and Government’s involvement 
in the making of diplomacy through personal diplomacy. This is done through state visits 
and correspondence or through sending envoys. It is one form of diplomacy that plays an 
important role in forging cooperation and alliances. Du Plessis (2006: 140), too, in his 
typology of diplomacy (see Chapter Two) writes about this form of temporary diplomacy 
characterised by high level visits, among others. 
 
4.3.1.1 President Nujoma and Namibia’s economic diplomacy: initiatives, drives and 
strategies 
 
The agency-structure debate on foreign policy discusses the role of individuals and 
structures on foreign policy and the influence that either of the two has on the other. The 
central question is whether the individuals’ preferences and interests drive their conduct 
of foreign policy or whether their actions are shaped by the dynamics of the environment 
and institutions surrounding them (Brighi & Hill 2008: 119). President Nujoma has been 
an actor who steers the direction of institutions. He takes initiatives and drives economic 
diplomacy agenda rather than waiting for the structures to shape his initiatives. For 
example, in pursuing economic diplomacy with Malaysia, President Nujoma brought the 
Smart Partnership Dialogue concept to Namibia and, by extension, to the southern Africa 
region (see Chapter Six). 
 
President Nujoma adopted personal diplomacy by visiting old friends and making new 
friends with the aim of attracting trade and investment to Namibia. Former Namibian 
High Commissioner to Nigeria and Malaysia, Ndeutapo Amagulu (2011: interview), 
affirms that President Nujoma has been an important role player in the making of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy (referred to in Chapters Three and Five). He describes 
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Nujoma as a powerful player whose office actively promoted trade and investment with 
foreign countries. Amagulu further states that during his presidency, President Nujoma 
established a good rapport with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
which enhanced trade between the two countries. It was during their tenures of office that 
the Langkawi and Southern Africa International Dialogues were held (see Chapter Six). 
The dialogue, held in Namibia in 1998, was the second of its kind, the first being the one 
that was held in Malaysia in 1995 (Angolo 2012: interview). In terms of the typology by 
Du Plessis (2006: 140), President Nujoma’s personal diplomacy was carried out in terms 
of temporary diplomacy by way of both inter-governmental high level visits and 
conference diplomacy on specific issues. 
 
President Nujoma marketed Namibia as a viable trade and investment destination to 
businesspersons from other countries. He used instruments or platforms such as his state 
visits, addresses to trade fairs and investment conferences. He cited, among others, good 
infrastructure and incentives for manufactures as attractive means for doing business with 
Namibia (Office of the President 1999a: 67, 393, 462).  
 
President Nujoma played an active role in driving for large economic projects. For 
example in May 1995, during his visit to South Africa, Namibia and South Africa 
underscored the changing nature of foreign policy from mere political to economic 
cooperation. Accordingly, the two countries discussed the need to cooperate on the 
energy sector by developing the Kudu Gas Fields in Namibia to ensure power self-
sufficiency (The Namibian 5 (330) 1996: 1). Adequate energy capacity is required for 
major economic activities, especially in the mining and industry sectors. The Kudu Gas 
Project is, accordingly, essential for an increased manufacturing base in Namibia. 
 
Maintaining important projects with large neighbours is a typical trend in small states’ 
diplomacy. This is reflected in Kyrgyzstan’s economic diplomacy with China, for 
example. China and Kyrgyzstan entered into joint partnership to develop the Kyrgyzstan-
China gas pipeline, pumping gas from Turkmenistan to Kashi in China. These two 
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countries then agreed that their economic relationship would be based on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefits (Wu & Li: 2013: 1; Global Times 12 September 2013: 1). 
 
It is typical for some small states leaders to exert much influence on the practice of 
diplomacy. Hey (2003: 131) states that The Gambian President, Yahya Abdul-Aziz 
Jemus Junkung Jammeh was a skilful and tenacious diplomat who worked for the 
acceptance of The Gambia as an important entity in international relations. Similarly, 
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker was an active foreign policy-maker who has 
presided over foreign policy issues and served as the embodiment of his country’s foreign 
relations (Hey 2003: 91).  
 
President Nujoma’s strategies have had an impact on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab (2010: interview), 
confirms that Namibia’s economic diplomacy is founded on the philosophy of former 
President Nujoma who declared that following independence, Namibia faced another 
struggle for economic emancipation. Accordingly, when Minister Gurirab’s deputy, 
Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, declared in the Parliament that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had set the motto for the year 1992 to be ‘Diplomacy with a purpose, the 
economic development of Namibia’ (see Chapter Three), the Ministry was defining what 
the President had in mind.  
 
The strategies of President Nujoma had further an impact on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy as a small state. It opened Namibian goods to the world market (see Chapter 
Five). It further brought the Namibian private sector into the fold of the Smart 
Partnership Dialogues (see Chapter Six).  Liberalism as a theory of IR studies recognises 
that the multi-centric world has institutions that are not part of the state establishments. 
Further, the theory maintains that economic cooperation will be forged for the mutual 
benefits of all partners (Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 104, 106).  
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4.3.1.2 The Nujoma Doctrine: Maintaining old friends and winning new ones 
 
President Nujoma advocated that apart from the friends that Namibia had acquired 
through SWAPO during the period of liberation struggle, the post-independent Namibia 
required that Namibia should obtain new friends in order to realise economic prosperity.  
Although SWAPO did not have strong relations with the West Bloc countries in the 
context of Cold War politics, President Nujoma (2011: interview), deemed it necessary 
that Namibia should open an office in the EU capital, Brussels, in order to facilitate the 
entry of her  products in the EU market. 
 
Addressing Namibian diplomats at the first diplomatic trading in May 1990, President 
Nujoma stated that in their promotion of trade and investments, they should engage all 
countries of the world (Office of the President 1999: 15). The mentioning of “all 
countries” by President Nujoma underscores the importance of engaging both old and 
new friends.  The founders of the Namibian state included in the Namibian Constitution, 
the foreign policy principle of maintaining non-alignment (Ministry of Informational and 
Broadcasting 1990: 52). This principle implored upon Namibia to relate to “all 
countries”. As stated within the research problem (see Chapter One), Namibia’s 
independence came during the end of the Cold War and the absence of bipolar 
international system required a new focus on foreign policy. With the new developments 
in world politics, it was ideal that President Nujoma adopted a principle to acquire many 
new friends for Namibia.   
 
President Nujoma further believed that the friendship that had been built with SWAPO’s 
allies over the years was to be maintained and consolidated. It was for that reason that he 
carried out re-circling diplomacy (see Chapter Three and Figure 2). This was to 
consolidate long-standing relations with the Nordic countries in 1993. The press release 
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993) about the visit to the Nordic countries, 
confirmed President Nujoma’s doctrine on maintaining old friends, as the visit was aimed 
at thanking the Nordic countries for their role in the liberation struggle for Namibia and 
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to further forge economic relations between an independent Namibia and the Nordic 
countries.  
 
The Frontline States and Nigeria were important role players who were involved in the 
process of negotiations that produced a roadmap for Namibia’s independence.11 President 
Nujoma was cognisant that reaching out to these old friends would strengthen economic 
relations in addition to political relations that had been built over the past years. 
Exchange state visits between President Nujoma and his Botswana counterpart, President 
Quett Masire, took place in 1990, within six months of Namibia’s independence and at 
both occasions, President Nujoma spoke of the need to increase trade volumes between 
Namibia and Botswana (Office of the President 1990a: 40 – 41).  
 
President Nujoma attended the Zambia Agricultural Show in 1990 and the Zimbabwe 
Trade Fair in 1991 where he promoted trade and investment and emphasised the need for 
economic cooperation and joint-venture partnerships between Namibia and the respective 
members of the Frontline States (Chapter Three). In 1992, President Nujoma invited 
President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria to pay a state visit to Namibia. During the visit, a 
Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, was inaugurated 
(The Namibian 2 (558) 1992: 2). 
 
Relations with two members of the Frontline States, Tanzania and Mozambique in the 
context of Nujoma’s economic diplomacy doctrine, are reflected by the high-level visits 
by the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Prime Minister Hage Geingob visited 
Mozambique in 1990 during which Namibia and Mozambique signed the General 
Agreement on Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation. The Prime 
Minister of Mozambique, Mario Machungo, visited Namibia in 1994 and a Memorandum 
of Understanding in Fisheries Cooperation was signed (Office of the Prime Minister 
1994). Namibia and Mozambique are coastal states with abundant marine resources and a 
                                                 
11  The Frontline states were southern Africa countries, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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cooperation agreement in the fisheries sector stands to promote the development of their 
respective fisheries sector. 
 
With regard to Tanzania, former President of Tanzania, Julius Njerere, was invited to 
visit Namibia in 1991, while Tanzanian Prime Minister, John Malecela, was invited to 
visit Namibia in 1992. Peer discussions reveal that the visits by the two Tanzanian 
leaders were, however, more about political than economic relations. Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy with Angola, which was another member of the Frontline States, 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
  
President Nujoma is a pragmatic foreign policy-maker who champions practical 
applications of his foreign policy doctrine. He did not pursue ideas unrealistically, 
leaving them to become sloganeering diplomacy. His pragmatism was not driven by the 
notion of self-interest for Namibia. It is embedded it the constitutional principle of non-
alignment and mutual beneficial relations. He wanted Namibia to embrace friends that 
would contribute to her economic development and prosperity and avoid political and 
economic isolation. 
 
 The doctrine of maintaining old friends is embedded in solidarity and ideology. Ideology 
is beliefs and ideas that have been adopted to form the basis of economic, political or 
social philosophy (Olivier 2006: 170). President Nujoma wanted Namibia to maintain 
strong economic relations with old political allies. Namibian leaders generally speak 
about the Namibian independence being a result of international solidarity. While 
embracing new friends, President Nujoma did not want Namibia to break economic ties 
with old friends and political allies who helped to bring about Namibia’s independence. 
This is different from small states of Eastern Europe, for example, which after the Cold 
War, broke ranks with Russia in favour of the US and joined NATO. To ensure the 
effective implementation of his doctrine, President Nujoma himself set an example by 
adopting forms of diplomacy (see Figure 2) that promoted new friendship and maintained 
longstanding relations. 
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The Nujoma doctrine is the opposite of the linear escalation in Figure 1 by Du Plessis 
(2006: 136) as it moves from political diplomacy to economic cooperation. The economic 
cooperation is not about aid which creates dependency, but trade and investments that are 
mutually beneficial. The output indexes of trade and investment (see Figure 2) that are 
reflected in Tables 7 and 8, reflect the Nujoma economic diplomacy doctrine of 
maintaining old friends and acquiring new ones (see further discussions in Chapter Five). 
The forms of diplomacy employed to implement the Nujoma Doctrine were both 
permanent and temporary diplomacy (see Table 2). This is illustrated by the opening of 
Namibian embassies and high level visits to countries from both the East and West blocs 
(see Chapters Three and Five). 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies supports Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy 
with her old and new friends, which as discussed in the previous chapters, covers various 
fields such as agriculture, fisheries and transport, among others. Liberalism theory argues 
that commercial diplomacy ensures that interaction among states cut across a number of 
issues of mutual concerns. States will be able to accommodate each other’s interests and 
work towards common goals for their respective developments. In their trade relations, 
states gain comparative advantages which they appreciate and, thus, avoid policies that 
will upset their mutual benefits (Doyle & Recchia 2011: 1436). 
 
4.3.1.3 President Pohamba’s personal diplomacy 
 
In pursuing Namibia’s economic diplomacy, President Pohamba used personal diplomacy 
described by Du Plessis (2006: 140) as a form of temporary diplomacy characterised by 
high level visits (see Table 2). He undertook 12 official and state visits to various 
countries, including six in SADC, namely Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Other countries visited included Namibia’s major trade partners, 
namely China, Germany and the US (Office of the President [sa]). 
 
In conducting personal diplomacy, President Pohamba placed emphasises on joint-
ventures and mutual beneficial relations, like his predecessor, President Nujoma. In April 
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2005, President Pohamba visited Zimbabwe, having been in office for less than a month. 
During his visit, he invited businesspersons from that country to enter into joint-ventures 
with their Namibian counterparts. During his visit to South Africa in May 2005, President 
Pohamba stressed the importance of the Kudu gas project, a joint-venture involving 
Namibian and South African power utilities, NamPower and Eskom, respectively (Office 
of the President [sa]: 18). As members of a common customs union, Namibian and South 
Africa are in a position to enhance industrialisation and economic diversification.  
 
Both the NDP 2 and NDP 3, as instruments of diplomacy, underscore the importance of 
developing the Kudu Gas Fields (National Planning Commission 2002a; National 
Planning Commission 2008b: 53). Discussions on this major power generation continue 
and they were part of the bilateral talks between Namibia and South Africa during the Bi-
National Commissions meeting that was held in November 2013.  
 
During his visit to Angola at the end of April 2005, President Pohamba informed his 
Angolan counterpart that Namibia was open to cooperation on trade and investment, with 
Angola and called for the re-activation of the Joint Commission of Cooperation between 
Angola and Namibia which had been inactive for some years. The Joint Commissions 
were a type of a long-term form of diplomacy which this study added to Du Plessis’s 
typology of diplomacy (see Chapter Two). Joint Commissions allow states to cooperate 
on various economic sectors to enhance trade and investment between them (Office of 
the President [sa]: 26). 
 
On two occasions President Pohamba addressed the Business Council for International 
Understanding (BCIU) at the roundtable in Washington DC in 2005 and at the business 
dinner in New York in 2006. The BCIU is a business association for more than 170 major 
companies and was founded in 1955 by President Dwight Eisenhower of the US. At the 
roundtable dinner, President Pohamba marketed Walvis Bay as the ideal port where US 
goods could enter the southern African market. He stated, 
Walvis Bay, Namibia’s main harbour...with a modern infrastructure...makes Namibia the first port 
of call for potential investors in southern Africa. In fact, according to the Africa Competitiveness 
Report, which is compiled by the Harvard University, Walvis Bay is ranked as the number one 
port in Africa, in terms of cost and efficiency (Office of the President [sa]: 93). 
 139 
 
President Pohamba further informed the US businesspersons that the port of Walvis Bay 
had maintained zero-theft, non-pilferage and non-violation of cargo for seven consecutive 
years. President Pohamba’s promotion of the Walvis Bay harbour fulfils one of the 
objectives of the NDP 1 which states that government plans to promote Walvis Bay as 
the gateway  for the southern Africa region (National Planning Commission 1995a: 255). 
 
The issue of logistics as one of the economic priorities stated in the NDP 4 (National 
Planning Commission 2012b: 81) includes the fact that Namibia wants the port of Walvis 
Bay to become a preferred west coast port in the region and on the continent. 
Accordingly, Namibian diplomats will market the port as an ideal logistics and 
distribution port. The NDP 4 states that Namibia will maintain the efficiency of the 
Walvis Bay harbour where the loading and unloading of goods take place within 24 
hours. The harbour has competitive advantage over other harbours in the SADC region 
for it takes two to five days to deliver goods to their respective destinations in the SADC 
region, Europe and America. Delivery of goods from other harbours in the region takes 
14 days (National Planning Commission 2012b: 86). 
 
President Pohamba’s personal diplomacy further included consultations with his peers in 
the region on matters pertaining to international relations in order to adopt a common 
regional position when necessary. It is, therefore, arguable that in terms of the agency-
structure debate in IR studies, the structures shaped President Pohamba’s conduct of 
economic diplomacy. 
 
While President Pohamba differed in approach and style from his predecessor, President 
Nujoma, in respect of conducting economic diplomacy, in essence the economic 
diplomacy messages by the two Presidents were similar. Both advocated joint-venture 
partnerships and industrialisation of the Namibian economy (see also Chapters Three and 
Five). These are among the major goals of Namibia’s foreign policy (see Figure 2). 
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President Pohamba’s personal diplomacy was characterised by cooperation, in the form 
of strengthening political diplomacy with economic relations. It did not adopt the linear 
escalation illustrated in Figure 1 adopted from Du Plessis (2006: 136). 
 
President Nujoma and President Pohamba are both pioneers of the liberation struggle, 
who served in the leadership of SWAPO, as a liberation movement for close to 30 years 
and President Pohamba served in the Cabinet of President Nujoma for 15 years. Thus, 
President Pohamba, too, appreciated the importance of solidarity as an ideology in 
Namibia’s foreign policy. This is what enabled him to create initiatives to reach out and 
invite old friends from the liberation struggle days, from Cuba, Tanzania and Liberia, for 
example, using a temporary form of diplomacy such as high-level visits illustrated in 
Table 2. 
  
4.3.1.4 President Pohamba’s economic diplomacy trends: continuity with 
improvements 
 
The foreign policy making in general, and economic diplomacy in particular, under the 
presidential tenure of President Pohamba, were a continuity of the foundation laid by his 
predecessor, former President Nujoma. President Pohamba concurred with former 
President Nujoma’s economic diplomacy doctrine of maintaining old friends and winning 
new ones. This was reflected in his statement at the commissioning of the Namibia’s 
Heads of Missions to Austria, Botswana, Nigeria and the UN when he said, 
 
I would like to underline the fact that international relations have become more complex, where 
the traditional divide of east-west and north-south has given way to new alliances among nations 
as each country pursues its political and economic interest....Namibian diplomats need to fully 
appreciate the new forces and realities that shape international relations and global trade today 
(Office of the President [sa]: 222). 
 
President Pohamba placed emphasis on stronger economic ties, with countries that 
provided solidarity and support to Namibia during the liberation struggle. This is 
illustrated by the fact that Heads of State from these countries, who had never paid an 
official visit to Namibia before, were invited during President Pohamba’s tenure. They 
included Presidents Denis Sasou Ngueso of Congo, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, Raul 
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Castro of Cuba and Macky Sall of Senegal. It was the first time that leaders from these 
countries paid official visits to Namibia. As for Cuba’s former President, Fidel Castro, he 
had only ever made a stopover in Namibia for about one hour in 1997 on his way to the 
NAM Summit in South Africa, but has never paid an official visit to Namibia. 
 
In emphasising the importance of economic diplomacy with old friends, new diplomatic 
missions were opened in Tanzania and Egypt during President Pohamba’s first term of 
office. Tanzania is where the first SWAPO external office was opened while Egypt was 
where the first SWAPO guerrilla fighters were trained. President Pohamba’s emphasis on 
economic cooperation with countries that supported Namibia during the struggle is also 
illustrated by his firm stance to defend the Chinese investors (see Chapter Five). 
 
The opening of the embassies in Egypt and Tanzania fulfilled the targets of the NDP 3 
(National Planning Commission 2008b: 156). These diplomatic establishments were 
opened within the period covered by NDP 3 (2008 – 2012). 
 
A number of diplomatic missions were further opened during President Pohamba’s 
second term of office. Recognising the importance of multilateral diplomacy, the 
representational office to the WTO (see Chapter Three) in Switzerland was upgraded to a 
fully-fledged diplomatic mission in 2010. In extending her presence in Asia, Namibia 
opened a diplomatic mission in Japan in 2010.  
 
In 2014, Namibia opened diplomatic missions in the countries that provided material 
support during the liberation struggle, namely Congo (Brazzaville), Finland, Senegal and 
Ghana. Congo hosted a high school for Namibians at Loudima while Ghana enrolled 
Namibian students in her institutions of higher learning. SWAPO has a diplomatic 
mission in Senegal where Namibian learners were enrolled in high schools. Pre-
independence relations with Finland have been described above (see Chapter Three). 
 
President Pohamba recognised the importance of permanent forms of diplomacy (Table 
2). Thus, under his presidential tenure, Namibian diplomatic missions were expanded. A 
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mission to the WTO was opened in Geneva and new bilateral missions opened, 
considering economic relations, like the missions in Egypt and Japan. Consulates were 
opened in neighbouring countries, for example in South Africa and in Angola, to take 
care of the business interests and social welfare of Namibians. 
 
Immediately after assuming office in March 2005, President Pohamba urged Namibian 
Ministers, parliamentarians, government and SOEs officials to familiarise themselves 
with the SWAPO Elections Manifesto of 2004 in order to implement the plans and 
programmes that are set in the Manifesto. President Pohamba continued this message 
during his second presidential tenure. He argued that carrying out economic diplomacy 
was a collective responsibility of government leaders (Pohamba 2013: interview). These 
leaders should base their policy formulations and decisions on the Namibian Constitution, 
the NDP 1, 2 3, 4 and the SWAPO Election Manifesto of 2009.  
 
President Pohamba’s diplomatic trends are best illustrated in Figure 2. He placed 
emphasis on national policies as instruments of diplomacy. He further included as many 
actors as possible in the practice of economic diplomacy. He advocated diplomatic 
relations at inter-personal levels to ensure that Namibia maintains a significant influence 
in international relations. 
 
4.3.1.5 The Pohamba Doctrine: Promoting people-to-people contacts 
 
President Pohamba’s doctrine advocated relations that are not included in the forms and 
types of the diplomacy by Du Plessis (2006: 140) (see Table 2). He implored upon 
Namibian diplomats to promote people-to-people contacts. 
 
People-to-people contacts mean that the interactions between governments should not 
only be restricted to official engagements, but that it should include non-official relations 
and relations beyond the traditional political and economic inter-state relations. These are 
forms of inter-personal relations between the nationals of states that go beyond 
governmental relations, characterised by making friends at a personal level and inter-
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cultural and sport relations. Berridge (2010: 114 – 115) argues that diplomats need to 
cultivate contacts with the ruling elite for the purpose of gaining influence. Such personal 
rapport with the ruling elite is a form of people-to-people contacts. It is arguable that with 
sound people-to-people relations, a better influence in the promotion of trade and 
investment and maintaining a successful economic diplomacy can be achieved. 
 
At the commissioning of Namibia’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Kakena Nangula, on 29 
June 2005, President Pohamba urged her to promote, among others, people-to-people 
contacts between Namibia and Zimbabwe (Office of the President [sa]: 61). The 
President thereby introduced his doctrine on the occasion of his first commissioning of a 
Head of Mission since he assumed the office on 21 March 2005. President Pohamba 
repeated his doctrine of promoting people-to-people relations during the subsequent 
commissioning of Heads of Missions (Office of the President [sa]: 99, 223 and 331). 
During the commissioning of Hadino Hishongwa as High Commissioner to Botswana, 
President Pohamba underscored the importance of fraternal relations between the people 
of Namibia and of Botswana. He stated that Ambassador Hishongwa was tasked to 
further expand these relations to consolidate the bilateral relations between Namibia and 
Botswana (Office of the President [sa]: 369). This indicated how the President values the 
essence of people-to-people contacts in the strengthening of bilateral relations and 
inherently, the pursuing of economic diplomacy. 
 
It is important to note that people-to-people contact is advocated in the White Paper on 
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management and Minister Hamutenya’s address to 
diplomats (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 18; Hamutenya 2003). These two sources 
charge that diplomats should be able to track down corporate executives and create a 
good rapport with them, which will provide a great opportunity for discussing trade and 
investment matters. 
 
People-to-people contacts correspond to the propositions of Liberalism as a theory of IR 
studies (Swatuk 1991: 62).  This theory argues that actors from cooperating countries 
play a significant role in the promotion of interdependent relations between their states.  
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There is room for people, rather than bureaucrats, to make their contribution to the 
forging of foreign relations. Accordingly, President Pohamba’s doctrine was, arguably, 
anchored in Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. 
 
It was stated above that President Pohamba’s doctrine was stated at the commissioning of 
Heads of Mission to Zimbabwe, for example. Ideologically, there is a firm stance by the 
rank and file of SWAPO Party that the people of Zimbabwe should be supported in their 
quest for land reform and against sanctions by the US and the EU. Both Namibians and 
Zimbabweans lost land to colonial settlers in the process of colonisation. Therefore, 
Namibia affirms her political support to Zimbabwe and maintains economic relations by 
working together on integrated energy projects. Further, cooperation between the 
Chamber of Commerce, of the two countries was promoted and will be discussed below. 
President Pohamba’s doctrine, accordingly, embraces the liberation struggle ideology of 
solidarity with progressive people who support just causes like freedom and 
independence of the oppressed people.   
 
Like his predecessor, President Pohamba’s doctrine was aimed at building mutual 
beneficial relations. In his discussions with Ministers he called for the practical 
implementation of the bilateral agreements that Namibia signs with other countries. As a 
pragmatic leader, he asked to be informed meticulously about the benefits that Namibia 
would derive from specific relations with other states. 
 
President Pohamba’s stance on Namibia’s economic diplomacy towards China will be 
discussed below (see Chapter Five); it was anchored in the ideology of solidarity. He kept 
reminding Namibians about the assistance that China provided to Namibia during the 
liberation struggle. The output index of China’s relations with Namibia is illustrated in 
Table 8; China grew to become Namibia’s third highest major trade partner in 2012. 
 
People-to-people contact is another form of temporary diplomacy that has not been 
included in the typology of diplomacy by Du Plessis (2006: 140) (see Table 2). People-
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to-people contacts are part of ad hoc personal diplomacy that involves trans-
governmental and non-governmental relations at all levels including diplomats. 
 
Liberalism theory’s sociological perspective relates to the study between the relations of 
individuals. It propounds that individuals too plays an important role in the relations of 
states (Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 104 – 105). It is stated that relations between private 
individuals create a ground for cooperation between states. It is further asserted that 
cooperation built on relations between individuals tend to be greater than that of states. 
Pohamba’s economic diplomacy doctrine corresponded to this assumption of Liberalism 
theory. 
 
4.3.2 The Prime Minister 
 
Article 36 of the Namibian Constitution states that the Prime Minister is the principal 
assistant to the President. The Prime Minister’s duties are to coordinate the activities of 
Government Ministries (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 26). Namibia’s 
first Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, now the President of the Republic of Namibia with 
effect from 21 March 2015, was involved in the pursuit of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. He led business delegations to other countries to promote trade and attract 
FDI to Namibia. He further hosted visiting Prime Ministers where he discussed issues of 
economic cooperation with them. 
 
Within the first months of his second term as Prime Minister which started in December 
2012, Prime Minister Geingob undertook a trade promotion mission to the US, 
accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Tjekero Tweya and 25 
businesspersons. This was an opportunity for Namibian businesspersons to build 
partnership with their US counterparts. Addressing the Third Annual Palm Beach 
Strategic Forum in Florida, Prime Minister Geingob, informed the audience that Namibia 
maintains macro-economic policies and an enabling environment for trade and 
investment (Muraranganda 2013: 2). 
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An economic diplomacy drive by the Prime Minister depends on the holder of the office. 
The second Prime Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, who served in that position for less than 
three years, was not involved in trade promotion. Having been involved in economic 
diplomacy, when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gurirab concentrated on domestic 
issues during his tenure. 
  
The third Prime Minister, Nahas Angula, who served in that position from 21 March 
2005 to 5 December 2012, was not involved in the pursuing of economic diplomacy or 
the making of foreign policy, in general. Prime Minister Angula’s involvement in foreign 
relations matters was mostly when he was delegated to attend multilateral meetings on 
behalf of the President. He did not undertake trade promotion missions. Accordingly, 
during the premiership tenure of Gurirab and Angula, there was a gap between the Office 
of the Prime Minister and the conduct of economic diplomacy. This changed when the 
first Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, succeeded Angula as the fourth Prime Minister. 
Geingob reactivated the role of the Prime Minister on the conduct of economic 
diplomacy as it was the case during his previous premiership tenure.  
 
In September, 2013, Deputy Prime Minister, Marco Hausiku, led a delegation of about 60 
Namibian businesspersons to the 17th China International Fair for Investment and Trade 
(CIFIC), held in Xiamen. He was accompanied by the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Calle Schletwein as well as the researcher of this study in his capacity as Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. The Deputy Prime Minister encouraged businesspersons in his 
delegation to partner with their Chinese counterparts. He stated that the purpose of 
bringing businesspersons to the fair is to network and showcase trade and investment 
opportunities existing in Namibia (Hausiku 2013). 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies propounds that when acting on foreign policy 
matters, state officials act in accordance with the preferences of the subset of society. 
Once these preferences are defined and known, the directions of foreign policy will then 
be geared towards fulfilling their aspirations (Carlsnaes 2008: 94). It could be seen from 
the pursuing of economic diplomacy by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
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that the interests of the society, especially the business community, were taken into 
account. Accordingly, they pursue a Liberalism theory-oriented economic diplomacy. 
 
4.3.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as the coordinating Ministry for Namibia’s 
foreign relations. It facilitates inward and outward missions, including those that are 
related to trade and investment. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is the head of the 
Ministry, assisted by the Deputy Minister. These two political principals of the Ministry 
are responsible for formulating policies and driving them. They carry out such task with 
the support of the Ministry’s staff both at the headquarters and at diplomatic missions. 
Namibia’s first Ambassador to the US, Tuliameni Kalomoh (2011: interview), states that 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy was primarily driven by the first Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, both in terms of conceptualisation and practical  
implementation. For example, the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 
Management defines economic diplomacy to include, inter alia, issues of investment, 
market access, credit and technology transfer (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: iii). This 
definition was conceptualised by Minister Gurirab when he delivered a public lecture on 
Namibia’s foreign policy at the Superior Institute of International Relations and 
Diplomacy in Maputo, Mozambique, in 1998 (Gurirab 1998). The first Deputy Minister, 
Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, publicised the economic diplomacy concept in the Parliament 
in 1992 (see Chapter Three). 
 
Minister Hamutenya made a comprehensive contribution to the definition of the concept. 
Seven paragraphs in the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Economic Diplomacy are 
replicated word by word from Hamutenya’s address to the Heads of Missions conference 
where he was explaining economic diplomacy. Four more paragraphs were also adopted 
from Hamutenya’s speech, with minor changes only in terms of tenses or first/third 
persons references (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 1 – 20 and Hamutenya 2003). 
 
Du Plessis’ (2006: 140) typology of diplomacy which discuses forms, types and levels of 
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diplomacy espouse that states establish permanent diplomatic institutions such as resident 
missions in the receiving states. These missions have diplomatic, consular and specialised 
representation functions. Namibia’s diplomacy, too, adopts a similar form that it 
established diplomatic missions that have diplomatic and consular services. The 
diplomatic missions later expanded with the deployment of Commercial Counsellors. 
This added specialised functions to such missions.   
 
The most senior official at a Namibian diplomatic mission is the Ambassador or High 
Commissioner in case of missions in the Commonwealth member-states. The officials 
serving at the embassies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are stated in Chapter Three. 
Other embassy officials involved in economic diplomacy are mostly those holding the 
position of First Secretary responsible for economic affairs. This occurs particularly in 
missions where there are no positions of Commercial Counsellors. The First Secretary’s 
duties, when responsible for economic affairs, are, amongst others, gathering and 
compiling information on trade and investment and reporting to the Ambassador. The 
Ambassador will assume responsibility for the processing of the information to the head 
office (Mushelenga 2008: 113 – 114). 
 
As stated in Chapter Three, Namibia opened her first diplomatic missions in 1990. The 
first Ambassadors were commissioned on 20 May 1991 (National Assembly 1991b: 123). 
Minister Gurirab charged the first group of Namibian diplomats with the task to pursue 
economic diplomacy. He asserted that for the diplomats to be effective in pursuing 
economic diplomacy they needed to acquire skills in strategy and in executing their tasks 
effectively, they needed ‘a quick mind of salesman and versatility of an entrepreneur’ 
(National Assembly 1994: 136). His successor, Hidipo Hamutenya, gave prominence to 
economic diplomacy by regularly referring to the concept in his speeches, including 
addresses to diplomats (Hamutenya 2003; Hamutenya 2004). Hamutenya further tabled 
the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Practice which elaborated broadly on 
the concept of economic diplomacy (see Chapter One). 
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Former Namibia’s Ambassador to Belgium and the EU, Dr Zed Ngavirue (2013: 
interview), underscores the importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its 
embassies when he states that some businesses in Namibia became successful because of 
the contacts made by the Government. Berridge (2010: 119) says that embassies are key 
players of economic diplomacy as they are involved in the promotion of exports and 
investments between their sending and receiving states. Diplomats gather information on 
markets in order to secure businesses for products from their sending states. Former 
NCCI President, Inge Zaamwani-Kamwi (2013: interview), states that Namibia’s 
diplomatic missions are better placed to know the business environment and strategic 
business partners in the host countries. Therefore, together with the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, the missions serve as a source of information to the Namibian business 
communities on business opportunities outside Namibia. Diplomats’ expertise in 
knowing the business environment in host countries is further confirmed by Berridge 
(2010: 115 – 116). 
 
Former President of NCCI, Martha Namundjebo-Tilahun (2013: interview), concurs with 
her predecessor on the role of Namibian diplomatic missions. She, however, added that 
not all diplomatic missions are of assistance to businesspersons. Some missions have not 
been helpful in providing the necessary information to the business community or have 
not been actively involved in making initiatives to promote business exchange visits. Her 
views are shared by the NCCI’s Second Vice President, Vekuii Rukoro (2013: interview), 
who contends that there is a need to improve on the effectiveness of the diplomatic 
missions in the promotion of trade, particularly in fostering close economic relations 
between the Namibian private sector and their counterparts in the external markets. 
 
There is, however, a need for the embassies to perform beyond just making contacts. 
Rukoro (2013: interview) asserts that economic diplomacy will not be successful if 
diplomatic missions do not produce researched papers, on the market analysis that points 
out to the threats and opportunities existing in external markets. This study concurs with 
his views; comprehensive papers will reduce the risk of wasting money and resources by 
undertaking fruitless outbound trade missions where there may not be trade and 
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investment potentialities. There is a problem with the in-depth analyses from the reports 
coming from diplomatic missions with a few exceptions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the researcher of this study, as Deputy Minister, have often raised this issue with 
members of the management and Heads of Missions. 
 
Officials at embassies are involved in trade negotiations. This is particularly the case with 
the Namibian embassy in Brussels which has been involved in trade negotiations with the 
EU. The Ambassador forms part of the Namibian delegation to the EPA rounds of 
negotiations, both in Brussels and those that are held outside Brussels. Rana (2007: 125) 
writes about economic diplomacy of a small state Singapore, where Ambassadors play 
important roles in trade negotiations. Berridge (2010:  115) argues that while negotiations 
are led by officers from the capitals, the embassy officials still play an important role in 
the negotiations (Berridge 2010: 115). Embassy officials have important information 
about the attitude and interests of the counterpart negotiating team which negotiators 
from the headquarters do not have. The Ambassador and his staff are, therefore, better 
placed to advise negotiators from the capital on how to approach negotiations. 
 
Hamutenya (2003) propounds that the performance of diplomats should be measured in 
terms of performance targets. In this respect, their representation should demonstrate 
results. He further maintains that they should be equipped with the necessary skills and 
information about trends at home in order to be able to market their sending countries. 
 
The Namibian diplomatic missions are further involved in tourism promotion. The NDP 
4 states that tourism investment and promotion should be driven and remains competitive 
(National Planning Commission 2012b: 92). The Namibian missions are better placed to 
promote tourism to Namibia. In 2012, the Namibia Wildlife Resorts (NWR), invited five 
diplomats from Namibian embassies in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK 
and took them on a programme where they were introduced to NWR’s tourism facilities 
in Namibia. This was to provide them with the necessary information needed to promote 
tourism.  
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4.3.4  The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
 
Economic ministries play a role in the pursuing of economic diplomacy. The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, in particular, plays an equally important role like the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry sends specialised diplomats, Commercial Counsellors 
abroad; these become an integral part of the Namibian diplomatic missions. Commercial 
Counsellors provide a synergy between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Trade 
and Industry as they report to their sending Ministry through the Heads of Mission who 
supervise their work. Accordingly, both Ministries are kept abreast of trade and 
investment activities between Namibia and the host country where a Commercial 
Counsellor serves. Schimming-Chase (2011: interview) states that Commercial 
Counsellors have been playing pivotal roles in economic diplomacy, complementing the 
work of the Ambassador in engaging the business community.   
 
Du Plessis (2006:140) writes in his typology of diplomacy (see Chapter Two) that 
opening resident missions with specialised diplomats is a permanent form of diplomacy 
that states maintain to facilitate their bilateral relations. This form of diplomacy is 
reflected in Namibia’s economic diplomacy towards the US when a Commercial 
Counsellor was added to the staff complement of the Namibian embassy in the US (see 
Chapter Three). Shipoke (2011: interview) states that the Commercial Counsellor ensures 
Namibia’s participation in trade fairs. Trade fairs are not mentioned in Du Plessis’s 
typology and, accordingly, this study proposes that trade fairs should fall under the 
category of temporary form of diplomacy. They fall under the type of state-to-non-
governmental multilateral relations. They are multilateral in the sense that participants in 
trade fairs come from more than one country and they include MNCs. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry further leads important trade negotiations like in the 
case of the EPAs (see Chapter Six). In 2013, the Ministry convened the national 
stakeholders’ workshop on the EPAs. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss and 
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have a national position on the EPA negotiations strategies and options. Liberalism as a 
theory of IR studies embraces the role of the private sector in forging economic 
cooperation (Doyle & Recchia 2004: 1436). The goods exported to the EU are supplied 
by the private sector. It is, thus, important that they should make a contribution to a 
position that will be adopted by the Government on the EPA negotiations. 
 
The Ministry of Trade advises the Government on major policy decisions that facilitate 
easier trade and investments. For example, it made a Cabinet submission recommending 
the removal of visa barriers to traders from within the SADC region. This resulted in 
even small traders from Tanzania and Zimbabwe coming to Namibia where they sell 
wood carvings in Okahandja (Tweya 2012: interview). 
 
In pursuing economic diplomacy, two important institutions under the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry play a key role. These are the Investment Centre and the ODC (Pakote 2011: 
interview). The functions of the ODC and the Investment Centre were discussed in 
Chapter Three. The two institutions complement each other. The difference being that the 
Investment Centre is a government department whose mandate is to attract FDI in all 
spheres. The Investment Centre has a broader mandate than the ODC, a government-
owned company, whose investment promotion functions is restricted to the EPZ.   
 
Namundjebo-Tilahun (2013: interview) confirms that the Namibian Investment Centre 
has been of a great assistance to the business community in providing information about 
existing business opportunities in the world. Her views are echoed by the Chief Executive 
of NCCI, Tarah Shaanika (2013: interview), who states that the Centre has been effective 
in marketing Namibian businesses and placing them in contact with their counterparts 
from other countries. 
 
Webber & Smith (2002: 32) propound that there are frictions between the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and other Ministries over foreign policy matters. This is more prevalent 
in established democracies. However, though Namibia is a democratic state, there are no 
turf wars between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries when it comes to 
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foreign policy arena. While there is no turf of war between the Ministries, their 
cooperation is, however, on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless, it is not ideal that issues of 
cooperation between the Ministries are discussed in the corridors where sometimes they 
are then not documented. There is a need for a permanent inter-ministerial structure as 
recommended below, where cross cutting issues are discussed. 
 
4.3.5 Other government Ministries and institutions 
 
While it is acknowledged that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Trade and Industry 
are the key drivers of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, they are complemented in their 
efforts by other sectoral economic ministries. This is because the promotion of trade and 
investment focuses on specific areas like the marketing of agricultural, mining or 
fisheries products, for example. These products fall under the respective line ministries 
that negotiate the relevant trade agreements.  
 
It is observed that during official visits of Heads of State, or meetings of Joint 
Commissions of Cooperation, officials from economic ministries form part of the 
Namibian delegations. During official visits by Heads of State, when Namibia considers 
entering into trade of goods with another country, a Minister responsible for the sector 
concerned leads the negotiations that culminate into signing an agreement. With respect 
to meetings of bilateral commissions, officials from economic ministries form parts of the 
delegation to lead negotiations pertaining to their sector. 
 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy is a leading state actor on Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy in the field of minerals and energy. For example, Namibia has been interested 
in importing oil from Nigeria. When the Namibian delegation went to the meeting of the 
Joint Commission with Nigeria in 2010, the officials from the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy were part of the delegation and made inputs in the discussions, on the terms on 
which the two countries should trade oil. For example, that Nigeria should provide oil to 
a concessional as opposed to a market related price. 
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The Ministry of Mines has also been involved in new trade negotiations of uranium, 
following the passing of the UNSC resolution 1929 of 2010 which imposes sanctions 
against Iran. The resolution prohibits further acquisition of shares or payment of 
dividends to Iran or her companies in a sector such as uranium, because of Iran’s nuclear 
weapons programme (UN 2010). Iran is a shareholder in Rössing Uranium through her 
public enterprise, IFIC. The Namibian Government is a shareholder in Rössing Uranium 
through the Ministry of Mines and Energy and, accordingly, the Ministry participates in 
the negotiations regarding compliance with the UN resolutions and Rössing Uranium’s 
new business ventures. In 2013, the Ministry of Mines and Energy negotiated and 
concluded an agreement with Angola for the oil trade (see Chapter Five). 
 
The Ministry of Finance, through SACU, has been involved in trade issues. Minister of 
Finance, Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila (2013: interview), states that during the 
negotiations on SACU revenues and activities, her Ministry ensured that SACU was not 
only an organisation for revenue, but that it also focused on issues of trade promotion. 
 
The Ministry of Finance officials further regularly form part of the Government 
delegations to the SADC Summits and Council of Ministers meetings. These platforms 
discuss issue of intra-regional trade. The trading of goods among countries is affected by 
customs excise and other taxation matters. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is an important 
stakeholder that should always be brought on board at platforms discussing trade and 
investment matters because of their tax implications. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture is another stakeholder in economic diplomacy, especially in 
the trade negotiations for agricultural products. Accordingly, the Ministry has a 
specialised diplomat at the Namibian embassy in Belgium who forms part of the 
Government negotiation team on the EPAs. The presence of the Ministry of Agriculture 
in the negotiations serves the purpose of articulating issues of food security and 
agricultural safeguarding measures in the EPA negotiations (see Chapter Six). 
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The NDP recognises the importance of economic diplomacy coordination by the 
economic ministries. The Ministries of Finance, Mines and Energy and Trade and 
Industry are entrusted with the task of carrying out strategies for the development of 
manufacturing industry in the NDP 4 (National Planning Commission 2012b: 103). The 
strategies include carrying out trade negotiations for businesses that will result in the 
creation of the manufacturing base at home.  
 
4.3.6 The Parliament 
 
Parliament, as the legislative body, plays a role in economic diplomacy. Prior to 
launching the EPA negotiations in 2001, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Economics, Natural Resources, under the chairmanship of Dr Kaire Mbuende, convened 
a workshop on the future Namibia-EU trade relations (National Assembly 2001). The 
workshop recommended that immediate attention should be paid to the following overall 
strategy: 
 
 Clearly identifying issues to be addressed and objectives to be pursued in the development 
of Namibia’s future trade relations with the EU. 
 Identifying clearly negotiating frameworks (within parliaments) within which Namibian 
concerns can be addressed and its objectives pursued. 
 The need for a common BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) position 
regarding the EU-SA TDCA, as BLNS will face free trade much earlier than other ACP 
countries. 
 The need to lobby EU member states and the European Union Parliament, on the need for 
better terms for BLNS. 
 
The above strategy provides a framework within which Namibia’s EPA negotiations 
should be pursued. Accordingly, the negotiations reflect this framework because, as 
stated in Chapter Six, Namibia has identified issues of concern which are also discussed 
in parliamentary platforms. 
 
Sessions of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and of its committees receive 
progress reports on the negotiations and deliberate upon them. Similarly, reports from the 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly sessions are tabled in the Namibian National Assembly for 
discussions. The discussion of the EPAs at the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
and the tabling in parliament of commercial agreements concluded by Namibia and other 
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countries, all provide an opportunity for legislators to debate economic diplomacy issues, 
thereby contributing to public debate on Namibia’s trade and investment matters. 
 
The constitutional function on the ratification of treaties has been stated above. Article 63 
further states that Parliament should receive reports from the Executive. Article 59, 
provides for Parliamentary Standing Committees. These Committees include the 
Parliamentary Stranding Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. 
Accordingly, this Committee invites the Minister, Deputy Minister or Permanent 
Secretary to make presentations on the activities and programmes of the Ministry. It also 
visits Namibian embassies to look at their operations and challenges. The Parliamentary 
Standing Committee presents its report to the Parliament for considerations. Further, 
Members of Parliament introduce and debate motions on foreign policy matters.  
 
4.3.7  Sub-state structures 
 
Bilder (1989: 82 – 83) writes about the growing importance of sub-state structures in the 
practice of economic diplomacy. This is because they enter into cooperation agreements 
with their foreign counterparts. This trend is applicable to the practice of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. Namibian sub-state structures comprise regional councils and local 
authorities. Regional Councils are the second layer of the Namibian Government that 
runs the administration of Namibia’s 14 regions.  Local authorities preside over cities and 
towns. 
 
In 2002, the Governor of Kavango led the NCCI business delegation to the Cuando 
Cubango province in Angola. The visit culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between businesspersons (Hausiku 2002: 3). The delegation, led by 
Governor Karupu, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with their counterparts from 
Cuando Cubango province. 
 
In 2013, the Governors of Caprivi and Kavango regions and the Chairperson of Karas 
Regional Council addressed a business seminar in Spain to market their regions as ideal 
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investment destinations when they visited that country as part of the delegation of the 
Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry. During the visit, Regional Councils of Kavango, 
Karas and Caprivi signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Extramadura 
Regional Government of Spain. They further signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Valsora Consultoria 2006 SL Company to develop rice projects in the respective 
regions. 
 
Local authorities are also involved in economic diplomacy. Namibia’s local authorities 
conclude twinning agreements with other local authorities from other countries to 
promote trade and investment, among others. For the purpose of this study, the focus will 
be on two local authorities, the City of Windhoek and Ongwediva Town. These two were 
chosen because they host the two major annual trade fairs which attract investors from all 
over the world on a large scale. The Ongwediva Trade Fair is held in August while the 
Windhoek Agricultural and Industrial Show is held in September. 
 
For example, former Mayor of Ongwediva Town, Erastus Uutoni (2013: interview), 
states that in 1998, Ongwediva Town signed twinning agreements with two towns from 
Belgium, Lommel and Ardooie. The town invited business persons to attend the 
Ongwediva Annual Trade Fair where they traded their products and joined the Namibian 
market. Within the framework of the twinning agreements, the towns further promoted 
tourism by inviting tourists from the countries of its sister towns to visit Namibia. 
 
The City Council of Windhoek has adopted the International Relations Policy in 2012 in 
which it sets the objectives of developing the local economy by supporting national 
foreign policy and NDPs. The City cooperates with other cities through partnership 
agreements that involve the local government, business community and civil society 
(City of Windhoek 2012). 
 
Former Mayor of Windhoek, Mathew Shikongo (2013: interview), states that the purpose 
of twinning agreements is to strengthen economic ties with other cities in the world. The 
City of Windhoek has participated in the trade fairs in Berlin and Hanover. This presents 
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an opportunity to show case trade opportunities in Namibia. Because of the twinning 
agreements, the City of Windhoek benefited in terms of exchange programmes and staff 
training with the City of Vantaa in Finland. The agreement further provides for business 
mentorship programme for entrepreneurs. 
 
The City of Windhoek has further entered into partnership agreements with the City of 
Berlin and City of Trossingen in Germany. The City of Berlin has helped the City of 
Windhoek with the establishment of the City Police which complements the national 
police in the combating of crime in Windhoek (Shikongo 2013: interview). 
 
Regional Governments do not, in most instances, initiate their own bilateral economic 
diplomacy per se, but they do so as an integrated approach with the national government. 
In the case of local authorities, they initiate and carry out their own relations with foreign 
local authorities as their own initiatives, independently from the national government. 
 
The economic diplomacy of Namibian local authorities corresponds to local authorities’ 
diplomacy discussed by Pluijm & Melissen (2007: 25), who state that economic 
diplomacy of local governments involves attracting tourism. Local authority further 
works towards attracting international events to their cities. Their relations are further 
aimed at sharing expertise in various areas of service rendering. 
 
The practice of sister city partnerships is not only applicable to small states. Cities from 
large states, like the US, also adopt this form of diplomacy. It is, however, stated that 
local authorities should seek consensus with national governments aspects of their 
relations with foreign local governments (Bilder 1989: 27). This is what the foreign 
policy of the City of Windhoek advocates as stated above. 
 
The economic diplomacy of the sub-state systems is significant to Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. For example, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding during the visit 
of Governor Karupu to Angola, is illustrated by the fact that Angola is the third largest 
export market for Namibia (see Chapter Five). The trade fairs in Windhoek and 
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Ongwediva promote intra-Africa and Africa-Asia trade as it attracts investors from 
Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Ongwediva Town Council 2013; Windhoek Show 
Society 2013). 
 
4.3.8 State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Namibia’s SOEs like NamPower, NamWater and TransNamib are among the state actors 
that have a stake in authoring Namibia’s economic diplomacy. In 1997, Namibia’s power 
utility, NamPower, concluded a power supply agreement with its Angolan counterpart, 
the Empresa Nacional de Eletricidade (National Electricity Company – ENE), to supply 
power to Ondjiva, southern Angola and had, henceforth, been supplying power to that 
town (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011b). In 2003, NamPower opened an office in 
Lubango to coordinate power supply programmes. 
 
It was stated earlier that South Africa and Namibia discussed the development of the 
Kudu Gas-to-Power Project. From the Namibian side, the project is led by NamPower. 
NamPower was further involved in the rehabilitation of the Hwange Power station in 
Zimbabwe. The rehabilitation of this power station boosts the capacity of power supply in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. Namibia also receives power supply from this station. 
NamPower and other power utilities from Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe spearheaded 
the Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and Namibia (ZIZABONA) Project as part of the 
regional economic integration (see Chapter Six). 
  
NamPower and the water utility the Namibia Water Corporation (NamWater) have been 
jointly involved in the power supply and trans-boundary water supply projects in 
Calueque and funded the rehabilitation of the road to Calueque. The Trans-boundary 
water projects between Namibia and Angola include the upgrading of water supply 
between Ondjiva and Oshakati in northern Namibia and a water reticulation at Ondjiva 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011b). This project will ensure that there is a supply of 
clean water to the communities of Angola along the canal that comes from Angola to 
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Namibia. Water is used for, among others, agricultural projects such as the Etunda 
Irrigation Scheme in Namibia. Further, NamPower and NamWater are members of the 
Permanent Joint Technical Committee (PJTC) between Namibia and Angola. The PJTC 
discusses the development schemes for the Baines Dam for the purpose of building a 
hydro-power station that will supply power to both Namibia and Angola. 
 
From 2003, following the trade agreements facilitated by Namibia’s railway SOE, 
TransNamib, more imports in machinery and construction flowed from China to 
Namibia, particularly parts for railway construction and other locomotive parts (Namibia 
Statistics Agency 2013b). 
 
4.3.9  Coordination among state actors 
 
Generally, in economic diplomacy, there could be uncertainty on whether the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Trade and Industry should take the lead. Berridge 
(2010: 19) propounds that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should coordinate and share 
foreign relations issues with other government agencies. While the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs remains in control of diplomatic missions abroad, it nevertheless needs other 
Ministries on board because foreign relations issues cut across many sectors. 
 
Minister Gurirab stresses the need for coordination between the Government Ministries 
when he says, “The increase in subjects of foreign policy requires close co-operation and 
liaison between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant Ministries and 
institutions of Government...” (National Assembly 1994, Vol. 38: 136). Gurirab (2010: 
interview) maintains that the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Trade 
and Industry are complementary. He sees the need for consultations in terms of planning, 
coordinating and reviewing economic diplomacy. Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Tjekero Tweya (2012: interview), concurs when he states that economic diplomacy 
cannot be conducted in isolation from political diplomacy. The functions of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Trade and Industry are complementary and there 
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should be synergy between these ministries and other economic ministries like Mines and 
Energy, Agriculture, Water and Forestry, and Environment and Tourism. 
 
To ensure the effective coordination of visa approval for investors, the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry is represented in the Immigration Board, at the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Pakote 2011: interview). This is to ensure that the Ministry of Home Affairs does not 
frustrate potential investors, who may be refused visa and in the process prevents 
significant investment to come to Namibia. 
 
There are, however, instances where there is no proper coordination on economic 
diplomacy among government Ministries, especially when it comes to the deployment of 
diplomats at Namibian missions abroad. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
deploys a First Secretary for Economic Affairs, while the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
deploys a Commercial Counsellor at the Namibian mission in Pretoria, South Africa. 
Both officers perform the function of trade promotion and report to the Ambassador. This 
state of affairs creates a problem of duplicate diplomacy. Duplicate diplomacy is not ideal 
for efficiency as time and resources are wasted in more people doing the work of a few 
people. The trade promotion function should have been left to the Commercial 
Counsellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have reduced its staff at the 
mission and only remain with officials focusing on political and consular matters. 
 
To ensure an effective coordination on economic diplomacy, there should have been a 
permanent inter-ministerial committee established between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other Ministries which are major stakeholders in pursuing Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. There is further a lack of coordination on negotiations. Apart from 
the Ambassador, as stated above, officials dealing with ACP-EU issues at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ headquarters are not involved in the EPA negotiations, whether at the 
actual negotiations or being invited to pre- and post-negotiation rounds debriefings. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Parliament coordinate their approach to the 
EPA negotiations. The researcher of this study, as a Member of the ACP-EU Joint 
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Parliamentary Assembly, received briefings from the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
officials regarding the status of the EPA negotiations before he attended the Assembly 
sessions. The coordinated approach is essential because the EPAs have been regular 
agenda items at the sessions of the Assembly and its Committees. Updating 
parliamentarians on the negotiations enable them to make an informed contribution at the 
Assembly and avoid contradictions between the executive and legislature in their 
statements or multilateral economic diplomacy with the EU. 
 
Former Minister of Trade and Industry, Hage Geingob, appeared before the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public 
Administration to brief the Committee on the EPA negotiations and other economic 
diplomacy activities by his Ministry. Minister Geingob previously served as the 
Chairman of this Committee and he therefore appreciates the complementary role of 
Parliament to the Executive in pursuing Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
Rana (2007: 125) mentions that Singapore, a small country, has mastered the 
coordination of pursuit of economic diplomacy. There is a clearly demarcated line of 
functions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Each of these ministries recognise the primacy of the other in the area of political 
diplomacy and trade promotion respectively; there is no competition between the two 
ministries. 
 
Modern Liberalism theory emphasises the role of the state in driving economic 
diplomacy for it regulates trade and markets. It is, thus, important that the Namibian 
Government does take the lead in driving the process of economic diplomacy as it 
includes other players in its endeavours. Accordingly, the overall championing of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy by state actors should be viewed within this context of 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies (Thorsen & Lie [sa]: 5). 
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4.4  The role of non-state actors on economic diplomacy 
 
Article 99 of the Namibian Constitution states that foreign investments should be 
encouraged subject to the investment laws to be passed by Parliament. Accordingly, 
Parliament passed the Investment Act which provides for the role of the private sector in 
the practice of economic diplomacy (see Chapter Three). 
 
Gurirab (2010: interview) states that the private sector has been party to the making of 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy. When there are inward and outbound high level visits, 
members of the business community are invited to interact with their foreign 
counterparts. He stresses that the idea of smart partnership dialogues is meant to give the 
private sector an opportunity to play their role in trade and investment promotion. 
 
At the induction course for Heads of Mission businesspersons are invited to make 
presentations (Nandi-Ndaitwah 2011: interview). Inviting business persons to speak to 
Heads of Mission presents an opportunity to businesspersons to make inputs on economic 
diplomacy as they identify areas of interests and bring to the attention of Namibia’s 
envoys abroad the priority areas of trade and investment. The presentations by 
businesspersons further enlighten the Heads of Mission on the methods of approaching 
investors and the language used to attract them to come and invest in Namibia. 
 
Businesspersons form part of the presidential delegations during official visits to foreign 
countries (Nujoma 2011: interview). The Minister of Foreign Affairs included 
businesspersons in his delegation to the first meeting of the Joint Commission of 
Cooperation and Trade between Namibia and Zimbabwe (Mushelenga 2008: 124). 
Businesspersons who form part of Joint Commission delegations present their views 
which contribute to the overall discussions of the Joint Commission sessions. The 
outcomes of the Joint Commission, where business persons participate, therefore, 
represent the views and interests of both the Government and the private sector. 
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Lindique (2012: interview) asserts that the business community is a major stakeholder in 
pursuing economic diplomacy and the Government brings them on board through the 
NCCI. The NCCI is represented in important policy-making bodies like the Board of the 
Namibia Trade Forum which comprises the Ministries of Trade and Industry; 
Agriculture, Water and Forestry, Finance, and two private sector representatives. The 
Namibia Trade Forum is a body established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry with 
the main function of serving as a dialogue between the Government and the private 
sector. It advises the Government on trade issues, including tariffs. 
 
The private sector, represented by the NCCI, was further part of the Government 
negotiation team for the tripartite agreement between SADC, COMESA and SACU. 
Their participation contributed to the removal of technical obstacles. Lindiques’s views 
are shared by Rukoro (2013: interview) who states that the private sector is an important 
role player in economic diplomacy. He maintains that, ordinarily, all Namibians carry out 
economic diplomacy when they individually engage foreign investors on matters of trade 
and investment.  
 
The Senior Trade Advisor of the Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum (ATF), Jurgen 
Hoffman (2013: interview), confirms that the private sector has been consulted on trade 
related negotiations affecting them such as the EPA negotiations. The ATF has been 
brought on board to advise the Government on the issue of agricultural tariffs. It serves as 
a transmitting belt of information between the Ministries of Trade and Industry, 
Agriculture Water and Forestry and the agro-business community. The AFT facilitates 
the exchange of information between the Government and the private sector and brings to 
the attention of the Government concerns of the private sector as far as the agricultural 
trade policies are concerned.  
 
The Managing Director of Namibia’s diamond mining company, Namdeb, Inge 
Zaamwani-Kamwi (2013: interview), who has previously served as President of NCCI, 
states that economic diplomacy is a public-private partnership venture. When the 
Government creates an environment conducive to trade and investment, it is the private 
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sector that should carry out the actual marketing and trading of products. The private 
sector should complement the Government’s efforts for trade promotion so that its 
agenda of economic diplomacy could be fully realised. 
 
Former President of NCCI, Akapandi Endjala (2013: interview), states that the NCCI 
should also be involved in the EPA negotiations. These agreements are important to the 
meat industry and they need to make primary inputs as the decision to sign or not to sign 
the agreements affects them directly more than it will affect the Government. The 
Government addressed this concern when it convened the EPA Stakeholders’ Workshop 
as stated earlier in this Chapter. 
 
Following a period of economic crisis in 2008, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
convened a conference in Geneva in May 2009 to discuss the effect of economic recess. 
This platform provided an opportunity for parliamentarians to exchange views on the 
need for governments to adopt financing, trade and investment strategies to mitigate the 
effect of economic recess. The Namibian delegation, led by the researcher of this study as 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resources 
and Public Administration, included two delegates from the NCCI. Parliament 
appreciated the need for the private sector to form part of the delegation and make inputs 
on the policies and strategies that would be adopted at the conference, since the 
financing, trade and investment issues that would be discussed at the conference were the 
domain of the private sector. 
 
In June, 2002, 105 businesspersons from the NCCI formed part of President Nujoma’s 
state visit to Angola (Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2002a). During the 
state visit, business meetings between individual businesspersons from the two countries 
were held to enable them to forge relations and conclude business deals.  
 
In July 2002, the NCCI led a delegation of Namibian businesspersons on a seven day 
business visit to Angola (Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2002b). The 
delegation attended the Buy-Seller meetings with their Angolan counterparts. The visit 
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was organised in conjunction with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Angola 
(CCIA) and the Angolan Industrial Association (AIA). The NCCI further facilitated the 
participation of the Namibian businesspersons in the Feira International de Luanda 
(International Fair of Luanda – FILDA), thereby introducing Namibian commodities to 
the Angolan market. This shows that the private sector can make its own initiatives of 
pursuing economic diplomacy and does not always wait for the Government to initiate 
and facilitate trade activities for them. 
 
The role of the private sector in economic diplomacy is not unique to Namibia as a small 
state. Other small states also advocate the importance of the private sector in forging 
economic relations. During his visit to Namibia in 1994, the Prime Minister of 
Mozambique, Mario Machungo, stressed the importance of the private sector in 
economic cooperation (Office of the Prime Minister 1994).  
 
Zimbabwe is another small state that ensures the participation of the business community 
in the pursing of economic diplomacy. During the meeting of the Joint Commission of 
Cooperation between Namibia and Zimbabwe held in Namibia in 2011, the 
Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry (CZI) formed part of the Zimbabwean delegation 
(Ekongo 2011: 7). 
 
Figure 2 lists the private sector among the actors on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
Further, the inclusion of businesspersons in government’s high level delegation, as stated 
above, contributes to the form of Namibia’s temporary diplomacy discussed by Du 
Plessis (See Table 2). It should be further noted that to address the afore-said economic 
priorities of the NDP 4, it is important that the Government works closely with the 
private sector in pursuing economic diplomacy. 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies emphasises the importance of cooperation and, 
ideally, this is better achieved when international relations are not the exclusive domain 
of governments. Liberalism theory’s perspective of Pluralism contends that the actors in 
international relations range from state to non-state actors who include even pressure 
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groups (Hayes, Hough, Malik & Pettoford 2011: 135 & 141). The importance that the 
Namibian Government attaches to the role of the private sector on economic diplomacy, 
therefore, makes Namibia’s economic diplomacy inclined towards the theory of 
Liberalism. 
 
4.5 Assessment of the actors 
 
President Nujoma’s pre-eminence in foreign policy practices is illustrated by the fact that 
he was an actor who drove and shaped the economic diplomacy programmes. This does 
not, however, make him the sole architect of Namibia’s foreign policy and economic 
diplomacy. The Namibian Constitution does not provide for the concentration of the 
foreign policy-making power in one structure or individual as it happens in some 
countries (Webber & Smith 2002: 34). 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies propounds that leaders make a difference (Mingst 
2008: 140). This is true for President Nujoma who took initiatives that culminated into 
economic diplomacy programmes of the Government; the Smart Partnership is a good 
example. His doctrine of maintaining old friends and winning new ones, together with the 
foreign policy principles in the Namibian Constitution and other policy documents, 
adopted by the Government, serve as a guiding framework for pursuing Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. President Nujoma, accordingly, fits the description by Mingst 
(2008: 143) that within the foreign policy-making elite, some individuals have a greater 
impact on foreign policy than others. 
 
The impact of President Nujoma’s doctrine is reflected in the major partners that Namibia 
has (see Chapter Five). Namibia does not only trade with the countries from the former 
East Bloc which sympathised with the Namibian cause of independence. She trades with 
countries from the West Bloc too, including those who objected to the UN imposing 
sanctions against the then apartheid South Africa for its illegal occupation of Namibia. 
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Rourke (2008: 76) observes that leaders’ perceptions about the operations of the 
international system influence their diplomacy practice. This is true for President 
Pohamba who believed in consulting not only his Cabinet, but also his peers in the 
region. As a leader whose conduct of diplomacy was shaped by the environment and 
institutions under which he operated, he advocated the doctrine of people-to-people 
contacts. This was aimed at building personal rapport with influential personalities and 
key decision-makers in other countries and ensured that Namibia’s position on foreign 
policy issues would gain substantial support on the international platform. 
 
Both President Nujoma and President Pohamba adopted the temporary form of personal 
diplomacy characterised by high level visits (see Table 2) to pursue Namibia’s bilateral 
economic diplomacy. President Nujoma’s other form of temporary is conference 
diplomacy on specific issues, focusing on both the WEF and Smart Partnership 
Dialogues. President Pohamba’s economic diplomacy, in this respect, focused on the 
WEF and paid little attention to the Smart Partnership Dialogues. President Pohamba 
further emphasised on instruments of economic diplomacy (see Figure 2) to be of 
cardinal importance in the implementation of government programmes in general, 
including the practice of economic diplomacy. 
 
The practice of economic diplomacy is not only confined to the senior leaders in the 
Government (see Figure 2). It includes junior officials like diplomats who provide 
valuable information to the negotiators from the capital about the culture and attitude of 
their counterparts. This information is of great use in the negotiations.  
 
Given the fact that there is plurality of actors on Namibia’s foreign policy and economic 
diplomacy practice, the study concurs with Carlsnaes (2008: 89) that states are 
institutional structures on whose behalf the foreign policy elite makes decisions. Mingst 
(2008: 127 – 128) also recognises the significance of the plurality of actors, especially the 
business community in the practice of economic diplomacy. 
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The practice in Namibia further signifies collective leadership. Not only that actors cut 
across government structures and the private sector (see Figure 2), but also that both 
levels of the structures of the Government have been involved in the practice of economic 
diplomacy. Pluijm & Melissen (2007: 11 - 12) discuss the trend of city diplomacy where 
local authorities engage in the practice of diplomacy. There is one form called two-sided 
diplomacy. This type of diplomacy involves a representative of the city, as one party, 
with another party. The aims of city relations include benefits to local government from a 
developing country in terms of providing assistance in a specific area. This form of city 
diplomacy is the most common to Namibian local authorities. 
 
Non-state actors’ contribution to the making of Namibia’s economic diplomacy is 
significant, especially when they are consulted on important multilateral agreements like 
the tripartite agreement between SADC, COMESA and SACU. This means that they are 
not only involved in bilateral diplomacy, but also in the practice of multilateral economic 
diplomacy (see Table 2). 
 
SOE’s contribution to Namibia’s economic diplomacy compliments the efforts of the 
Government. The ZIZABONA Project, for example, enhances cooperation between the 
states involved. The participation of Namibian SOEs in the PJTC further adds to their 
contribution to the permanent form of diplomacy. This is a contribution to a permanent 
form of economic diplomacy which Du Plessis (2006: 140) did not include in Table 2. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Foreign policy actors involve both state and non-state actors. The Namibian Constitution 
serves as the primary source for these actors’ involvement in economic diplomacy. In 
addition to the Constitution, the Government puts in place policies and programmes that 
are conducive to the conduct of economic diplomacy. The President, as the chief foreign 
policy-maker, is involved in the conduct of economic diplomacy with the assistance of 
various Ministers. Depending on the personalities of the office holder, the Prime Minister 
also plays a role in the pursuing of Namibia’s economic diplomacy.  
 170 
 
The two Presidents that have been at the helm of Namibia’s foreign policy have different 
personalities and, therefore, pursued their respective economic diplomacy disciplines. 
President Nujoma is a pragmatic foreign policy-maker who goes on the forefront and 
aggressively pursues Namibia’s economic diplomacy. President Pohamba is led by the 
dynamics of the structure and institution of state in terms of the agency-structure debate 
in IR studies. Coming from the Cold War era, President Nujoma adopts an economic 
diplomacy doctrine that accommodates both friends and adversaries. This is in line with 
pursuing the Namibian Constitution’s principles of maintaining the policy of non-
alignment and promoting mutual beneficial relations. President Pohamba pursues a 
doctrine that promotes relations at an individual’s level and extends that to government 
relations. 
 
 
This position has a constitutional role of coordinating government activities. However, it 
depends on the drive of the holder of the office, for instance, Prime Minister Geingob 
was actively involved in pursuing economic diplomacy unlike his successors Gurirab and 
Angula.  
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry’s officials are at the forefront of driving 
foreign policy matters. Ministers of Foreign Affairs play a key role in the formulation of 
economic diplomacy. Minister Gurirab, for example, conceptualised Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy, with Minister Hamutenya defining the tenets of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy at length, resulting in the tabling of the White Paper on Foreign Policy and 
Economic Diplomacy in the Namibian Parliament and the adoption thereafter. The 
Namibian Government deploys diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
specialised diplomats from economic ministries to forge trade relations with other states 
and complement the work of the Minister and staff from the capital. 
 
Because economic diplomacy involves trade issues, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
plays a significant role as it facilitates trade agreements and is responsible for bilateral 
trade policies. Conducting diplomacy is not only restricted to the Executive branch of the 
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Government. The Legislature, too, is another state actor which is relevant to the pursuing 
of economic diplomacy, as it ratifies bilateral trade agreements and discusses multilateral 
trade regimes, at international parliamentary forums. Other state-actors are the regional 
councils and local authorities which conduct economic diplomacy with their respective 
counterparts from other countries. SOEs, by virtue of their services which are needed in 
other countries and their need to procure equipment for their operations, become involved 
in the conduct of economic diplomacy.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as the coordination Ministry on foreign relations 
matters and, therefore, on economic diplomacy. Government Ministries coordinate their 
foreign relations related matters through membership of inter-ministerial committee on 
specific matters like Immigration Board, but there is no permanent structure that deals 
with inter-ministerial coordination on economic diplomacy matters. 
 
Small states theories propound that decision-making in small states is inclined to power 
concentration in individuals (Papadakis & Starr 1991: 429). Individuals’ personal styles 
dominate policies and their preferences rather than that of a group, play a role in shaping 
the programmes of their respective states. The Namibia approach is different from this 
typical small states’ decision-making trend. State actors coordinate their economic 
diplomacy activities, albeit, sometimes not as effectively as it should be. Economic 
diplomacy is a group effort and there is no concentration of power in one leader to 
determine economic diplomacy. There is, however, a need to establish an inter-
ministerial body dedicated to coordinating economic diplomacy in order to avoid 
duplicate diplomacy. 
 
The impact of foreign policy in general and economic diplomacy in particular is not only 
felt by the Government, but by the private sector as well, especially the business 
community. The private sector is involved in the actual trading of commodities and it is 
important to involve them in important economic diplomacy engagements, like in the 
meetings of bilateral Joint Commissions of Cooperation. The NCCI, as an umbrella 
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association for businesspersons, coordinates the participation of the private sector in the 
making of Namibian’s economic diplomacy. 
 
Individuals and societal groups matter and their interests are defined independently from 
political interests. Once defined they are aligned to political decision-making through 
collective action of political and societal groups. Emphasis is placed on the role of 
societal actors on foreign policy-making rather than the traditional foreign policy-making 
propositions that focus predominantly on state actors (Carlsnaes 2008: 94). Overall, the 
actors pursue mutual beneficial relations in the spirit of cooperation without using 
coercive modes of diplomacy. 
 
Chapter Five addresses bilateral economic diplomacy, focusing on six major trading 
partners of Namibia in terms of both imports and exports and will further highlight the 
EPZ. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NAMIBIA’S BILATERAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: MAJOR ECONOMIC 
SECTORS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In pursuing economic diplomacy, the main goals of states are to attract FDI and secure 
markets for their commodities. Namibia set these objectives for her foreign policy as 
stated by the first Minister of Foreign Affairs when he addressed the Parliament on the 
objectives of Namibia’s foreign policy, in 1991 (National Assembly 1991: 80).  
 
This chapter assesses Namibia’s practice of economic diplomacy by securing markets for 
her commodities and attracting FDI. The discussions will be in terms of three major 
economic sectors of fishing, agriculture and mining. Table 7 below shows export values 
per sector for the past five years (2009 – 2013). At the time of writing (March 2015), the 
exchange rate of US $ to N$ was 1 = 11.6. 
 
Table 7: Export values per different economic sectors in N$ 
 
 
Sector 
                                                         Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Agriculture   3 623 542 253     3 174 306 918    3 044 324 494  1 814 055 605 1 992 222 063 
Fisheries   4 804 430 244     4 691 074 119   4 590 766 547  4 546 397 919  6 041 945 747  
Mining 16 863 540 804  18 983 391 741 19 460 485 560  21 428 244 329 24 815 553 097 
 Source: Namibia Statistics Agency (2014) 
 
The Table shows that the agriculture sector experienced a decline from the year 2010. 
This could be attributed to low rainfall. The fisheries sector, too, experienced a decline 
from the year 2010 but picked up in 2013. Meanwhile, the mining industry has witnessed 
a steady growth. 
 
This chapter will further discuss inward investments; the EPZ; domestic disagreement on 
economic diplomacy and an assessment of Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy. The 
chapter will fill the gap existing in the literature on the forms and types of diplomacy (Du 
Plessis 2006: 140). Bilateral agreements concluded with trade partners in the sectors 
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being discussed are part of the instruments of diplomacy that form the basis of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. Accordingly, lists of bilateral agreements concluded with these 
countries are appended to this study.12   
 
5.2 The institutional foundation of Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy 
 
The institutional framework for Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy is provided in 
the NDP 1, 2, 3 and 4, Vision 2030, and the White Paper on Foreign Policy and 
Diplomacy Management. The NDP 3 focuses on multilateral diplomacy and is not 
applicable to discussions on bilateral diplomacy. 
 
The NDP 1 states that Namibia’s strategies include diversifying import sources and 
export markets. They further include encouraging joint-venture partnerships between 
Namibia and foreign businesses (National Planning Commission 1995a: 7). In pursuing 
economic diplomacy, Namibian leaders have underscored the importance of joint 
venture-partnerships between Namibian entrepreneurs and their foreign counterparts (see 
Chapters Three and Four). 
 
The NDP 1 states that Namibia will strive for the diversification of trade links. While 
acknowledging that South Africa is an important trade partner, Namibia wants a variety 
of export markets to reduce dependence from South Africa (National Planning 
Commission 1995a: 9). 
 
The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management states that Namibia’s 
bilateral diplomacy will be pursued with prior consideration of national interests 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 63). This is to ensure that Namibia’s sovereignty is 
not compromised. It is further underscored that relations between Namibia and other 
                                                 
12   The economic diplomacy related agreement(s) with many of the European trade partners is mostly 
the EPA. Some trade partners have one or two bilateral agreements. In that case, such agreements 
are mentioned under the respective sections but are not included in the appendices, to avoid having 
an appendix with only one or two agreements.  
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states should be mutually beneficial to both parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 
73).  
 
The NDP 2 states that, in line with the principles of mixed economy, major actors in the 
energy sector will be the SOEs and private companies which will be involved in energy 
projects (National Planning Commission 2002a: 341). The development of a major 
energy project, the Kudu Gas Fields, will be coordinated by the Inter-Ministerial 
Working Group chaired by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and comprising the 
Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, Environment and Tourism, and the Offices of 
President and Attorney-General (National Planning Commission 2002a: 352). 
 
Vision 2030 states that Namibia will increase and maintain bilateral relations (Office of 
the President 2004b: 183). Bilateral relations with trade partners are, therefore, fulfilling 
the aspiration of Vision 2030. The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 
Management states that Namibia prioritises on bilateral relations with countries in SADC. 
It further states that Namibia covers a wide geographical area for bilateral relations that 
includes Africa, Europe, America and Asia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 64 – 73). 
 
In 2012, the Namibian Government adopted the NDP 4. This blueprint does not have 
specific sections detailing the goals and targets on international relations like the previous 
NDPs. However, it sets overall four economic priorities namely, agriculture, logistics, 
manufacturing and tourism (National Planning Commission 2012b: 81). These areas of 
focus have a link to economic diplomacy. 
 
5.3 Bilateral economic diplomacy: practice and process 
 
Bilateral economic diplomacy is conducted between a state and other states. In general, 
the modes of diplomacy include influence, compelling, coercion and the use of military 
force (see Figure 1). It was, however, stated earlier (see Chapter Two) that in the practice 
of diplomacy, small states have limitations applying diplomatic methods that are aligned 
to promoting conflicts. Small states prefer using cooperation methods of influence.  
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Temporary forms of economic diplomacy that involve high-level visits are among the 
effective types of economic diplomacy methods adopted by states (see Table 2). During 
the occasions of high-level visits by Namibian leaders to other countries, or by visiting 
foreign leaders to Namibia, agreements are concluded in various economic fields that 
provide a framework for trade cooperation. Such agreements are among important 
instruments of economic diplomacy. 
 
The permanent form of economic diplomacy (see Table 2) is characterised by the 
opening of diplomatic and consular missions. Earlier, it was stated that in the NDP 1 
diplomatic missions are charged with the promotion of trade and investments (see 
Chapter Three). The practice of bilateral economic diplomacy further involves bilateral 
Joint Commissions of cooperation (Chapter Three). Because of limited resources, small 
states, including Namibia, make use of honorary consuls to complement the work of their 
embassies in promoting trade and investment (see Chapter Three). Traditionally, these 
diplomatic establishments are responsible for marketing their respective sending 
countries. Liechtenstein embassies and consular offices, for example, obtain commercial 
information for dissemination to enterprises in Liechtenstein (Stringer 2011: 30). 
Berridge (2010: 12) confirms the proposition that the process of economic diplomacy 
includes the gathering and dissemination of information to local and foreign investors 
about investment opportunities. 
 
Barston (2006: 11 – 12) notes that the process of diplomacy includes a synchronisation of 
domestic and foreign issues. This is because domestic issues are taken to the international 
realm. Arguably, this provides an opportunity to domestic players to venture into the area 
of foreign relations. Accordingly, the process of bilateral diplomacy involves state and 
non-state actors (see Figure 2). State actors formulate bilateral economic policies (See 
Chapter Three). Non-state actors initiate economic diplomacy processes that include 
engaging their foreign counterparts and forging bilateral economic relations (Chapter 
Four). They also contribute to public opinion on Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy 
as it will be discussed below. 
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The NDP 2 states that Namibia’s economic diplomacy strategies include convening 
investments seminars and workshops (National Planning Commission 2002a: 337). These 
workshops serve the purpose of disseminating information and creating a platform for 
local and foreign investors to meet. 
 
5.4 The Fisheries sector 
 
The Namibian fisheries sector contributes to Namibia’s economic diplomacy. The 
sector’s export values totals N$ 6 billion for the year 2013 (Namibia Statistics Agency 
2014). The trade in fisheries had led to exploitation of these products, resulting in the 
fisheries sector experiencing a decline during the years 2010 to 2012, as illustrated in 
table 7. Kirchner and Stage (2005:2) write about the decline in the Namibian fishing 
stock in their study that focuses on kob and snoek which are the main targets of 
commercial line fishing. These resources face a challenge of depletion. Kirchner and 
Stage maintain that the decline of fish stock coupled with more entrants in the fishing 
industry poses a problem to the industry in the absence of regulation to limit the size and 
number of the species. Sherbourne’s (2013: 140) discussion on Namibian fisheries sector 
echoes this assertion when he states that there has been a large number of fishing rights 
holders compared to the resources available. 
 
At independence in 1990, Namibia’s fishing stock was depleted due to fishing over-
exploitation (Manning 1995). Subsequently, the Namibian government had to put in 
place measures to build the fish stock, in order to have sufficient supplies for exports. 
Lange (2003: 10) explains that the hake and horse mackerel species have increased since 
independence. This resulted from the Government’s targeted policy for the development 
of the hake industry.  
 
The Chairman of the Confederation of Namibian Fishing Associations, Matti Amukwa 
(2012), states that the Namibian hake is mainly exported to the EU followed by South 
Africa. The hake’s market is Spain, Germany, Holland and Italy. Spain further imports 
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frozen monk and tuna fish while South Africa further imports canned pilchard (Namibia 
Statistics Agency 2014).  
 
The National Accounts for the year 2013 show that the large markets where Namibia’s 
fish exports value are over N$ 100 million are found in Europe and southern Africa. 
These are Germany, Italy, Mozambique, The Netherlands, South Africa, Spain and 
Zambia (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
 
5.4.1  Europe 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with European countries stems from the Lomé IV 
Convention (see Chapter Six). For some European countries who are members of the EU, 
as it will be discussed in the next sections, they do not necessarily have bilateral trade 
agreements with Namibia. The multilateral trade agreement between the EU and ACP 
countries serves as the framework of bilateral economic diplomacy between Namibia and 
these respective countries. Some of the EU member-states, however, have bilateral 
economic agreements with Namibia, in addition to the multilateral ACP-EU trade regime. 
 
The National Accounts for the year 2013 reveal that Spain is the largest market which in 
the year 2013 imported fish valued at N$ 1.49 billion. This figure represents about 25 
percent of total exports. Most of the exports to Spain are hake and hake fillets which are 
valued over N$ 1 billion. The rest of the fish stock is made up of frozen horse mackerel 
and other frozen fish. Fish exports to Spain are valued at N$ 1.49 billion (Namibia 
Statistics Agency 2014). Exports for various types of tuna fish for the year 2012 were 
valued at N$ 99.78 billion. The Spanish company, Pescanova Group of Companies, is a 
leading company in the fishing industry through its subsidiary company, NovaNam 
Limited Group. This company employs over 2 000 people which is a large number in 
respect of the Namibian population of 2 million people (UNAM 2006: 10 – 11). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013e) states that in total, there are 7 Spanish fishing 
companies operating in the Namibian fisheries sector. These companies are in joint-
venture partnerships with Namibian partners and they provide jobs to 14 000 Namibians.  
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Namibia and Spain signed a number of economic cooperation agreements appended to 
this study as Appendix 3. Following the signing of bilateral agreements, Namibia and 
Spain worked towards sharing technical expertise. Spain assisted with the establishment 
of the Fisheries and Marine Institute in Walvis Bay so that Namibians can also acquire 
various skills for the fishing industry. Namibia and Spain’s economic relations fulfil the 
foreign policy principle of striving for mutual beneficial relations (Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53). It is a relation that benefits both parties because, 
while Spain is granted access to the Namibian marine resources, she transfers technology 
to Namibians.  
 
The economic diplomacy between Namibia and Spain as a middle economy reflects the 
proposition made by Hussain (2006: 44) that for a middle economy like India to be 
successful, it should embrace assistance to less privileged countries. Relations with such 
countries should not only be carried in a narrow context of promoting self-interests, but 
there should be a benign approach to economic diplomacy. Namibia as less privileged in 
technology needs to be assisted by Spain to develop a marine institute that will contribute 
to the management and productivity of the fisheries sector. If Spain does not provide such 
assistance, another middle economy may offer to do that. In accordance with the spirit of 
mutual beneficial relations Namibia would, accordingly, want to shift trading from Spain 
to a partner that is willing to help in building the marine institute. Establishing the marine 
institute is in line with the targets of Vision 2030 that underscores improving access to 
knowledge for the marine environment (Office of the President 2004b: 159). 
 
Italy is the second largest European importer of Namibian fish products. In 2013, fish 
products sold to Italy were valued at N$ 514.8 million. These include frozen horse 
mackerel, frozen hake and frozen hake fillets. Italy is followed by Germany with 
imported fish valued at N$ 147.8 million according to the 2013 figures. This comprises 
hake fillets valued at N$ 97.8 million as well as frozen jack and horse mackerel fish 
(Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
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Portugal is the fourth largest European importer of Namibian fish products comprising 
mainly hake and other fresh fish. Total fish exports to Portugal was valued at N$ 247.5 
million in 2013. Namibia also exported horse mackerel, frozen hake and frozen hake 
fillets to The Netherlands valued at N$ 126.3 million in 2013. 
 
France largely imports the hake fillets and other hake fish products, having imported hake 
products valued at N$ 72 million out of a total import valued at N$ 144.8 million in 2013. 
The other portion of imports are made up of other fish like albacore or long-finned tuna 
(Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
 
After independence, Namibia’s relations with the French Republic had been that of 
developmental diplomacy. For example, Mushelenga (2008: 87) states that by 2002 
France had granted cooperation assistance to Namibia amounting to 60 million Euros of 
which 51 million Euros were grants and 9 million Euros were in the form of loans. 
Exports to France show that the relationship between a small state and a middle income 
economy has moved from developmental diplomacy to economic diplomacy. 
 
Although fish exports to Ireland are below N$ 100 million, Ireland is relatively a new 
large market where large stocks of fish are exported to since 2012. In 2013, Ireland 
imported fish valued at N$ 97.6 million which is largely made up of horse mackerel. The 
stock further includes frozen hake and other fish (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
Together with the UK, Ireland donated the remote sensor equipment for the station in 
Swakopmund to monitor the surface water temperature and, thus, assists in the research 
for the conditions that affect fisheries (National Assembly 1995c: 40). 
 
5.4.2 Southern Africa 
 
Significant fish exports go to South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. At political level, 
the ruling parties of these three countries maintain sound relations with Namibia’s ruling 
party, SWAPO, and all are part of the forum for former liberation movements in southern 
Africa. 
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South Africa is the largest market in southern Africa for Namibian fish exports and is 
second only to Spain in the world. In 2013, fish exports valued at N$ 863.7 million 
comprised horse mackerel, sardines, hake and tuna were exported to South Africa. 
 
Overall, South Africa is Namibia’s largest trade partner. Hengari and Saunders (2014:  
169 and 174) say this is the situation because South Africa was the last colonial power in 
Namibia. This explains why Namibia’s economy continues to be linked to the South 
African economy. Hengari and Saunders (2014: 174), however, maintain that although 
South Africa views Namibia as a small state, Namibia does not submit to South Africa’s 
pretentions to lead the region and the continent. Therefore, Namibia’s smallness and 
dependence on South Africa do not compromise her in pursuing foreign policy choices. 
 
Hengari and Saunders (2014: 178) contend that in the long run, Namibia’s dependence to 
the South African economy may shift, as she may divert towards her northern neighbour, 
Angola. These two middle powers Angola and South Africa remain very much important 
for the success of Namibia’s economic diplomacy.  
 
Mozambique is the second largest southern African importer of the Namibian fish 
products. In 2013, Namibia exported to Mozambique frozen mackerel and frozen horse 
mackerel valued at N$ 569. 4 million, a sharp increase from the previous year’s figure of 
N$ 216 million. Namibia and Mozambique have been cooperating in the fisheries sector 
having signed a cooperation agreement (see Chapter Four).  
 
Namibia and Mozambique signed an Agreement on cooperation in the fisheries sector in 
December 2010. In terms of the agreement, the two governments agreed to establish 
business joint ventures to trade on fish products within the SADC region. They further 
agreed to promote trade and investment in their marine products and cooperate on the 
mutual use of their harbours by ship owners. Article 3 stipulates that commercial 
relations in fisheries between the two countries will be based on the dogma of mutual 
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benefits, thereby underscoring the foreign policy principle enshrined in the Namibian 
Constitution (Ministry of Fisheries 2010). 
 
In 2013, fish exports to Angola were valued at N$ 230.4 million. The exports comprised 
frozen mackerel, horse mackerel, frozen hake, frozen hake fillets and other fish. She 
further exported in the same year frozen horse mackerel, frozen hake and frozen hake 
fillets to another neighbour, Zambia; the value was N$ 114.4 million. Hamutenya (2014: 
85) surmises that Namibia and Angola have a symbiotic relationship, having firmly-
embedded historic, social, economic and cultural ties. He maintains that Namibia and 
Angola are of geographic importance to each other, and they belong to the same 
multilateral economic organisations like SADC and the WTO. He further states that 
Angola is a great market for export because of the economic reconstruction programme 
that is currently taking place to develop the country’s infrastructure that was devastated 
during the civil war that took place from 1975 to 2002. 
 
One of the reasons why Angola is among the top export trading partners of Namibia is, 
arguably, because of the low transport cost, especially for goods from Oshikango EPZ, 
which is at the borders of Namibia and Angola. Namibia’s economic diplomacy with 
Angola is further boosted by a number of agreements that the two countries have signed 
on trade and investment matters. The agreements are appended to this study as Appendix 
4. 
 
The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2004: 68 – 69) cites Angola as a strategic ally for trade partnership and Zambia as 
offering great opportunities for trade in respect of proximity and cross-border affinities. 
 
Trading with neighbours has a relative advantage, namely that with excellent transport 
infrastructure, goods are transported faster and they are generally cheaper because of low 
costs of transportation. Accordingly, Namibia’s largest trading partner is her neighbour, 
South Africa. Exports to South Africa for the year 2013 were valued at N$11 910 076 
306, while imports were valued at N$ 45 324 155 790. Another neighbour, Angola, is the 
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fourth major partner in terms of exports which were valued at N$ 4 299 475 573 in 2013 
(Namibia Statistics Agency 2014).  
 
It is quite common for small states to trade with neighbours. Cooper & Momani (2011: 
115) affirm the importance of neighbourhood trade. They write about the effect of 
transport cost, resulting from remoteness from major trade centres. It reduces the 
economic returns of small states. Thus, Lithuania prioritises on trading with her 
neighbour Belarus (Gricius 1999: 36). 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies supposes that when states find common interests, 
they voluntarily agree to cooperate and gain from that cooperation. Accordingly, there are 
benefits accruing to states from commercial relations (Richardson 2002: 7). With 
globalisation on the increase, states become further interdependent and, thus, economic 
activities between them increase. Angola and South Africa are Namibia’s neighbours and 
looking at a number of economic agreements that they have signed, appended to this 
study as appendices 2 and 3, there is, arguably, common interests between the two 
countries to enhance trade and investment. The return of peace in Angola was a turning 
point as an environment conducive to accelerate cooperation and interconnectedness 
which in turn boosts economic diplomacy between the two states.  
 
Trading with Angola and South Africa is what the White Paper on Foreign Policy and 
Diplomacy as an instrument of economic diplomacy, advocates when it states that 
Namibia prioritises bilateral cooperation with neighbouring countries which will include 
cooperation between regions bordering each other (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 63 
– 64).  
 
5.4.3 Namibianisation of the fishing sector and value addition 
 
In 1998, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Hifikepunye Pohamba, reported 
in the Parliament that by 1996 the ‘Namibianisation’ of the fishing fleet had reached 84 
percent, well ahead of the 80 percent target set by the NDP 1 (National Assembly 1998: 
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221; National Planning Commission 1995a: 192). However, the progress to the 
‘Namibianisation’ was hampered by the fact that some fishing rights holders sold their 
shares to venture into other business sectors and this attracted buyers from among foreign 
investors (National Assembly 1998: 221). Sherbourne (2013:155), however, says that the 
greater Namibianisation of the Namibian fishing sector is hampered by the fact that mid-
water fleets require specialised skills to operate because of their expensive freezer-
trawlers. Namibia is yet to fulfil the aspirations of the NDP 1 which calls for the 
‘Namibianisation’ of the fishing industry with the purpose of empowering Namibians that 
were disadvantaged educationally, socially and economically (National Planning 
Commission 1995a: 191).  
 
Manning (1995) explains that after independence when fishing rights terminated on 31 
December 1993, the Ministry of Fisheries granted 165 fishing rights to 124 fishing 
enterprises. Of these companies, 51 percent were owned by Namibians. 
 
It is, however, stated that the issue of the ‘Namibianisation’ of the fisheries sector appears 
only sound on a face value. Fergus, Manning & Eide (2005: 26) state that although 
Namibians had 80 percent ownership of the hake quotas by 2002, compared to 17 percent 
in 1991, the significance of real ownership and benefit distribution is different. Real 
ownership is veiled by ownership arrangements which include, inter alia, nominee 
shareholders and shareholding through joint ventures.  
 
Manning (2000: 27 – 28) explains the issue of the ‘Namibianisation’ of the fishing 
industry, examining the shareholding structure of fishing companies and whether the 
benefits accruing from the fisheries trade are received appropriately by the shareholders, 
in terms of the shareholding structures in the fishing company. He surmises that while the 
Government announced by 1993 that the companies that had been allocated fishing rights 
fisheries are 70 percent wholly owned by Namibians and a further 23 percent majority 
owned by Namibians, in reality, this does not translate in the benefits from the fisheries 
resources accruing to those Namibian owners. This is because fishing quotas holders 
lease their quotas to large fishing companies to catch fish for them. 
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The Namibian government announced that consideration for granting fishing quotas will 
be made to fishing companies that are 51 percent owned by Namibians. However, 
Manning (2000: 32) contends that, practically, there was a different picture for a 
company like Pescanova, which is 100 percent owned by Spanish investors, received the 
largest hake quota. Government argued that Pescanova had made substantial investment 
in the country in terms of processing facilities and employment creation.  He further 
contends that when Pescanova changed to a Namibian registered company, NovaNam, in 
1995, it was not because there was pressure exerted on the company but more to save 
money from levies for foreign-owned company. Accordingly, it immediately saved N$ 5 
million in quota levy payments (Manning 2000: 33). 
 
Manning (2000: 40 – 41) states that another fishing company, Cadilu, was 51 percent 
Namibian and 49 percent Spanish owned but Namibian shareholders later sold their 
shares to Edwardo Viera of South Africa, making the company 100 percent foreign 
owned. He further maintains that conglomerations of foreign owned fishing companies, 
creating joint ventures with Namibian majority owned companies, in the end, still 
benefits foreigners rather than Namibian shareholders when the benefits are distributed. 
Another issue that paints a picture of the ‘Namibianisation’ of the fishing industry, on 
face value only, is the ownership of the vessels that catch the fish. These may not 
necessarily be owned according to the shareholding structure of the fish quotas holder 
companies. Manning (2000:  50) observes that the mid-trawl fleet is made up of mostly 
foreign registered vessels. 
 
Sherbourne (2013:  156 - 157) explains  that about 70 percent of fisheries export goes to 
Spain and, accordingly, the foreign ownership of a large part of the Namibian industry 
raises concern about value addition, in terms of packaging and branding, among others. 
This is because the foreign investors themselves become involved in the processing of the 
fish products. It is argued that the fresh products earn investors high prices in the 
European market compared to the processed fish. It is further argued that a Spanish 
company like Pescanova has established itself competitively in the European market 
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using Namibian resources. Therefore, introducing a Namibian company brand to compete 
with Pescanova could be expensive. 
 
Amukwa (2012) says that of the more than 70 000 metric tons of fish exported to the EU, 
the largest percentage is in a form of raw materials. This means that more jobs are created 
in the European countries as only a small portion of fish is processed in Namibia. This 
impacts negatively on the industrialisation of the Namibian economy which is a goal set 
in the NDP 2 (National Planning Commission 2002b: 137). 
 
5.5 Agriculture 
 
The main agricultural commodities that Namibia exports are meat, grapes and pelts. This 
section discusses Namibia’s agricultural exports that are valued at N$ 50 million per 
annum, or a single commodity exported to a given country that is over 1 000 metric tons.  
 
5.5.1  Meat 
 
A large share of Namibia’s agricultural exports are traded with South Africa. These are 
mainly live cattle (pure breeding animals), fresh and frozen boneless bovine animals and 
sheep carcases. For the year 2013, these exports to South Africa were valued at N$ 1.16 
billion (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). They comprised live cattle pure-bred breeding 
animals, other cattle pure-bred breeding animals, fresh or chilled boneless bovine meat, 
frozen boneless bovine meat, fresh or chilled sheep carcasses and half carcasses. The 
South African market imported 39.5 percent of meat export volume in 2013 which earned 
Namibia 24.5 of its total value earnings from meat exports (Meatco 2014: 47). 
 
The second largest market for fresh and frozen bovine meat is the UK which in 2013 
imported Namibian agricultural products valued at N$ 368.4 million. They comprised 
fresh and frozen bovine meat, fresh or chilled sheep carcasses and half carcasses, and 
fresh grapes (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). In 2008, The Meat Corporation of 
Namibia (Meatco) opened the Meatco UK office to market beef in Europe. About 30.6 
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percent volume of meat exports went to the European market, earning Namibia 60.3 
percent of the total income from meat exports.  
 
The UK and Namibia have strong trade relations, reflecting a sound economic diplomacy 
between the two countries. From 2008 to 2013 the UK was the second major trade 
partner for Namibia in terms of the total trade values for both exports and FDIs. In 2013, 
the UK fell from even the list of top ten export partners for Namibia. This is attributed to 
the diversion of diamond exports to Botswana as the UK has over a long period until 
2012 been a leading market for the export of Namibia’s non-industrial diamonds 
unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013a). 
Agricultural commodities exported to the UK are largely beef and grapes.   
 
The UK is further the largest customer for Namibia’s meat from the EU (Namibia 
Statistics Agency 2013b). Namibia is part of the seven countries that are part of the Beef 
Protocol concluded with the EU as part of the Lomé Convention. Other countries are 
Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia and Madagascar. It is important to 
note that quotas were negotiated bilaterally and Namibia negotiated for a quota of 30 
metric tons annually. The UK took the largest share with the value of beef exports to the 
UK for the year 2012 totalling N$ 73 million (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013b). 
 
The UK is a middle power with a strong currency. The buying power of the British 
Sterling is stronger than that of other major currencies like the US Dollars or Euro. 
Accordingly, exports to this country earn Namibia high returns. Both the UK and 
Namibia mutually honour their Beef Protocol, thus keeping the UK as a major beef trade 
partner as stated above.  
 
Angola takes the third place with Namibia’s exports to that country for live cattle pure 
breeding animals, fresh and frozen boneless bovine animals for the year 2013 valued at 
N$ 69 million.   
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Denmark is the fourth largest market for Namibian meat products. Agricultural products 
exported to Denmark in 2013 were valued at N$ 59.1 million. The exports comprised 
fresh or chilled boneless bovine meat and frozen boneless bovine meat (National 
Statistics Agency 2014). Export to Denmark is part of Namibia’s preferential access to 
the EU under the Lomé Convention. 
 
Namibia has been granted a preferential access to the EU market under the Lomé 
Convention which entails a tariff-free annual quota of 13000 metric tons of beef. 
However, Namibia has not been able to fill the quota. This is partly attributed to high cost 
of beef production, such as the fact that farmers buy fodder at high costs (Chiriboga, 
Kilmer, Fan & Gawande [sa]: 3 – 4). Another small country, Botswana does not also fill 
her EU quota (Meatco 2008: 10). 
 
Despite not meeting her quota, Kandenge (2012: 4) observes that Namibia is the highest 
exporter of beef to Europe from Africa. The promotion of meat export is among the 
strategies of the NDP 3 (National Planning Commission 2008a: 101). 
 
Chiriboga et al.  ([sa]: 7) notes that Namibian farmers have two options for beef exports. 
They can sell the one year old weaners on hoof to South African feedlots or grade B and 
C cattle which are in the range of three to four years to abattoirs in Namibia which are 
exported as beef after being slaughtered.  Because of the attractive process for weaners’ 
exports, a large portion of Namibia’s weaners is exported to South Africa. 
 
Namibia intends to open new markets for her beef exports in China and Russia. China 
and Namibia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Animal Health and Quarantine 
in December 2011. Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, China 
sent a team of experts to Namibia to inspect animal health facilities, including abattoirs. 
The Chinese were happy with their audit and developed a Protocol outlining import 
requirements. At the time of writing this study (March 2015), the process of drafting an 
export health certificate is ongoing and the Protocol is expected to be signed later during 
2015.  
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Russia and Namibia discussed the possibility of exporting beef to Russia and in 2012 
Russian experts visited Namibia and carried out an audit on animal health status. Russia 
was satisfied and the process of negotiating the health export certificate commenced. At 
the time of writing this study (March 2015), Russia has indicated that she will sent a team 
to do further inspection of abattoirs for the purpose of beef exports and fisheries 
companies that want to export fish products to Russia (Shilongo 2015). 
 
5.5.2 Grapes    
                          
Fresh grapes also contribute to trade in agricultural products. The EU granted a tariff free 
quota of 800 tonnes to Namibian grape exports. Additional grapes are levied at 8 percent 
tariff (Sherbourne 2009: 90). Sherbourne (2009:88) explains that Namibian grapes have a 
competitive advantage as they become ready in early November, a month ahead of  other 
grapes from the southern hemisphere. Namibian grapes, thus, enter the European market 
without competition.  
 
 A large portion of grapes is exported to the Netherlands. Fresh grapes form the largest 
portion of agricultural products exported to The Netherlands in 2013, and they were 
valued at N$ 192.6 million. The rest is frozen boneless bovine meat which is valued at 
N$ 1 million (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). During the formative years of economic 
diplomacy (1990 – 1995), Dutch business institutions started arranging platforms for 
marketing Namibia as a trade and investment destination. For example, in 1993, the 
Dutch Committee on Southern Africa, Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (KZA) organised a 
business seminar for Dutch enterprises to be appraised on business opportunities in 
Namibia and South Africa (Hendriks 2006: 83). In 1995, another business conference on 
trade and investment in Namibia was held in The Hague in conjunction with the South 
Africa-Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (SANEC). This conference was addressed by 
Namibia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab and Deputy Minister of 
Finance, Rick Kukuri. At the conference Dutch businesses were lobbied to increase their 
 190 
imports from Namibia and for Namibian products to be marketed at the trade fairs in The 
Netherlands. 
 
In 1998, President Nujoma paid an official visit to The Netherlands. During his visit the 
Namibia-Netherlands Business Forum was convened to showcase Namibia as an ideal 
investment destination (Hendriks 2006: 105). Further, to create an environment 
conducive for businesses, Namibia and The Netherlands signed the Agreement on 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment in 2002. This agreement 
arguably boosts the confidence of traders and investors from the two countries (Hendriks 
2006: 105). The reciprocity nature of the agreements corresponds to the foreign policy 
principle of striving for mutual beneficial relations (Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting 1990: 53). In 2005, a second Namibia-Netherlands Business Forum was 
organised in Zoeterwoude, The Netherlands, by the Namibian Embassy in Belgium and 
SANEC.  
 
The Namibian-Dutch economic diplomacy, involving the Government’s relation with 
SANEC, reflects a temporary form of bilateral diplomacy of the type of governmental to 
non-governmental relations. This form and type of diplomacy is stated by Du Plessis 
(2006: 140) in his typology of diplomacy which is adopted in Chapter Two of this study. 
Nichols (2004: 749) states that one of the proponents of the theory of Liberalism, Richard 
Shell, supposes that business interest groups join governments on international relations 
programmes. This proposition is reflected in Namibia’s economic diplomacy when the 
Namibian Government leaders engaged business groups in The Netherlands to serve the 
business interests of their country. 
 
Grapes are also exported to the US following the US Department of Agriculture’s 
approval of quota and duty-free Namibian grapes exports to the US under AGOA in 2006 
Sherbourne (2013: 122). Sherbourne (2009: 90) states that this is significant as Namibia 
is able to trade her late harvest during the months of December to March which is the US 
winter period. 
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Apart from the markets stated above in this section, over 1000 metric tons of fresh grapes 
are further exported to the United Arab Emirates and Germany. Grapes weighing 1000 
metric tons, valued at N$ 18.6 million, were exported to the United Arab Emirates in 
2013. Grapes exported to Germany the same year weighed 1 300 metric tons and were 
valued at N$ 16.6 million. This shows that the United Arab Emirates market offers a 
competitive price for the Namibian grapes. For a smaller amount of grapes exported to 
the United Arab Emirates, the returns are higher than the larger amount of grapes 
exported to Germany. Fresh and dried grapes valued at N$ 3.2 million were also sold to 
South Africa in 2013. 
 
The NDP 1 states that as from 1994, Namibia negotiated duty free export quotas for the 
seedless grapes. The Namibian table-grapes have a seasonal advantage comparative to 
grapes from other countries (National Planning Commission 1995a: 253). 
 
5.5.3 Karakul pelts 
 
Another agricultural product, the karakul pelts are sold mainly in Denmark at the 
Copenhagen Fur Auction that takes place twice a year. Pelts are sorted out at the Agra 
pelt-sorting centre in Windhoek. Being the only sorting centre in Africa, South African 
furs are also sorted in Windhoek and sent out together with Namibian furs to international 
auctions. These are supplied by 40 Karakul sheep breeders from Namibia and 16 karakul 
sheep breeders from South Africa (Cloete 2007: 15). 
 
Pelt exports to Copenhagen’s auctions have averaged 100 000 pelts per year. In June 
2014, it was announced that exports would increase to 300 000 pelts per year (!Gaeb 
2014). Table 8 below shows karakul pelts exports over the period of five years, from 
2008 to 2012. These statistics were the latest five years available at the time of writing 
(March 2015). 
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Table 8 Namibia’s pelt exports, from 2008 to 2012   
 
Year quantity Value N$ million 
2008 112 067 46 
2009 100 061 30.7 
2010 116 078 39.8 
2011   97 544 50.5 
2012   97 128 63.2 
       Source: Swakara (2014: 51) 
 
The figures in Table 8 above shows that although exports decreased to below 100 000 
pelts during the years 2011 – 2012, the value of pelts exports increased. This is a result of 
pelt prices increase.  For example, in 2010, the average price per pelt exported was N$ 
342 – 396, which increased to N$ 517 – 572 in 2011 and N$ 650 – 698 in 2012. 
 
5.6 Mining 
 
Namibia’s main mineral exports are diamonds, uranium and copper. This section 
discusses mineral exports that are above N$ 1 billion. It further discusses new 
investments in the mining sector 
 
5.6.1 Diamond 
 
Diamond mining activities are located in the southern part of Namibia. An area stretching 
from the Orange River for 360 along the coast and 100 km inwards is called Spiergebiet. 
Sherbourne (2009: 136 - 137) observes that until 1994, diamond mining was under the 
complete hold of the Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) which was established in 
1928 by a South African mining magnate, Sir Ernst Oppenheimer. In 1994, CDM was 
reconstituted into Namdeb, a joint venture between the Namibian Government and De 
Beers Centenary AG in which the two parties hold 50 percent ownership. Namdeb further 
holds shares in DebMarine Namibia which mines diamonds off-shore. Sherbourne (2013: 
174) states that Namibia has the richest off-shore diamond deposits in the world. 
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Diamonds are exported mainly to the UK, Belgium and Botswana. Exports to Belgium 
for the year 2013 amounted to N$ 1.2 billion, largely made up of non-industrial 
diamonds, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted; 99.99 percent pure and non-
industrial diamonds, not mounted or set (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014).  
 
Former Namibian Ambassador to Belgium, Dr Zed Ngavirue (interview: 2013), states 
that Belgium was primarily interested in trading with countries that she has historical ties 
with on the African continent. Namibia does not fall in that category. However, albeit at a 
slow pace, Namibia was able to forge trade relations with Belgium that produced some 
results, such as the cutting of Namibia’s diamonds in Antwerp. The sale of diamonds to 
Belgium is an area where Namibia’s trade with Belgium is significant, as Belgium has 
been the third largest market for the non-industrial diamonds unworked or simply sawn, 
cleaved or bruted (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013a). This is illustrated by the figures of 
exports for these commodities which rank UK, EPZ and Belgium in that order. It was 
only in 2012 that Belgium came fourth after Botswana (Namibia Statistics Agency 
2013a). Belgium and Namibia do not have bilateral trade agreements and trade between 
them is carried under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement that grants Namibian 
commodities access to the EU market.  
 
Diamonds are the most traded commodity between Namibia and the UK. In 2012, exports 
for this commodity were valued at N$ 4.7 billion (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013a). 
 
Namibia’s trade with Botswana were boosted in the recent years. Up to 2011, Botswana 
did not feature among the top five trade partners. She, however, had maintained close 
relations with Namibia since independence. Immediately after Namibia’s independence, 
Botswana President, Sir Ketumire Masire, became the first Head of State to pay an 
official visit to Namibia in July 1990. During his visit, Namibia and Botswana signed the 
Botswana Namibia Joint Commission of Cooperation on 26 July 1990. The Joint 
Commission currently serves as a vehicle through which cooperation on economic 
diplomacy is being channelled (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011a).  
 194 
 
 The rise of Botswana to become a major trading partner with Namibia resulted from 
diamond exports. From 2012, diamond exports increased from 1 percent to 87 percent of 
total exports to Botswana (Namibia Statistics Agency 2012). For the year 2013, 
Namibia’s largest export to Botswana was diamonds which was valued at N$ 7.67 
billion. 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with Botswana must be understood in the context of a 
small state with another small state; Botswana is a landlocked country. Namibia offered 
Botswana a dry port facility at Walvis Bay which the latter uses for her imports from 
overseas. During the visit of President Khama to Namibia in 2012, President Khama also 
visited the dry port facilities in Walvis Bay and called for the speedy development of the 
facilities. After visiting the facility, President Khama addressed the Namibian Parliament 
where he highlighted the importance of projects like the Trans-Kalahari Railway Line 
and the dry port facility in Walvis Bay (National Assembly 2012: 47). He maintains that 
such projects are of strategic importance to Botswana being a land locked country. His 
country treated Namibia as a strategic partner to enhance Botswana’s access to the world 
market and to ensure the speedy transportation of goods between the two countries. 
 
In March 2014, Namibia and Botswana signed an agreement to construct a 1 500 
kilometres railway line from Botswana to Namibia. The railway will have a coal terminal 
and associated loading facilities. It will be a mode of transportation for Botswana’s coal 
exports estimated to be at 90 million tonnes annually. The railway does not only benefit 
Botswana, but will serve as an alternative route to other SADC countries like Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. This project cost N$ 100 billion and both countries will 
contribute to the portion of the railway in their respective territories (Heita 2014: 7 & The 
Namibian 28 (66) 2014: 13). 
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5.6.2 Uranium 
 
Uranium is one of the main mineral exports of Namibia. Two mines that produce 
uranium in Namibia are the Rössing Uranium Mine and Langer Heinrich mine. The 
Rössing Uranium Mine has been in operation from 1976 and is owned by Rio Tinto, 69 
percent; Iranian Government, 15 percent; IDC of South Africa, 10 percent; the Namibian 
Government, 3 percent; and individual shareholders, 3 percent. The market for Rössing 
Uranium Mine’s yellow cake is found in Europe, China, USA and Asia Pacific where it is 
used in the generation of electricity. Langer Heinrich started production in 2007 and is 
owned by Paladin Resources (IJG 2007: 14 -16). 
 
From 2004 to 2006 Namibia ranked the sixth largest uranium producer in the world, 
moving up to be the fifth largest uranium producer in 2013 after Kazakhstan, Canada, 
Australia and Niger. Annual production increased from 3 000 tons in 2004 to 4 500 tons 
in 2013. Namibia produces about 8 percent of the total world uranium production (OECD 
2014: 60).  
 
France is the highest importer of the Namibian uranium. In the year 2013, France 
imported uranium ores and concentrates from Namibia valued at N$ 1. 92 billion, 
followed by Canada which imported uranium ores concentrates valued at N$ 1.9 billion 
(Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy towards Canada is pursued mainly through mining 
investments. Canada has acquired mineral interests in Namibia and has been a leading 
partner for the exports of Namibia’s uranium ores and concentrates. The value for the 
export of these commodities was N$ 2.29 billion in the year 2012 (Namibia Statistics 
Agency 2013). 
 
Namibia participates at the Canada Association of Developers and Prospectors 
Conference that is held every year in Toronto. The Conference’s aim is to promote 
countries’ mineral opportunities and introduce them to companies involved in mining 
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explorations. At this occasion, Namibia makes a presentation on mining opportunities 
and general economic opportunities in Namibia (Embassy of the Republic of Namibia in 
Washington DC 2012). Attending this annual conference is a long-term form of 
diplomacy. The type of this diplomacy is a state to non-governmental organisation which 
this study introduced as an additional dimension to Du Plessis’ (2006:140) typology of 
small states (see Chapter Six).  
 
Canada’s economic diplomacy with Namibia illustrates that specialised conference 
diplomacy is an important form of small states relations with middle powers. In this 
respect, a platform is created by middle powers for small states to market their 
investment potentialities. Having mining interests in Namibia, it is important that Canada 
convenes related investment conferences. In the absence of a permanent Namibian 
diplomatic mission in Canada, or a Canadian diplomatic mission in Namibia, specialised 
conference diplomacy is an ideal platform for information exchange and forging relations 
among stakeholders in the Namibia-Canada economic diplomacy. 
 
Other large markets for Namibia’s uranium are China and the US; each imported uranium 
ore and concentrates valued at N$ 1.1 billion in 2013 (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014).  
 
A recent major investment in uranium mining in Namibia is the Husab Uranium Mine 
which was discovered in 2008. The mine is jointly owned by Epangelo Mining, a 
Namibian SOE, and the China Nuclear Power Group. After completion in 2015, the mine 
is expected to produce close to 7 000 tons of uranium oxides each year. This capacity will 
make Husab mine the second largest uranium producer after Canada’s MacArthur River 
mine. The construction phase is expected to create a total number of 6 000 jobs, while 2 
000 permanent jobs will be created when the mine opens (Guchu 2013: 5). 
 
The development of the Husab Uranium Mine is in line with the strategies of the NDP 3 
which underscores the promotion of developing new mines. Such development leads to 
increased mineral and exports and create employment opportunities (National Planning 
Commission 2008a: 120). 
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Since independence, Namibia and China’s relations have largely been based on 
development funding. Trade and investment agreements were concluded from 2003 
where Namibia was no longer just a recipient of grants, but that Namibian companies 
were importing goods and negotiating joint-ventures (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005b; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). Namibia set targets in the NDP 1 that she will avoid 
dependency on aid (National Planning Commission 1995a: 56). The change in Sino-
Namibia relations from aid to trade and investment, therefore, fulfils the aspiration 
expressed in the NDP 1. 
 
5.6.3 Copper 
 
Namibia’s copper is mined by Ongopolo Mining and Processing Limited. In 2006, the 
entire copper production was exported to China (Du Pisani 2014: 118). Exports to China 
of the copper ores and concentrates for the year 2013 amounted to N$ 19.5 million. It is 
the uranium ores and concentrates that raised the figure of mineral exports to China as it 
amounted to N$ 1. 1 billion.  
 
Copper ore concentrates valued at N$ 2 billion were exported to Switzerland in 2013. 
This represents about 51 percent of total exports to Switzerland for the year 2013 which 
amounted to N$ 3.9 billion. Copper exports to Switzerland represents 38 percent total 
exports to Switzerland with a value of N$ 5.3 billion. Switzerland is an important trade 
partner for Namibia, as trade figures shows that she was the third highest export partner 
and second highest import partner for Namibia during 2013 (Namibia Statistics Agency 
2014). 
 
Unlike other major European trade partners, Switzerland is not a member of the EU and 
her trade and investment are not a result of the Cotonou Agreement. The regime 
governing economic diplomacy between Namibia and Switzerland is the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) signed between the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)13 and SACU in 
                                                 
13  EFTA member-states are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
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2006 (Embassy of the Republic of Namibia in Geneva 2013). The agreement provides for 
trade liberalisation of goods and allows free trade to EFTA of SACU products. The trade 
liberalisation between EFTA and SACU conforms to the trade rules of the WTO. 
 
Accordingly, the multilateral agreement between SACU and EFTA countries are 
anchored in Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. Liberalism’s regime theory states that 
global trade regimes promote free trade and ensure understanding and cooperation among 
states. There are policies to follow rather than individual states choosing their trade 
pattern behaviour that serves their interests without consideration for the interests of other 
states (Burchill 2009: 67 – 68). 
 
Belgium is another market for Namibian copper. In 2012, Namibia’s exports of unrefined 
copper and copper anodes for electrolytic refining to Belgium was higher than with any 
other country with a value of N$ 667 987 550. Namibia further exports cathodes and 
sections of cathodes of refined copper in large quantities to Belgium (Namibia Statistics 
Agency 2013b).  
 
Belgium is of strategic importance to the Namibian mining industry as two major 
minerals diamond and copper are exported to that country. During his presidential tenure, 
President Nujoma used personal diplomacy to pursue economic diplomacy between 
Belgium and Namibia. During his visit to Belgium in 1994, President Nujoma promoted 
trade and investment between Namibia and Belgium (Office of the President 1999a: 402). 
As Namibia has a diplomatic mission in Belgium, applying the typology of diplomacy by 
Du Plessis (2006: 140) on Namibia’s economic diplomacy with Belgium, it can be stated 
that it is characterised by both permanent bilateral diplomacy and temporary high-level 
visits.  
 
It is typical of small states’ economy to rely on the mining industry. It is stated that 
countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana rely heavily on 
the mining industry as a major foreign currency earner. Another small country, Tanzania, 
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together with South Africa, Ghana and the DRC, dominates the African Mining industry 
(Namibia Mining February 2006: 4).  
 
5.6.4 Ownership and value addition 
 
Namibia can improve on the issue of ownership by learning from her neighbour 
Botswana which is also a small state. In Botswana, ownership of the mining industry is in 
the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs). But the Government of Botswana tends 
to have a higher shareholding percentage in the mining companies, compared to Namibia, 
ranging between 15 and 50 percent. There are, however, mining companies that are fully 
owned by foreign shareholders (Jefferis 2009: 69 – 70).  
 
Namibian minerals are exported in raw forms and there has been no development of the 
industries in that regard. In the diamond industry, for example, local industries for 
diamond cutting and polishing imports diamonds for value addition as there is a short 
supply from the Namibian Diamond Trading Company (NDTC) which supplies 
diamonds (Namibian Mining February 2006: 6). In the meantime, Namibia exports rough 
diamonds while leaving local industries that import diamonds at a higher cost. The NDP 
4, for example, states that only 10 percent if the diamonds mined in Namibia are cut in 
the local cutting and polishing industry. The Namibian Government plans to increase this 
to 20 percent (National Planning Commission 2012b: 101). The importance of providing 
sufficient rough diamond to the Namibian cutting and polishing industry to grow the 
Namibian economy is further highlighted in a study by Hamutumwa (2008: 61). 
 
5.7 The Export Processing Zone 
 
The EPZ was a creation of the EPZ Act, No. 9 of 1995 (see Chapter Three). EPZ 
companies are mainly in the mining sector. Table 9 shows the status of the EPZ by 2011, 
being the latest statistics available at the time of writing this study (March 2015). 
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Table 9: Export Processing Zone status (2011) 
 
 
 
Sector 
 
Number of 
enterprises 
 
Investment 
value  
(N$ million) 
 
Employmen
t level 
 
Export 
value 
(N$ million) 
Expenditure on 
local goods and 
services (N$ million) 
General 
manufacturing 
               
                 3 
                        
                       54 
                                                              
             138             33.7 
                           
                      10.56 
Mineral 
processing 
 
               16 
 
                  4 984 
             
           2 242 
 
           6 970 
 
                        1 289 
Assembly 
operations 
                            
                 1 
           
                     6.7 
  
               29 
 
             19.2 
                                           
                             3.5 
Total                20                  5 045            2 591            7 023                          1 304 
 
Source: Adopted from ODC (2013). 
 
EPZ investors originate from a number of countries, including six of the major trade 
partners (see Tables 7 and 8), namely China, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, UK and 
US. The investments are in the diamond and polishing industry, vehicle manufacturing, 
plastic industry and granite cutting and polishing. Production value in these major sectors 
had increased from N$ 3.2 billion in 2009 to N$ 6.2 billion in 2011, while the export 
value has increased from N$ 4.9 billion in 2008 to N$ 7.6 billion in 2011 (ODC 2013). 
The EPZ exported non-industrial diamonds unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, 
amounting to N$ 2.27 billion, while non-industrial diamonds, not mounted or set, 
amounted to N$ 1.76 million during 2013 (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
 
It was stated above that Namibia’s EPZs are not fenced-off (see chapter Three). An 
example of this is Namzinc which mines zinc at Skorpion. Zinc is exported in Europe and 
East Asia in countries like Belgium and Singapore. Zinc exports to Singapore during 
2013 is valued at N$ 1.17 billion (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014). 
 
More than half of the EPZ exports go to SACU member-states. This means that 
Namibia’s EPZ prioritises trading with neighbours. EPZ imports mainly come from 
Europe, especially Bulgaria where 34 percent of the imports originates. Imports from 
Bulgaria are mainly copper concentrates. The EPZ provides employment opportunities to 
Namibians which grew from 372 employees in 1998, to 2 591 employees, in 2011. Of 
these employees, 2 424 belong to the minerals processing sector (ODC 2013). 
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Broadly, the EPZ faces a challenge of job creation. While the Government had set the 
target for employment within the EPZ to be 25 000 by 1999, only 400 had been created 
by that time (Jauch 2002: 105). The problem of job creation is further fuelled by EPZ 
companies that never commenced operations. Sherbourne (2013: 248) argues that 
although by 2004 116 EPZ certificates had been issued, the ODC only had 32 companies 
on its book. Accordingly, the remaining 84 companies were either deregistered, failed to 
become operational or went out of business. It is stated that there are EPZ companies that 
had never started operations; some disinvested, liquidated, closed or cancelled.  
 
EPZ status was further granted to the Namibia customs smelters which mines copper in 
Tsumeb and Ramatex, a garment production enterprise owned by the Malaysians. This 
company capitalised on the EPZ privileges. For example, Winterfeldt (2007: 65 - 66) 
writes that companies like the Ramatex derived advantages from the EPZ status, making 
profits while, in the end, the Namibian Government ended up losing. The Namibian 
government offered Ramatex lucrative business incentives covering energy and water 
supply, labour conditions and land, with a view that Ramatex would provide solution for 
employment creation. 
 
Ramatex was offered a leasehold at a nominal value of N$ 1 188 million for the duration 
of leasing land in Windhoek which had a lease value of N$ 16.9 million. Its energy and 
water infrastructure were provided for free (Winterfeldt 2007: 69). Melber (2005: 313) 
states that the preferential treatment extended to the Ramatex factory under the EPZ 
regime exploited the Namibian economy.  No technology transfer had taken place and the 
company did not leave behind an infrastructure for a valuable use by Namibians. 
Ramatex investment culminated in a retrenchment of 1 600 Namibians. It was not a story 
of success. 
 
Eventually, of the 20 companies that remained in the EPZ business by 2012, 14 are 
diamond cuttings, with three in the mining industry (Sherbourne 2013: 248). The EPZ 
sector is, thus, not largely composed of companies that process materials from outside 
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Namibia. Therefore, tax incentives granted to EPZ companies were in vain. Ndalikokule 
& Kadhikwa (2007: 14) state that the Government had a plan to ensure that the SME 
sector and EPZ programmes took a lead in value addition to Namibia’s raw materials. 
But, the situation within the EPZ sector, as discussed above, points out that such a plan 
was not being fully realised.  
 
The NDP 2 targets, among others, were the growth of the EPZ and, thus, it was to address 
job creation (National Planning Commission 2002a: 316). Further, the White Paper on 
Namibia’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, too, states that the EPZs were 
initiated to create sufficient employment and adequate industrial base for Namibia 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004:19). However, the decline of the EPZ companies and 
the closure of the Ramatex factory, which left many Namibians jobless, contradicts the 
said provision of the NDP 2 and the White Paper. 
 
The NDP 4 states that the manufacturing industry growth envisaged by the NDP 3 was 
5.3 percent, but the industry’s out-turn was 5.6 percent (Office of the President 2012: 99). 
Arguably, if there has been prudent management of the EPZ regime, the output could be 
higher. 
 
5.8 Setbacks in economic diplomacy: the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) 
 
Economic diplomacy between Namibia and the US is further pursued under the 
framework of AGOA, passed by the US Congress in 2000, which regulates trade and 
investment between the US and sub-Saharan Africa countries (Ndalikokule, Biwa & 
Kaakunga 2006: 3).14 The US and sub-Saharan Africa countries negotiate trade 
agreements for mutual benefits. This complements the third foreign policy principle in 
article 96, of the Namibian Constitution, namely to strive for mutually beneficial relations 
(Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53).  
                                                 
14   There is no bilateral agreement between Namibia and the US in respect AGOA but the Act 
benefits Namibia unilaterally, as the US instrument of economic diplomacy. Other agreements 
between Namibia and the US are appended to this study as Appendix 6.  
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The President of the US is empowered to review, on an annual basis, countries in sub-
Saharan Africa that should participate in the AGOA programme. Countries are given 
duty free quotas to trade goods with the US. Ndalikokule, Biwa & Kaakunga (2006: 3) 
write that AGOA stems from the 1974 US Trade Act. AGOA provides an opportunity for 
broadening trade preferences within the framework of the Act. The preferential regime 
that is enabled by the US Trade Act facilitates the import of duty-free goods from sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
The AGOA programme has shortcomings from Ramatex, as discussed above (see the 
section on EPZ). Sherbourne (2013: 28 - 29) writes that having come to Namibia under 
AGOA arrangements, there was already a risk that when AGOA preferences change, the 
garment manufacturing business of Ramatex would disappear. 
 
Melber (2005: 312 - 313) avers that in respect of projects like Ramatex, AGOA serves 
the interests of maximising profits of large investors, rather than stimulating local 
economies of African states. Instead, Malaysians investors benefited from exclusive 
exports to the US market for their products. He further argues that the preferential 
treatment under AGOA does not serve prospects for industries in the long run. He 
maintains that, for example, with the closure of Ramatex, Namibia has become less 
attractive for further investments. 
 
Lindeke (2014: 196 - 197), too, states that AGOA’s benefit was in terms of the Ramatex 
textile, which, unfortunately, had closed in 2004. He further states that during the 
Ramatex textile industry’s operation, Namibia’s exports to the US under AGOA totalled 
US$ 200 million per year, but it has since reduced to US$ 8 million per year. 
Accordingly, there are no direct trade and investment benefits for AGOA to Namibia. 
However, since AGOA affords growth to the economy of Namibia’s neighbours their use 
of the Namibian port would benefit Namibia. 
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The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, as an instrument of 
diplomacy, recognises the US’s AGOA programme as an important tool of economic 
diplomacy, by which Namibia enjoys free access to the US market. Namibia’s trade 
relations with the US confirm the proposition by Prasad (2009: 48), that the relationship 
between small states and large economies is that of one-way trade preferences. Economic 
superpowers grant privileged markets access to small states. As an economic superpower, 
the US is a large market for Namibia’s exports. Mohamed ([sa]: 4), too, states that small 
states maintain preferential trade agreements with large economies, to ensure access to 
large markets for their products. Another small country, Mauritius, recognising this 
importance, concluded a bilateral economic agreement and takes advantage of the free 
market access to the US (Naeem 2008: 78, 83).  
 
5.9 Tourism and Construction as avenues for general inward investments and 
Foreign Direct Investments  
 
Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy had seen FDIs rising over the years (National 
Planning Commission 2002a: 307). For example, while FDIs flow was N$ 348 million by 
1995, it increased to N$ 695 million by 1999. From 2001 to 2006, FDIs recorded an 
annual average of US$ 266 per annum (National Planning Commission 2008a: 28).  The 
construction and tourism sectors were chosen because of their significant contribution to 
the economy. Sherbourne (2013: 627) states that the construction industry employs about 
42 000 people. The NDP 4 states that the tourism industry creates about 19 percent of 
jobs in Namibia (National Planning Commission 2012b: 92).   
 
5.9. 1  Construction 
 
The construction industry in Namibia is dominated by Chinese investors. Du Pisani 
(2014: 121) states that Chinese companies have penetrated the Namibian construction 
industry, against the background of unequal competition with Namibian construction 
companies, as the former tender for projects underwritten by the Chinese Government 
money. Jauch & Sakaria (2009: 14), too, states that Chinese companies are backed by the 
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Chinese government funding when tendering for construction companies. This means 
that China uses deep-pocket diplomacy (see Chapter One) in her FDI programmes. The 
results are that these companies weakens the competitiveness of the Namibian 
companies, which do not enjoy the same backing of government subsidies. Dobler (2007: 
101) states that the Chinese share of the construction industry is estimated between one to 
two thirds of the total percentage. Amadhila (2012b: 53) states that Chinese companies 
are able to competitively tender against local Namibian companies as they acquire 
construction equipment from Chinese manufacturers at lower prices. 
 
The high proportion of Chinese companies in the construction industry is not typical of 
small states, as Dobler (2007: 100) writes that only a third of road construction projects in 
Mozambique tenders went to Chines companies.  
 
Among the major projects awarded to Chinese contractors are the construction of the 
Namibian Supreme Court by China Jiansu International Namibia Ltd, part of the 
Construction of the Heroes Acre and the construction of the presidential residence of the 
Namibian State House (Dobler 2007: 100; Jauch & Sakaria 2009: 14). A construction 
project like the construction of the presidential residence, of which the money was 
donated by the Chinese government, was not awarded through public procurement 
process. Accordingly, there have been complains that Chinese investors in the 
construction industry receive preferential treatment in the award of public construction 
tenders (Dobler 2007: 101).   
 
Deputy Minister of Lands and Resettlement, Theo Diergaardt, questioned the preferential 
treatment of Chinese investors during the discussions on the Targeted Intervention 
Program for Employment and Economic Growth (TIIPEG), at the information sharing 
meeting convened by the Hardap Regional Council. Minister Diergaardt was in support 
of the local construction industry, which charged that, Chinese investors were awarded 
tenders, through preferential treatment, at the expense of Namibian contractors. 
Community members applauded Diergaardt, expressing doubt in the credibility of the 
tender process (!Narib 2011: 2).  The unfair competition is, among others, a cause of 
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domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy towards China, discussed in the next 
sections. 
 
Developmental diplomacy (see Chapter One) has been part of China’s diplomatic 
relations with Namibia. Du Pisani (2014: 123) states that, however, China ranked 15 in 
terms of countries that provided development aid to Namibia. Thereafter, Chinese 
developmental diplomacy had increased. This was after China donated a presidential 
residence for a new State House that was completed in 2010. Soft loans from China 
amounting to N$ 2 billion dollars had been extended to Namibia by 2009. 
 
Namibia and China’s economic diplomacy is regulated by a number of general and 
sectoral trade agreements that the two countries signed. In 1991, Namibia and China 
signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical cooperation (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2009). It is a general agreement providing a framework for the two countries to 
cooperate in trade and investments. Although China’s trade relations with Namibia is 
boosted by imports from China, it is also important to state that in 1996, Namibia and 
China signed an agreement to export Namibian ostrich meat to China. A list of 
agreements signed between Namibia and China are appended to this study as Appendix 6.  
In 1995, Namibia opened a diplomatic mission in China, thereby, forging closer ties with 
one of the emerging world economies. 
 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – also known as North Korea, too, 
has been visible in the construction industry. The DPRK firms, too, have been involved 
in the construction of major public projects like the construction of the Heroes Acre. The 
construction project of the State House was awarded to Mansudae Overseas Project 
Group (Office of the President [sa]: 467).  
 
Namibia’s Independence Memorial Museum, too, was constructed by the Mansudae 
company. The electrical, mechanical and civil work was contracted to Namibian 
companies. The value of the construction work is estimated at N$ 100 million (Ministry 
of Youth, National Service, Sport and Culture 2014). The company was further awarded 
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the tender to construct the military museum at Okahandja.  While there are no exact total 
figures available of the construction projects, the British High Commission estimated the 
figures to be about US$ 66 million (British High Commission 2015). 
 
Namibia and North Korea maintain sound diplomatic relations. North Korea provided 
material support to SWAPO during the struggle for Namibia’s independence. In 1992, 
Namibia and North Korea signed the Promotion and Development of Trade Relations 
agreement. In May 2014, North Korea’s Vice Minister of Foreign Trade visited Namibia 
and held meetings with his Namibian counterpart, Tjekero Tweya. They discussed issue 
related to economic cooperation in the fields of trade, construction agriculture and 
fisheries, among others (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014b).  
 
Applying Du Plessis’ (2006: 140) typology of diplomacy The DPRK’s economic 
diplomacy relations with Namibia is characterised by regime based and personal 
diplomacy. It is further embedded in regime-based diplomacy.  
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with the DPRK faces a challenge, following a series of 
resolutions passed by the UN Security Council from 2006 to 2013, imposing sanctions 
against the DPRK because of its nuclear tests. These are UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1718 of 2006; 1874 of 2009, 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). The resolutions 
are aimed at preventing the financing of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The 
resolutions place an obligation to the Namibian government to comply and, therefore, 
take measures that impact on economic diplomacy between Namibia and the DPRK. 
Accordingly, in 2013, Ambassador Martin Uden, Coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts 
on sanctions against the DPRK, visited Namibia to explain the UN sanctions and their 
implications thereof. The Namibian government started to put in place measures to 
comply with the UN resolutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). In December 2014, 
the Ambassador of the DPRK was summoned to Windhoek where the Namibian 
government explained its measures in compliance with the UN sanctions against the 
DPRK. Subsequent to the meeting, the DPRK government withdrew two of its diplomats, 
 208 
based in Windhoek, who are linked to companies that fall within the framework of UN 
sanctions, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). 
 
Other major investments that came to Namibia in the construction industry include the 
Ohorongo Cement factory owned by Ohorongo Investment (Proprietary) Limited, a 
subsidiary of Schwenk Group of companies. This is a major investment that is worth 250 
million Euros, which has created jobs for 300 Namibians. The factory produces 700 000 
tons of cement annually (Sherbourne 2013: 271). Prior to commencement of Ohorongo 
Cement, a Namibian company, Jack’s Trading cc, imported cement from China. 
Ohorongo Cement applied for infant industry protection. The protection was granted and 
came into force on 27 July 2012. Jack’s Trading challenged the matter in the courts. At 
the time of writing (March 2015), the matter is still pending at the Supreme Court. 
 
The maintenance of economic diplomacy by small states with former colonial powers is 
typical of small states (Mohamed [sa]: 18). Cultural and historical values bind former 
colonial powers and their colonies. There is then an exchange of trade and investment 
between two countries in that category. Former colonial powers further invest in 
industrial enterprises in former colonies, given the developed economy the latter. Ede 
(1986: 179) states that an official from a middle economy, France, stated that French 
industries have stake in her African colonies economies, who also serve as sources of raw 
materials. Namibia, having been a German colony (see Chapter One), the Ohorongo 
Cement factory investment reflects the trend of economic diplomacy with former colonial 
powers. 
 
5.9.2 Tourism 
 
A highest number of tourists in Namibia come from Angola. The arrival figures for 2011, 
which are the latest figures that the Namibia Tourism Board provided, shows that the top 
five tourist countries of origin are Angola (361 480), South Africa (272 930), Germany 
(79 721), Zambia (61 120) and Zimbabwe (42 945) (Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism 2012: 30). 
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Namibia’s first Ambassador to Germany, Nora Schimming-Chase (2011: interview) 
stated that when she arrived in Germany in 1991, tourism was an area that she gave 
priority to. This resulted in German tourist operators, such as Epacha coming to Namibia. 
Germany had, henceforth, become a source of the highest number of tourists from 
Europe. 
 
The tourist survey carried out, between June 2012 and January 2013, revealed that 
German tourists rank third, in terms of the highest number of tourists who visit Namibia, 
after Angola and South Africa. German tourists represent 7.7 percent of all tourists who 
came to Namibia during the period of the survey (Millennium Challenge Account 
Namibia & ACORN 2013: 8). Other figures for German tourists were cited in Chapter 
Three. The latest available tourist figure during the time of writing (March 2015) is for 
the year 2011, showing that 79 721 German tourists had visited Namibia during that year 
(Ministry of Environment 2012: 30). 
 
With regard to the high number of tourists coming from Germany, this could be 
attributed to colonial history between Germany and Namibia. There are places with 
German heritages, like the coastal town of Swakopmund, which has German buildings 
and other interests, for example. Tourism is important for Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. The NDP 2 states that the mission of the Government on the tourism sector is 
to develop the industry to contribute effectively to the economic development of Namibia 
(National Planning Commission 2002b: 127).  
 
During his tenure of Office, President Nujoma marketed Namibia as a tourist destination.  
Applying the typology of diplomacy by Du Plessis (2006: 140), the type of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy with Germany is inter-governmental relations, characterised by the 
high level visits. Germany’s President, Roman Hertzog and Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, 
have both visited Namibia, while Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba, too, paid state visits 
to Germany. During the visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1995, President Nujoma 
applauded Germany’s economic diplomacy with Namibia in the area of tourism and 
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emphasised the need to explore further areas of trade and investment (Office of the 
President 1999b: 70). President Nujoma further underscored the importance of tourism 
between Germany and Namibia during the visit of President Roman Hertzog to Namibia 
in 1998 (Office of the President 1999b: 325). 
 
Tourist figures show that from 2006 – 2009 the UK has been the sixth major source of 
tourism market for Namibia and was actually the fifth in 2007. The UK only dropped to 
the seventh position in 2010 – 2011, arguably due to the effects of the global economic 
crisis of 2008. 21 584 tourists from the UK visited Namibia in 2011 (Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism 2012: 30). 
 
The Namibian Embassy in Belgium, which is also accredited to The Netherlands, has 
been promoting Namibia as a tourist destination. Thus, of the tourists who come from 
Europe, Dutch tourists have been the third highest in numbers and only swooped 
positions with French tourists to become fourth, as from the year 2007 (Namibia Tourism 
Board 2010).  
 
The NDP 2 provided that the Government will establish the Namibia Tourism Board 
(NTB), which will serve as the link between the government and tourism activities 
operation (National Planning Commission 2002a: 282). The NTB was established and 
serves as a regulatory body for tourism activities in Namibia. 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, maintains that governments’ interactions relate to 
many fields, ranging from political, social to economic matters (Webber & Smith 2002: 
20). This assumption of Liberalism is reflected in Namibia’s economic diplomacy with 
Germany as it is not only focusing on the area of trade, for example, but it also focuses on 
tourism.  These have impact on other foreign relations aspects. For example, given a 
number of tourists that comes from Germany to Namibia, German tourists enjoy visa 
exemption in Namibia. 
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5.10  Domestic disagreement on bilateral economic diplomacy: the case of Chinese 
investors 
 
There have been complaints in the recent years about Chinese investors in Namibia. In 
2007, when the President of NCCI, Akapandi Endjala, addressed the SME’s Compete 
launch, he expressed concern about the Chinese investors who venture into even kapana 
businesses. Kapana is a roasted or fried meat, customarily sold by unemployed persons, 
to make a living and sustain their families. Endjala urged the Government to adopt infant 
industry protection measures and called on other businesses to take a lead in that 
endeavour, if the Government was not supportive (Informante 7 June 2007: 3). 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies advocates free trade (Dorn 2006: 426). However, 
infant industry protection should not be misunderstood to mean that there is an 
inclination to Realism. Protectionist measures are meant to allow the growing of local 
infant enterprise and guard against dependency. Accordingly, the call for infant industry 
protection, by the President of NCCI and by the Namibian Government, in the EPA 
negotiations (see Chapter Six), serves that purpose. And further corresponds to 
Interventionist Liberalism. 
 
Writing on domestic disagreement on Namibia’s economic diplomacy, Amadhila (2012: 
73) uses the concepts official and non-official perspectives about Chinese businesses in 
Namibia. These include government considering Chinese businesses to be favourable 
while locals regard them to be a threat to their economic livelihoods. 
 
Commenting on the issue of Chinese investors six years later, Endjala (2013: interview) 
changed the tone of his position and acknowledges that there are Chinese businesspersons 
who uphold good virtues of investment. These should be differentiated from others who 
do not respect Namibia’s labour laws and further avoid paying taxes. 
 
There have been further complaints with regard to the quality of products sold by some 
Chinese investors. Some Chinese shops were selling counterfeited goods. The Namibian 
newspaper (25 June 2013) reports that Namibian custom officials confiscated 84 960 
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counterfeit goods, valued at N$ 10.2 million (US$ 1 million). It was further reported in 
the newspaper, that there has been tax evasion by the same business which recorded a 
loss totalling N$ 94 023 over a period of four years, from 2008 to 2012, while, during 
that same period, payments for a total amount of N$ 8. 9 million were made into three 
bank accounts, belonging to the business owner. 
 
The criticisms of Chinese investors, has been rejected by President Pohamba, former 
President Nujoma and leading members from the Namibian business community. In 
March 2011, President Pohamba castigated Namibians who condemn Chinese investors, 
stating that it was shameful for Namibians to condemn the Chinese, as they provided 
Namibians with arms during the liberation struggle (The Namibian  25 (53): 13). President 
Pohamba’s views are shared by former President Nujoma, who maintains that people 
who complain about the Chinese are narrow-minded, as they do not appreciate the role 
played by the Chinese, in the course of Namibia’s liberation struggle (Nujoma 2011: 
interview). 
 
The issue of domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy with China continued and in 
2012, the public was shocked to learn about the mistreatment of workers by some 
Chinese businesspersons. This prompted the Minister of Labour to visit the businesses 
concerned and made it clear that Namibia will not tolerate investors who mistreat 
Namibian citizens. This also resulted in President Pohamba adjusting his stance and he 
informed the Chinese Ambassador, Xin Shunkang, that Chinese investors were subjected 
to Namibian laws in respect of industrial relations and inter-personal relations (Pohamba 
2013: interview). 
 
Following a public outcry on the unbecoming behaviour of some Chinese investors, 
Ambassador Xin Shunkang convened a meeting of Chinese businesspersons, where he 
urged them to conduct their businesses in accordance with the Namibian laws. The 
Ambassador complained that, 
Everyone knows of recent incidences in the news criticising Chinese on how they conduct their 
business. We feel bad about it and so I came to organise the Chinese people and tell them correct 
their behaviour (Nakale 2013: 1). 
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The Ambassador travelled to different regions of Namibia to address all Chinese 
investors. He wanted to ensure that trade relations between Namibia and China remain 
sound and that the growing impatience among Namibians against Chinese investors has 
calmed down. 
 
Jauch & Sakaria (2009: 19) write that the National Union of Namibian workers (NUNW), 
a federation of trade unions and the Construction Industries Federation of Namibia (CIF) 
complained about the treatment of workers, in contravention of Namibia’s labour laws. 
At its 4th Ordinary Congress held in 2006, the NUNW expressed concern over the 
treatment of workers by Chinese companies, which included cheap labour practices. The 
Congress resolved to commission a study by the Labour Resource and Research Institute 
(LaRRI) to investigate labour laws malpractices by Chinese investors. The study 
confirmed the validity of the complains and concluded that, 
The current labour practices at Chinese firms in Namibia are unacceptable and cannot be tolerated.  
A matter of particular concern is the awarding of tenders to companies, which do not adhere to 
national laws and regulations (Jauch & Sakaria 2009: 39).   
 
The study was concluded and it points out that the Namibian government is reluctant to 
take actions against the abuse of Namibian workers at the hands of Chinese investors. 
The reluctance of the Namibian government is reflected in the pronouncement of the 
Namibian leaders, when they resort to denouncing those who complain against Chinese 
investors’ malpractices, as state above.  
 
It is argued that the defence of Chinese companies at the expense of  national labour laws 
compromises the government and encourages continued negative perception from some 
sectors of the Namibian society (Amadhila 2012: 75). Amadhila (2012: 78) states that the 
government cannot allow its nationals to be disadvantaged at the cost of referring to pre-
independence assistance rendered by China.  
 
Meanwhile, this study submits that repeated defence of Chinese investors by the 
Namibian leaders on the basis of assistance provided by China to Namibia’s 
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independence raises a fundamental question of whether the Chinese assistance overrides 
the domestic labour laws, and whether it is valued more than financial and material 
support provided by other countries. Countries like the Frontline States and Nigeria (see 
Chapter Four), Cuba, the former USSR (presently represented by Russia) and the Nordic 
countries for example, supported the Namibian cause of independence (see Chapter 
Three). However, investors from these countries abide by Namibia’s labour laws and are 
not awarded public tenders at a disproportionate rate with Namibian entrepreneurs.   
 
Further, the defence of Chinese investors by the leadership is, arguably, compromised by 
the controversy of awarding scholarships to Namibian students, linked to senior 
government leaders, to study in China. In October 2009, Informante newspaper reported 
that children or relatives of President Pohamba, Founding President Nujoma and other 
high-ranking profile Namibians overseeing multi-million dollars procurements benefited 
from the Chinese Government scholarships (Nyangove & Hamata 2009: 1). These 
scholarships, that did not go through public advertisements reflects deep-pocket/cheque-
book diplomacy. Consequently, the scholarship awards put the President and other 
leaders in a compromising position. When they defend Chinese contractors it may, 
arguably, be viewed in the context of cheque book diplomacy. 
 
While China provides aid and development to Namibia, the real value of her development 
aid is lower than it appears, as she puts a condition to have Chinese companies that are 
selected by the Chinese government (Amadhila 2012: 62). Such developmental 
diplomacy largely benefits Chinese. A picture is portrayed that they invest a large amount 
of money in the Namibian economy, whereas part of that money goes back into the 
Chinese economy.  
 
A recent issue of domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy with China resulted 
from the leasing of a 10 000 hectares land in Caprivi Region to a Chinese Company, 
Namibia Oriental Tobacco. It was reported in the local dailies (Haidula 2015: 1 – 2; 
Beukes 2015: 1 – 2), that the Chinese company want to grow tobacco on the land. 
Opposition to the proposed project came from former leaders of SWAPO Party Youth 
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League who were suspended from SWAPO at the end of 2014, reportedly for 
embarrassing the party, after occupying plot in a Windhoek suburb of Kleine Kuppe, 
which they termed ‘affirmative repositioning’. The suspended leaders call themselves 
land activists. Former Secretary of Information and Mobilisation of SWAPO Party Youth 
League and lead land activist, Job Amupanda, issued a statement following the news of 
allocation of land to the Chinese company that together with other two youth who were 
suspended from SWAPO, Dimbulukweni Nauyoma and George Kambala, they will make 
a submission to the Namibian government, objecting for the allocation of land to the 
Chinese company, as there are Namibians who need land.  
 
Namibia’s Minister of Health, Richard Kamwi, too, voiced opposition to the planed 
project, asserting that the project is pushed by money hungry people. He maintained that 
the tobacco industry is not in the best interest of the health of the Namibian people. The 
Minister asserted that, 
 
It is detrimental to us.  It was for this reason that we enacted a new Tobacco Act which prohibits 
smoking in public places. Now the Chinese are coming with plans for tobacco plantation…it is 
nonsense (Iileka 2015: 1 – 2). 
 
Critiques for the envisaged tobacco plantation maintain that Namibian government sends 
mixed moral messages with regard to tobacco, at the convenience of pushing for the 
Chinese investments.    
 
The Chief Executive Officer of NCCI, Tara Shaanika (2013: interview), maintains that 
negative behaviours by Chinese investors are isolated incidents and should not be 
generalised to all Chinese investors, as there are those who have been good corporate 
citizens. He, however, admitted that there are problems with investors in SMEs because 
they venture into small businesses that should have been left to local investors.  
 
Meanwhile, the Second Vice President of NCCI, Vekuii Rukoro (2013: interview), 
argues that the problem is not the Chinese investors, rather how Namibians relate to the 
Chinese. The Chinese have defined their interests, in terms of trade and investment and it 
is now up to Namibia to also define her interests, relative to China, that will serve as 
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guidelines in engaging Chinese investors. Rukoro’s views correspond to the views of 
Jauch & Sakaria (2009: 38 – 39). They state that China is not to be blamed for its 
strategic approach and securing raw materials for industrialisation elsewhere, but it is for 
the Namibian government to set its own tactical priorities, aimed at securing better trade 
and investment arrangements.  
 
5.11 An assessment of Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy 
 
In the NDP 3, Namibia sets the goals to consolidate her economic diplomacy in the 
region through high-level bilateral visits and joint-commissions of cooperation, among 
others (National Planning Commission 2008a: 267). It is further stated that Namibia will 
strive to expand her trade and diversifies her export commodities. Her bilateral economic 
diplomacy programmes include promoting investments and facilitating exports (National 
Planning Commission 2008b: 154). 
 
This chapter illustrates that Namibia’s bilateral diplomacy focuses, among others, on 
regional diplomacy. The NDP 2 sets the targets that Namibia will increase intra-trade 
relations and sign bilateral agreements with other states (National Planning Commission 
2002a: 316). The promotion of regional economic diplomacy is a goal of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy (see Figure 2).  
 
Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy is not conducted in terms of linear escalation 
from political diplomacy to economic sanctions and later even to military forces (Figure 
1). But it is conducted through temporary form of diplomacy, characterised by high-level 
visits and permanent form of diplomacy, characterised by resident diplomatic 
establishments (Table 2), bilateral trade agreements and joint-commissions of 
cooperation. These relations are a type of inter-governmental relations. With the private 
sector being involved in the practice of economic diplomacy, through inclusion in the 
high-level visits, Namibia’s economic diplomacy also include a type of non-
governmental relations (Table 2).  
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Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy strategies include the development of the EPZ 
and manufacturing industry, thereof. This is to ensure the processing of fisheries, 
minerals and agriculture primary products (National Planning Commission 1995a:  256 – 
257). Figure 2, too, state that Namibia’s economic diplomacy includes the promotion of 
the manufacturing industry. The NDP 2, as an instrument of diplomacy, sets the targets 
that Namibia will endeavour to increase her exports and secure access to new markets 
states (National Planning Commission 2002a: 316). The fulfilment of this target is 
illustrated by the increase in export value of the EPZ (ODC 2013) and in the export 
products to major trade partners, which was, however, hindered by the 2008 economic 
recess. It is further mentioned above that Namibia has captured new markets such as 
Botswana and Belgium, becoming major trade partners in the recent years. But, it should 
also be stated that, overall, the decline in the number of EPZ companies does not present 
a successful picture of Namibia’s EPZ. 
 
Namibia’s export investments have increased over the past five years (see Table 7). 
Although the figures went down during the period of 2010 – 2011, due to economic crisis 
which started in the US, in 2008, Namibia’s exports to Angola and Canada for the year 
2012 had increased. Inward investments, too, experienced a drop in the figures during the 
period of economic recess but imports from South Africa and Switzerland had increased 
from 2011. Imports from China increased in 2012. Although Namibia trades various 
commodities with each trading partner, she places weight on trading specific 
commodities with each partner, such as fisheries for Spain, beef for the UK and mining 
for Canada (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013b). The significance of this approach is that 
it enables her to concentrate on a given specific sector and focus on increased trade 
within that sector. 
 
The Namibian Statistics Agency (2013a) lists more than 100 countries that are markets 
for Namibian products. This is contrary to the theory that says small states have a narrow 
scope of international relations (Chowdhury 2010: 9). Although a small state, Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy has been able to cover all geographical regions in the world.  
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Namibia had shown leadership in her conduct of economic diplomacy with partners. 
Although a small state, Namibia has been able to keep the trade balance with the UK in 
her favour. She created a market for her products and was able to attract inward 
investment from the African, Asian, European, and American economies. It is also 
important to note that among the major trade partners for Namibia, are former colonial 
powers, namely South Africa and Germany. This is because colonial powers maintain 
historical and cultural ties with their former colonies, as Ngavirue (20011: interview) 
states that a country like Belgium prioritises her former colonies when it comes to 
maintaining economic relations with African countries. 
 
In her bilateral relations, Namibia emphasises to her trade partners that their trade and 
investment should be mutually beneficial. This shows that Namibia fulfils her 
constitutional foreign policy principle, that she will maintain mutual beneficial relations 
with other countries in the world (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53). 
For a country like Spain, which has more than 2000 persons benefiting in employment 
from the Namibian fisheries, she had to make a contribution to the establishment of the 
Marine Institute, so that Namibians can benefit by acquiring the necessary skills, to 
process marine resources. However, the mutual benefits in respect of the Namibianisation 
of the fisheries sector is yet to be realised. 
 
Economic diplomacy, through high level visits, included business forums arranged as 
part of the programme of the visits. This provided an opportunity to business 
entrepreneurs to interact and exchange information in order to explore trade 
opportunities. Accordingly, it points to cooperation between the Government and the 
private sector in furthering Namibia’s economic diplomacy (see Chapter Four). 
 
The NDP 1 states that Namibia’s objectives are, among others, to increase her trade and 
investment profile (National Planning Commission 1995a: 255). This goal has 
conceivably been achieved, as Namibia’s trade profile has been increasing, in terms of 
both imports from and exports to major partners, and the EPZ production. Although a 
small country, Namibia did not want to be dependent on aid but rather, to raise her trade 
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and investment portfolio, in order for her economic diplomacy with other states, to be 
based on interdependence, as stated in the NDP 1 (National Planning Commission 1995a: 
57). Investment in the manufacturing sector and working towards increased trade thereof, 
is an objective set in the NDP2 (National Planning Commission 2002a: 317). 
Accordingly, the increased production in the EPZ manufacturing companies is in 
fulfilment of the NDP 2. 
 
Namibia’s exports are primarily agricultural and manufactured products. This is typical 
of small states, as it is the case with The Gambia, Mauritius, Swaziland and Sao Tome 
and Principe (Dömeland & Sander 2007: 7). Another small states’ economic diplomacy 
trend is the tax incentives extended to companies manufacturing goods for exports in the 
EPZ (see Chapter Three). Pieretti, Zanay & Zou (2010: 3) aver that small states attract 
trade and investment through favourable tax incentives to foreign investors.  
 
With instruments of diplomacy, like the Foreign Investment Act and EPZ Act, Namibian 
leaders and President Nujoma in particular, referred to these when he marketed Namibia 
as an investor-friendly environment during bilateral high level visits, as discussed above. 
Accordingly, these instruments of diplomacy, which are also cited in Figure 2, become a 
point of reference in the practice of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
South Africa as a middle economy is of strategic importance to Namibia. It is typical for 
small states to maintain good relations with regional economic powers. This is supported 
by Ede (1986:  183 – 184), who states that in West Africa, Benin has maintained sound 
economic relations with Nigeria. For the efficient transport of goods, the two states 
constructed a road that links them. They further entered into a joint-venture cement 
factory. Gricius (1999: 36) writes that Belarus, too, maintained sound economic relations 
with Russia and Germany. In 1998, they were among her top two major trade partners. 
 
Namibia is yet to overcome challenges of crop production in the agricultural sector. For 
example, the NDP 4 states that Namibia imports 50 percent of cereals and horticultural 
products (National Planning Commission 2012b: 106). Namibia’s economy is historically 
 220 
linked to South Africa, as a former colonial power and, thus, she depends on South 
African imports.  Most of the goods are transported by road. The value of South Africa’s 
exports to Namibia, in 2012, was N$ 45.3 billion, representing 70 percent of the total 
imports from the top six imports partners (Namibia Statistics Agency 2014a). Since 
Namibia is largely dependent on South African products, including basic foodstuffs like 
sugar, dairy products, juice and poultry among others, she agreed with South Africa to 
cooperate on Namibia’s industrial development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a). 
 
Namibia’s bilateral relations manifest President Nujoma’s doctrine of maintaining old 
friends and winning new ones. Some of Namibia’s trade partners like the US and 
Germany, opposed the imposition of sanctions against South Africa for her illegal 
occupation of Namibia (Landsberg 2004: 22). Meanwhile, Canada and The Netherlands 
were among Namibia’s pro-solidarity countries that advocated hard-hitting sanctions 
against South Africa’s apartheid regime. 
 
Domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy, in respect of the Chinese investors, is 
not unique to Namibia as a small state. Van Bracht (2012: 56) writes about similar trends 
in Zambia’s economic diplomacy towards China. Small businesses in Zambia asserted 
that Chinese involved in small business should leave Zambia and leave such businesses 
to Zambians. Domestic disagreement on Namibia’s economic diplomacy, too, comes 
largely from members of the business community. They have, accordingly, assumed a 
role in discussing matters of trade and investment, as provided in the NDP 1 when it 
underscores the role of the private sectors in economic matters (National Planning 
Commission 1995a: 3). 
 
5.12  The gap in the literature: forms and types of bilateral economic diplomacy 
 
In Du Plessis’ (2006: 140) typology of diplomacy (see Chapter Two), he confined the 
permanent form of diplomacy to resident missions in receiving states. He left out an 
important aspect of permanent form of diplomacy, namely regime-based diplomacy. This 
study propounds that regime-based diplomacy is part of the permanent form of diplomacy 
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and economic diplomacy, is largely pursued within the framework of bilateral agreements 
signed or multilateral treaties acceded to.   
 
Namibia signed a number of economic cooperation agreements and other trade and 
investment promotion regimes that served as the foundation of her economic diplomacy, 
during the formative years (see Chapter Three). This trend continued in the subsequent 
years. In the case of European trade partners, economic diplomacy is based on 
multilaterally negotiated regimes, like the Lomé Convention and the FTA between SACU 
and EFTA. Namibia has no resident missions in her major trade partners like Spain and 
The Netherlands, yet because of the respective trade agreements between Namibia and 
these countries, the output of Namibia’s economic diplomacy with these countries is 
more than her economic diplomacy output with other countries, in the same region, 
where Namibia has resident missions, like France and Sweden, for example.   
 
The relevance of regimes in economic diplomacy was further illustrated when Namibia 
and Senegal signed the Establishment of a Joint Commission Agreement, during the state 
visit by the President of Senegal, Macky Sall, to Namibia in August, 2013. Peer 
discussions reveal that signing this agreement was of essence to economic diplomacy 
between Namibia and Senegal, as the latter does not conduct trade without signing the 
cooperation regime. Accordingly, the form of economic diplomacy of another small state, 
Senegal, too, is regime-based. This study, thus, seeks to fill this gap in Du Plessis’ (2006: 
140) discussion of forms of diplomacy.  
 
There is a type and duration of bilateral economic relations between Namibia and her 
trade partners that is not included in the typology of Du Plessis (2006: 140), namely the 
Joint Commissions of bilateral cooperation. This study propounds that, like the EPA 
negotiations, these commissions, too, fall under long-term diplomacy. They are held at 
various levels including Heads of State and Ministers, as in the respective cases of South 
Africa and China. 
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Further, the level of these bilateral joint commissions are not discussed in Du Plessis’s 
typology. Joint Commissions are generally known to be at the level of Ministers or 
Deputy Ministers, or senior officials. However, they may also be at the level of Heads of 
State. An example is the joint commission of cooperation between Namibia and South 
Africa. Towards the end of President Nujoma’s second term, Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy with South Africa reached another level of Bilateral Economic Meetings, 
chaired by the Heads of State, which later became a Bi-National Commission during the 
term of President Pohamba. The creation of this structure started in 1999 when President 
Nujoma and his South African counterpart, Thabo Mbeki, inaugurated the 400kV 
transmission station at Kokerboom in Keetmanshoop (Maletsky 1999a: 3; Isaak 1999: 
16). This was one of the major projects between Namibia’s power utility, NamPower, and 
its South African counterpart, the Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM).  
 
At the inauguration of the Kokerboom Transmission Station, President Mbeki was 
accompanied by his Ministers, Dr Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma of Foreign Affairs, 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka of Minerals, Alec Erwin of Trade and Industry and Jeff 
Radebe of Public Enterprises. The inauguration was followed by, what was called, a 
“Joint Cabinet Meeting”, in which the two sides discussed, among others, issues of 
mutual trade, such as the Kudu Gas-to-Power and the Trans Kalahari Highway projects. 
President Nujoma’s delegation included Ministers Hidipo Hamutenya of Trade and 
Industry, Jesaya Nyamu of Mines and Energy, Hampie Plichta of Works, Transport and 
Communication and Tuliameni Kalomoh, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (Maletsky 
1999b: 3).  
 
After the “Joint Cabinet Meeting”, Namibia and South Africa agreed to regularise their 
interactions by instituting the Heads of State Economic Bilateral Meeting. This meeting 
is held bi-annually in Namibia and South Africa, on a rotational basis, to discuss issues of 
economic cooperation. At the Heads of State Economic Bilateral Meeting, held in 
Namibia in 2010, Namibia and South Africa agreed to elevate the Head of State Bilateral 
Economic Meeting to a Bi-National Commission. The Commission is chaired by the 
Heads of State and has different sectoral committees constituted and chaired by 
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Ministers. The first inaugural session of the Bi-National Commission, was inaugurated in 
Namibia, during President Jacob Zuma’s state visit, in November 2013. 
 
The discussion of the relationship between Namibia and South Africa during the 
presidential tenure of Presidents Nujoma and Mbeki fills the gap that exists in the 
discussion on Namibia’s relations with South Africa in the publication by Hengari and 
Saunders (2014). Despite milestone economic diplomacy initiatives during the 
presidential tenure of Presidents Nujoma and Mbeki, like the institutionalisation of the 
Heads of State Economic Bilateral Meeting, Hengari and Saunders only focused on the 
presidential tenures of Presidents Nujoma and Mandela, and of Presidents Pohamba and 
Zuma. 
 
Liberalism as a theory of IR studies propounds that international regimes and institutions 
promote cooperation among nations (Işiksal 2004: 141). This, too, illustrates the 
importance of international agreements in economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy, 
whether coordinated bilaterally among states, like Namibia and Angola, for example, or 
facilitated through multilateral institutions, like Namibia and Switzerland, for example, 
are all based on trade regimes. This also applies to a number of trade and investment 
related agreements between Namibia and South Africa, appended to this study as 
Appendix 5. 
 
5.13 Summary 
 
Namibia’s major economic sectors of mining, fisheries and agriculture are among the 
sources of her exports to the world market. Products from these sectors are traded as a 
result of bilateral trade agreements between Namibia and other countries, or multilateral 
trade agreement between SADC and the EU or SACU and EFTA. 
 
In the fisheries sector, Namibia’s large exports go to the European market and within the 
southern African region. The issue of ‘Namibianisation’ of the fisheries sector is not 
resolved. The current trend is of empowerment in fishing companies through quotas. In 
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this respect, Namibians do not benefit sufficiently in real terms when the profits are 
divided, because they look at ownership of the vessels too, for example.  
 
The agricultural sector’s products like beef and grapes are traded in Europe under the 
Cotonou agreement. As a small state, Namibia’s challenge is to fill her beef quota in 
Europe because of the resources needed for production. This is applicable to other small 
states. Namibia further extends her exports to the markets where she receives better price 
deals, like her grape exports to the United Arab Emirates. 
 
In the Mining sector, the large market share for Namibian products is in America, Europe 
and Asia. However, most of the minerals are exported in raw form, and where the 
government provides opportunities for manufacturing, like in the diamond industry, only 
a small size of these resources is cut and polished in Namibia. 
 
Applying the typology of Du Plessis (2006: 140) on diplomacy (see Chapter Two), 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy has been a mixture of both the permanent and temporary 
forms of diplomacy. In countries like Germany, for example, permanent diplomatic 
representation and personal diplomacy have played a role in the promotion of trade and 
investment. These establishments serve the purpose of facilitating, among others, trade 
missions from Namibia to those countries and vice versa. 
 
Regime based diplomacy is another important aspect in Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with Switzerland is based on a multilateral trade regime. 
Forms of bilateral economic diplomacy further include joint-commissions of cooperation.  
 
Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy recognises the importance of neighbourhood 
foreign relations. Thus, she exports her diamonds to Botswana, meat to South Africa and 
Angola, and fish exports to Angola and Mozambique. 
 
Mere hosting of conferences does not mean that a country has an effective tool for 
economic diplomacy. The measurement of conferences’ successes is when they produce 
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some results. Namibia’s conference diplomacy was effective because it attracted 
investors to invest in the Namibian fishing and diamond industries, for example. Namibia 
used this form of diplomacy mostly in her economic diplomacy towards middle powers. 
She attracted both middle and economic super powers to bring FDIs to Namibia and open 
up their markets for Namibian products. 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy with China reflects deep-pocket diplomacy, as state 
subsidized investors come to compete with Namibians. Its cheque-book diplomacy 
symbolised by the granting of scholarships to children linked to influential government 
leaders compromises them to address the plight of the Namibian workers and investors, 
who disagree on the manner in which Chinese investors are awarded public construction 
tenders, and the way they treat their workers. This results in domestic disagreement with 
regards to pursuing Namibia’s economic diplomacy.  
 
Chinese and North Koreans are Asian countries whose investors dominate the Namibian 
construction industries. They were awarded tenders for important projects that include the 
Heroes Acre, State House and Independence Memorial Museum, among others. This 
leaves Namibian construction companies with a small share of public construction 
projects. North Korea and China supported the Namibian cause for independence and 
economic diplomacy with Namibia is anchored in old friendship ties. 
 
The EPZ sector does not have much success. Companies were granted EPZ status, but 
they have not come into operation. Another setback was caused when Ramatex was 
granted an EPZ status to export garments under AGOA to the US. While Malaysian 
investors were given favourable concessions to invest, their investment was short-lived 
and made huge profits at the expense of the Namibian government, leaving thousands of 
Namibians without jobs. In the end, the AGOA programme only serves the purpose of 
maximization of profits by large industries. 
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Chapter Six focuses on Namibia’s multilateral diplomacy within the context of ACP-EU 
relations and within other regional and international organisations, such as SACU, 
SADC, UNCTAD and WTO. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NAMIBIA’S MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Multilateral diplomacy is among the methods of diplomacy employed by foreign policy-
makers in modern diplomacy. Barston (2006: 39) states that multilateral diplomacy is 
pursued through international, regional and sub-regional institutions, and permanent 
conferences. In his typology of diplomacy, Du Plessis (2006:140) supposes that 
conference diplomacy may not only be in a form of permanent conferences, but it may 
also be in a form of conferences on specific subjects (see Figure 1 and Table 1).  
 
Through multilateral diplomacy, states feel that they are able to air their concerns, which 
will be considered because of the principle of equality of sovereignty. When a position of 
a given state is supported by the majority of other members of a multilateral institution, it 
will be collectively passed. In bilateral relations, states are sometimes put in unequal 
relations versus large states. These unlevelled relations are not favourable to the effective 
pursuance of diplomacy by small states. Small states adopt multilateralism to benefit 
from collective security and economic development, thereby, overcoming their 
limitations as single entities (see Chapter Two). 
 
Various aspects related to multilateral diplomacy have been discussed earlier (see 
Chapter Two) and are applied and analysed in this chapter. This chapter focuses on the 
practice and outcomes of Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy, by discussing 
illustrative multilateral case studies, such as the EPA negotiations with the EU; 
outstanding issues in the EPA negotiations; the WTO; UNCTAD; regional integration in 
SADC focusing on the fisheries, transport and energy sectors; SADC and China; SACU; 
and conference diplomacy focusing on the Smart Partnership dialogues and World 
Economic Forum (WEF). The chapter concludes with an assessment of Namibia’s 
multilateral diplomacy.  
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6.2 The institutional foundation of Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy 
 
The NDP 1, 2, 3 and 4; Vision 2030; and the White Paper on Foreign Policy and 
Diplomacy Management, as national strategy documents on Namibia’s policies and 
programmes, are among the key policy documents that provide an institutional 
framework for the pursuit of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. The targets for multilateral 
diplomacy in the NDP 1 stipulate that Namibia will work towards greater integration for 
SACU and SADC, among others (National Planning Commission 19995a: 56). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs adjusted itself to this policy target. When the White Paper on 
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management was drafted, it highlighted regional trade 
within SADC and proposed plans to make SADC a trade and investment hub (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2004: 65). 
 
Vision 2030, too, sets the objective that Namibia should contribute to an effective 
regional integration and play a meaningful role in regional institutions (Office of the 
President 2004b: 193). Namibia had held the chairmanship of SADC in 2000 and 2011. 
In order to effectively carry out the mandate of Namibia’s chairmanship, the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and of Trade and Industry made the necessary financial and human 
resources available.  
 
Namibia, hosted SACU and the Government had to make resources available to provide 
land for the SACU headquarters. Accordingly, the Ministries of Finance and of Trade and 
Industry had to ensure that Namibia plays a significant role in the formulation of SACU 
trade policies. Namibia’s achievements in respect of regional integration and economic 
cooperation will be discussed in the next sections. 
 
The central goal of the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management is the 
promotion of trade and investment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004:17 – 19). 
Accordingly, in multilateral negotiations, the issues to ponder on will inherently be how 
the negotiations will promote the exports of Namibian products and how they will attract 
FDI to Namibia. The line Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Trade and Industry; and 
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Agriculture Water and Forestry had, therefore, to ensure full participation of the 
Namibian Government in the multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
The NDP 2 laid a framework for the promotion of the manufacturing industry. It states 
that Namibia will put an emphasis on value addition to local sources from Namibia 
(National Planning Commission 2002a: 317). When the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
negotiates multilateral trade agreements, the objectives of the NDP 2 serve as a referral 
point. The Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Tjekero Tweya (2012: interview), 
stated that against the promotions of NDP 2, his Ministry’s programmes include the 
empowerment of the SMEs to grow into the manufacturing industry.   
 
With the complexities of trade negotiations, the NDP 2 sets the target of Namibia 
opening an office at the WTO (National Planning Commission 2002a: 315). Opening an 
office at the WTO enables Namibia to participate strategically in the decisions pertaining 
to the world economy and international trade. Lesotho, a smaller country than Namibia, 
had a permanent diplomatic representation at the WTO before Namibia had a 
representation there. 
 
In addition to maintaining specialised diplomats at multilateral missions that deal with 
economic diplomacy, such as the missions in Belgium and the WTO (see below), 
Namibia further pays her membership contribution to multilateral organisations in full 
and on time.  
 
Narlikar’s (2001: 136) assertion that small states are isolated following the formation of 
large states clubs is not applicable to Namibia. While Namibia is not invited to the 
meetings of large states clubs such as BRICS and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) 
(see chapter Two), she makes use of her individual bilateral relations to trade with 
BRICS and IBSA countries. Thus, trade figures show sound inward and outward 
investments with these countries (see Chapter Five). 
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The NDP 3 sets the goals that Namibia will work towards regional and global economic 
integration, within SADC and SACU, with regional integration programmes focusing on 
various sectors. Namibia will further strive for a just global trading environment under 
the auspices of the WTO and ensure fair trading agreements with the EU (National 
Planning Commission 2008a: 265 – 268 and National Planning Commission 2008b: 153).  
 
One of the NDP 4’s areas of focus, the manufacturing industry, continues to support the 
government position as articulated by leaders (see chapters 3 and four). The promotion of 
manufacturing has been among the successfully concluded issues in the EPA 
negotiations, especially in respect of the export taxes, as it will be discussed in the next 
sections (see chapter six). 
 
6.3 Multilateral economic diplomacy: practice and process 
 
Multilateral economic diplomacy involves a process of cooperation among states that are 
party to multilateral trade agreements. Such mode of cooperation is attained through 
methods such as influence (see Figure 1), by which states endeavour to influence trade 
negotiation, for example, in order to attain favourable results. Hey (2003: 78 and 83) 
states that Luxembourg has adopted influence as a method of cooperation in the EU but it 
does not employ coercion as a method of diplomacy (see Figure 1). It is propounded that 
in multilateral negotiations, small states endear themselves to other states, in order to win 
them over to their point of view. 
 
The duration of multilateral economic diplomacy can either be short or long-term (see 
Table 2). Short-term diplomacy includes high-level meetings and visits, while long-term 
form of multilateral economic diplomacy includes opening diplomatic missions 
accredited to multilateral institutions that deal with trade and investments matters, such as 
SADC, the EU and WTO. 
 
The types of multilateral economic diplomacy include conference diplomacy. In this type 
of diplomacy, states and international organisations discuss issues of trade and 
 231 
investment. Conference diplomacy is also used as a platform that brings together states 
and MNC, at which states showcase their trade and investment opportunities. 
Parliamentary diplomacy, too, is another type of multilateral economic diplomacy (see 
Table 2). Parliamentary diplomacy is illustrated by, among others, membership to the 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, where the researcher of this study has 
represented Namibia from 2007 to 2010. The Committee meetings and sessions of the 
Assembly meet twice a year and discuss, among others, trade and investments between 
the ACP states and the EU member-states. 
 
The level of multilateral economic diplomacy is at the Heads of State and/or Government 
and Ministers (Hamilton & Langhorne 2011: 226). Regional and international 
organisations have regular summits that are held at the Heads of State level. The summits 
are preceded by ministerial meetings. The ACP-EU multilateral economic diplomacy, 
too, is conducted at the level of ministerial meetings and summits, and further at the level 
of parliamentarians as stated above. 
 
The actors in multilateral diplomacy are both state and non-state actors (see Figure 1). 
State actors are predominantly present in all types of multilateral diplomacy. Non-state 
actors are mostly involved in conference diplomacy. They, are however, sometimes 
consulted on other forms of multilateral diplomacy on specific issues, like the EPAs as it 
will be discussed below. 
 
6.4 Multilateral economic diplomacy with the European Union: the Economic 
Partnership Agreements 
 
The EPAs between the EU and ACP is an overall agreement that regulates the trade of 
commodities between the EU and ACP countries. The history of the EPA could be traced 
to 1975, when nine member-states of the EEC, the precursor to the EU signed the Lomé 
Convention with 46 members of the ACP (Bilal 2001: 46). This was followed by 
successive Lomé Conventions in 1979 and 1984 and the Lomé Convention IV signed in 
1989. These Conventions regulate trade relations between the EU and ACP member-
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states. The last Convention came to be known as the Lomé IV and it covers a period of 
ten years. Following her independence in 1990, when the Lomé IV Convention was in 
force, Namibia applied for LDC status which was granted and she subsequently acceded 
to the Convention (Du Pisani 1992: 61). 
 
The EU gave preferential treatment to goods from ACP member-states that were colonies 
of EU member-states (Hanrahan 2001: 1 – 2). This resulted in the restriction of bananas 
from a number of countries, including Latin America, to enter into the EU market. The 
US companies dominated the markets of these countries. The US, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Mexico declared a dispute at the WTO over the EU’s banana import regime, which 
resulted in the WTO ruling in their favour. The EU requested for an extension for the 
time of the import regime until 2007, to bring its regime in compliance with the WTO 
rules while negotiating the new EU-ACP trade agreements. The new agreement came to 
be known as EPAs, whose negotiations had already commenced five years earlier.  
 
6.4.1 The European Union and Southern Africa Development Community’s 
Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations  
 
Du Plessis (2006: 140) identified permanent and temporary forms of diplomacy (see 
Table 2). In view of the duration, that the EPA negotiations have taken place, as it will be 
discussed in the next sections, this study propounds that a new form should be added to 
the typology, namely the long-term form of diplomacy. This is in a form of state-to-inter-
governmental organisation, inter-governmental organisation-to-inter-governmental 
organisation, inter-governmental relations or state-to-non-governmental organisations. 
Accordingly, the EPA negotiations fall in the category of long-term form of diplomacy. 
They do not fall in the permanent category, because these negotiations are not a 
permanent, but rather an ad hoc exercise. They also do not fall in temporary diplomacy, 
because they have lasted for a longer period of over 10 years. 
 
The EPA negotiations were launched in 2002, between ACP and EU member-states. This 
culminated in the initialling of the Interim EPAs between the EU and SADC EPA group. 
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The diplomatic strategies and techniques employed by Namibia, in the EPA negotiations 
were, inter alia, to talk to other SADC member-states, in order to have Namibian issues 
of concern adopted as SADC issues of concern, playing an active role by hosting 
negotiations and using both the members of the Legislature and the Executive, to argue 
Namibia’s issues of concerns, at multilateral form and in their engagement with their 
European counterparts. Namibia adopted a firm stance on her position and sought to 
inspire other members of the ACP in the overall negotiations, using influence rather than 
other forceful modes of diplomacy stated in Figure 1 (see Chapter Two), by Du Plessis 
(2006: 136).  
 
Although SADC has 15 member-states, the SADC EPA negotiation group has seven 
member-states, comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Namibia and South Africa. Other SADC members-states belong to other EPA 
configurations. For example, Tanzania belongs to the East African EPA configuration. 
Grünke (2011: 17) states that the splitting of the SADC region in smaller units reflects 
major conflicts in the EPA negotiations. This view has also been expressed in the 
meetings of the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which the researcher of this 
study attended from 2007 to 2010. Melber (2013: 2 – 3), too, surmises that the EPA 
configuration creates a problem for regional integration. He further referred to the 
bullying attitude of the EU in the EPA negotiations and the blackmail that the EU used in 
setting the deadline for signing the EPA by October 2014. 
 
In the Joint Parliamentary Assembly sessions, ACP parliamentarians accused the EU of 
using divisive strategies, where some ACP member-states would be lured in agreeing to 
the EU’s proposals, leaving others who are against signing the interim EPA, to appear as 
difficult or bad trade partners. This is because, for example, Angola, Namibia and South 
Africa (ANSA) have initialled the Interim EPA (IEPA), but did not sign pending the 
finalisation of some issues that the parties did not agree upon (these issues are discussed 
in the next paragraphs). Meanwhile, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique 
have signed the IEPA. 
 
 234 
Following the initialling of the interim EPA by the ANSA group, the following issues 
were still outstanding and needed to be negotiated between the SADC EPA group and the 
EU: (i) export taxes, (ii) quantitative restrictions, (iii) food security, (iv) infant industry 
protection (v), bilateral safeguard/agricultural safeguard measures, (vi) free circulation of 
goods, (vii) most favourable treatment resulting from free trade agreements, and (viii) 
definition of parties (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2009).  
 
Namibia took a leading role in these negotiations, by hosting a round of negotiations in 
March 2009, which resulted in reaching consensus on four issues, namely export taxes, 
quantitative restrictions, food security and free circulation of goods (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 2009). Consensus was reached with regard to export taxes. SADC EPA 
states wanted to a relatively high tax, for raw materials that are exported to the EU, 
compared to processed goods. The absence of export taxes was seen as an impediment to 
industrial development policies. It was agreed that SADC EPA states can increase export 
duties under restricted conditions, that the duties should not be incompatible with WTO 
rules. Duties should be imposed on goods to be exported to all destinations. The round of 
negotiations further reached an agreement that parties can apply quantitative restrictions 
in conformity with the WTO agreement.   
 
With regard to food security, the SADC EPA states successfully negotiated for the 
inclusion of a clause on infant industry protection. This allows Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland to levy duties on imports in order to protect their infant industries. The rounds 
of negotiations in Namibia further agreed on free circulation of goods. This means that 
when goods enter a custom union territory, they will be levied only once. For a country 
like Swaziland that belongs to more than one custom union, SACU and COMESA, any 
duties paid on imports from the EU will be refunded when goods are re-exported to 
another custom union territory (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2009).  
 
By the end of 2013, there remained outstanding issues, which the SADC EPA states want 
resolved, before the signing the full EPAs (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2011). 
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Firstly, SADC EPA states are opposed to the inclusion of the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) clause in the EPA. The EU wants ACP states that are party to the EPAs to extend 
to the EU any preferential treatment that they have with other countries which makes up 
over 1 percent of world export merchandise. Namibia, on her part, argues that this clause 
undermines her trade relations with emerging economies that she trades with, like China, 
Brazil and India. Accordingly, this upsets her trade policy of South-South cooperation 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 2011). 
 
In the second instance, there is further disagreement on the issue of the rules of origin. 
This is used to determine a country of a product’s origin in international trade. When a 
processed product is finally sold to end users, it should reflect its origin. Namibia in 
particular wants the fish caught in her territorial waters to be reflected as having 
originated from Namibia.15 This is of particular importance to Namibia, as illegal fishing 
occurs in her territorial waters and where legal fishing occurs, its origin should be 
mentioned. 
 
In the third instance, the definition of the parties is an issue. The EU wants to define 
SADC-EPA states as a juristic person. However, SADC-EPA states argue against the 
legal feasibility of such a party. The SADC-EPA group is not a juristic person established 
by statutes unlike SADC, for example. It is the single sovereign states that are legal 
entities and, therefore, the EPAs should define the parties in terms of individual member-
states. 
 
These issues that were outstanding were finally resolved by July 2014, resulting in 
Namibia signing the Interim EPA (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2015). 
 
Proponents of Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, suppose that there are exceptions that 
states can deviate from the GATT and by extension, WTO principles.16 This is partly 
                                                 
15  Territorial waters include the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 12 nautical miles from 
the baseline. 
16  The history of WTO is traced to the GATT, which was founded in 1947 to promote free global 
trade. In 1995, the WTO was established as a successor to the GATT. 
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because some custom unions existed before GATT was established (Cohen & Zysman 
1983: 2). Arguably, in terms of the principles of equal treatment of parties, members-
states of custom unions established after the GATT should also be able to deviate from 
WTO principles when it is justifiable. It is, thus, appropriate that issues that are part of 
WTO rules, such as the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause, are being opposed by 
SADC-EPA states. The reason is that their inclusion does not bring equity in trade, 
because SADC and EU member-states do not have the same economies of scale.  
 
The firm stance adopted by Namibia, Angola and South Africa not to sign the IEPA 
before their concerns are addressed, adds a dimension of the Liberalism theory’s 
perspectives of institutionalism to multilateral economic diplomacy. This theory 
advocates that states do not allow a hierarchical enforcement of agreements rather they 
require cooperation from other states, for the sake of achieving common interests. The 
theory further espouses principles of even distribution of gains, reciprocity and 
cooperation (Keohane & Martin 1995: 39 – 46). It is these principles that the SADC EPA 
group has firmly pursued, to ensure that the signing of EPA results in the gains not only 
of the EU, but of SADC as well. For example, since resources from SADC member-
states that are traded with the EU do not negatively affect the EU industries, SADC 
member-states want a reciprocal gesture that their local infant industries, too, should be 
protected from goods from the EU. SADC member-states are conscious of the fact that 
common interests of all stakeholders should be safeguarded with the signing of the EPA. 
They insist on cooperation and that they should be treated as partners in the negotiations 
with their EU counterparts.  
 
6.4.2 Namibia and the European Union trade negotiations 
 
Namibia has played a significant role in the EPA negotiations. This followed her hosting 
of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, in Windhoek, 1996. Two years later, 
Namibia’s Ambassador to the EU, Dr Zed Ngavirue, served as Chief Spokesperson for 
the negotiations during the period from 1998 to 2001. During the same period, he further 
served as Chairperson of the Committee of ACP Ambassadors to the EU.  
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The EU set in motion the point that after the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2007, 
the new EPA should be based on reciprocal trade benefits. The EU has further threatened 
to close its market to ACP products from ACP countries that do not sign the EPAs. The 
ACP countries took a stance that the negotiated EPAs should safeguard their products, so 
that these products do not lose the markets to the EU products (Ngavirue 2013: 
interview). 
 
Namibia has been assertive against the marginalisation of small countries in the EPA 
negotiations and maintained, 
In order for the new agreement to achieve its objectives, it must define new ways and instruments 
to foster the smooth and gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy and to 
promote their sustainable development. The motto of the new agreement should be: true and 
strengthened partnership (Ngavirue 1999:19). 
 
Ambassador Ngavirue (1999: 20) avers that in respect of reciprocal trade benefits 
advocated by the EU,  it will be pre-mature to introduce duty-free imports from the EU, 
as due consideration should be given to the level of economic development of ACP 
countries. The ACP countries are not yet at the same level of development like EU 
member-states and their commodities can, therefore, not compete equally in the market. 
It should, therefore, not be construed that Namibia’s stance on reciprocal benefits is 
contradictory to her foreign policy principle of striving for mutual beneficial relations 
(Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1990: 53). Rather, Namibia does not want to 
become worse off under the guise of reciprocal trade benefits and, thus, remained 
opposed to the pre-mature introduction of duty-free imports from the EU. Further, 
Namibia wants fairness and equal competition to realise the goals set in the NDP 1 
(National Planning Commission 1995a: 55 – 56). 
 
Namibia has been especially staunch on issues of infant industry protection and food 
security. Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Tjekero Tweya (2012: 
interview), states that Namibia is at the developing stage and she needs to develop her 
infant industries, whereas Europe is already developed. Signing the IEPAs and later 
EPAs, would result in Europe bringing products in the Namibian market, with which 
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local products will not be able to compete. He further states that the non-industrialised 
economy forces Namibia to import even smaller items. For example, an outbreak of the 
Bird Flu disease in South Africa, in 2011, resulted in the scarcity of poultry on the 
Namibian market.  This state of affairs could have been averted, if there was a thriving 
poultry industry in Namibia. The situation will not change if there is no protection of 
infant industries, a principle that the EPA, as agreed in Swakopmund, advances. 
 
During the negotiations held in Namibia, it was agreed that an article on food security 
should be included in the EPAs to prevent shortage of foodstuffs and products. The 
negotiations further agreed on the application of safeguard measures to protect 
agricultural products critical for ensuring food security.  
 
Namibian Ministers engage their EU counterparts to argue unresolved issues in the EPA 
negotiations. Peer discussions reveal that the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Hage 
Geingob, raised Namibia’s issues of concern in the EPA negotiations with his 
counterparts from Europe whenever he met them, during his official visits to their 
respective countries. In both instances, Namibian Ministers asked their European 
counterparts to understand the implications of the issues to the Namibian and SADC 
economies and urged them to convince other European Ministers to support the position 
of the SADC EPA group, in the negotiations.  
 
The role played by Namibia in the EPA negotiations is not typical of a small state.  For 
example, while all other small states in the EPA negotiations signed the IEPA, Namibia 
remained adamant on her stance not to. The other SADC EPA states that had not signed, 
such as Angola and South Africa, are not small states. It should also further be noted that 
Namibia’s stance inspired other ACP states. Melber (2013: 4), too, writes that 
notwithstanding the fact that Namibia is a small and vulnerable country, Namibia adopted 
a principled stance not to sign the EPA, followed by Angola and South Africa.  
 
Melber (2013: 7) supposes that Namibia’s principled stance to refuse being cowed into 
signing an agreement that is detrimental to her interests inspired other ACP states to 
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remain firm. Further, it should be stated that some of the issues that started as issues of 
concern to Namibia, like infant industry protection, for example, eventually became 
issues of concern to the whole SADC EPA group and later to the entire ACP group.  
 
The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Malan Lindique (2012: 
interview), maintains that while it is true that Namibia is a small state, she maintains a 
firm position not to sign the full EPA before her issues of concern are addressed, in order 
to ensure equity and balance in international trade. He states that the persistence of 
Namibia, in her reluctance to sign the Interim EPA, has encouraged other small states to 
also voice their concerns with the EU, on issues that they are not satisfied with. Peer 
discussions, too, reveal that the then Namibian Minister of Trade and Industry, Hage 
Geingob, once told the EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, that Europeans 
cannot bulldoze negotiations, just because Namibia is a small state.  
 
Milani (2014: 285) underscores that the signing of an agreement guarantees Namibia’s 
trade flows to the EU. While Namibia is aware of that fact, she firmly maintained her 
position to ensure that her concerns are addressed in the negotiations. 
 
Lindique (2012: interview), states that Namibia’s firm stance in the EPA negotiations 
was meant to support industrialisation, thereby, fulfilling the objectives of the NDP 2 
(National Planning Commission 2002b: 137). The breakthrough on negotiating the issue 
of export taxes further means that Namibia retains her rights to decide on how best her 
raw materials should be treated under international trade. 
 
Proponents of the theory of Liberalism argue that states have a way to counteract the 
inequities caused by subsidisation (Cohen & Zysman 1983: 2). Similarly, interventionist 
liberals call for the state to ensure the balance of economic inequalities that existed 
between the north and the South. Accordingly, issues of import restrictions and infant 
industry protection could, arguably, be viewed in the context of this proposition by 
Liberalism. This is how far small states can go to introduce protection measures to 
safeguard the growth of their infant industries.  
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6.5 Membership to and participation in multilateral organisations as multilateral 
economic diplomacy 
 
Du Plessis (2006: 140) explains that there are permanent forms of multilateral diplomacy, 
where states send their representatives to diplomatic missions accredited to multilateral 
institutions (see Table 2). He differentiated this form of diplomacy from inter-
governmental relations, which are either state to state or state to inter-governmental 
organisation. This study propounds that both having representatives at multilateral 
organisations and the joining of those organisations are forms of permanent multilateral 
diplomacy. It is important to note that not all countries that are member-states of an 
organisation will have permanently accredited staff at those organisations. Namibia, for 
example, joined the WTO at its inception in 1995 but only opened an office in Geneva, 
accredited to the WTO, in 2004. Not having a representative at a multilateral organisation 
does not make a member-state a lesser member than those that have permanent 
representatives. Both member-states are equally engaged in a given permanent 
multilateral diplomacy. 
 
Namibia is a member of numerous inter-governmental and multilateral organisations (see 
Chapter One). In order to illustrate the country’s economic diplomacy in a multilateral 
context, this section focuses on the WTO, the UCTAD, SADC and SACU.  
 
6.5.1 The World Trade Organisation 
 
Apart from promoting free trade, the WTO further regulates the policies and rules of 
global trade (Leysens & Thompson 2006: 83). Namibia joined the WTO in 1995 as stated 
above and the Namibian embassy in Belgium was, de facto, responsible for the WTO 
negotiations. Among the issues that Namibia negotiated was to bring down tariffs, which 
would have otherwise destroyed infant industries (Katjipuka 2012: interview and 
Ngavirue 2013: interview). This achievement by Namibia in negotiating tariffs shows 
that Namibia can perform beyond the perceived level of a small state. According to 
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Papadakis & Starr (1991: 425), traditional perspectives of small states suppose that they 
are generally expected to adopt a passive and reactive approach on foreign relations, 
rather than initiating foreign policy issues. They are unable to have influence on other 
states and are unlikely to maintain independent foreign policies. 
 
In 2004, Namibia opened the office of the Commercial Counsellor in Geneva, responsible 
for the WTO. Ben Katjipuka, from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, was appointed to 
that office. As Commercial Counsellor, he was solely responsible for WTO negotiations, 
unlike other diplomatic missions in Geneva that deal with other specialised agencies of 
the UN. Having a representative to the WTO is crucial for any country. Therefore, 
Namibia, too, was able to be pro-active in WTO negotiations when she had a permanent 
staff member accredited to the WTO. Subsequent to deploying a specialised diplomat in 
Geneva, Namibia became a focal point for the Africa Group on matters related to trade in 
agricultural products. The Commercial Counsellor is what Du Plessis (2006: 140) 
describes in his typology of diplomacy as specialised representation. Though he classified 
such representation under bilateral relations, it is important to note that specialised 
representation is also relevant to multilateral missions, as it happened in the case of 
Namibia’s representation to the WTO. 
 
Namibia assumed leadership roles in WTO negotiations. From 2005 to 2008, she served 
as Chair of the Working Parties on State Trading Enterprise. For some years, SOEs from 
LDCs and developing countries had an unfair competition from SOEs from developed 
countries. For example, China uses SOEs in international trade and given the support that 
they receive from the government, it creates unfair competition when they trade versus 
private enterprises. This trend leads to a monopoly in international trade. The 
negotiations at the WTO resulted in the regulation of the SOEs trading to guard against 
trade monopoly (Katjipuka 2012: interview). The negotiated results are supported by the 
critics of globalisation who, too, reject the unequal competition that is created in the 
global market (see Chapter Two). 
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Katjipuka (2012: interview) avers that the absence of other specialised diplomats from 
the Ministries, such as Mines and Energy, Agriculture, Water and Forestry, in Geneva 
means that Namibia misses opportunities for full participation in the negotiations. It is 
important for these Ministries to support the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the 
staffing of the office. This was, however, alleviated when a permanent Namibian mission 
to the UN specialised agencies was opened in 2010. The state of having one official at the 
WTO, points to the challenges of small states, that while multilateral diplomacy has the 
advantages of promoting cooperation among stakeholders, it, however, also has its own 
disadvantages. Cross-Mike ([sa]: 7) argues that given their limited human and financial 
resources, small states have little representations at multilateral negotiations. This 
inevitably results in their interests not receiving maximum consideration.  
 
The opening of the fully-fledged Namibian diplomatic mission in Geneva took the 
pressure from the Commercial Counsellor’s office. Like other specialised diplomatic 
officials, the commercial office became an integral part of the diplomatic mission. 
Namibia’s prestige, at the WTO, was elevated and she was like any other country that has 
a fully-fledged diplomatic mission.  
 
The leadership role that Namibia took is beyond the traditionally perceived roles of small 
states, which is low participation in world affairs (East 1973: 557; McCraw 1994: 7). In 
the WTO, however, Namibia’s participation was at a high level, assuming an important 
leadership position and led negotiations including large member-states. She had, 
therefore, higher participation and prestige in world affairs. Unlike other small states, like 
Luxembourg, that needs muscles when covered under the EU, in order to effectively 
negotiate at the WTO (see Chapter Two), Namibia was able to negotiate the lowering of 
tariffs as an individual member of the WTO (Katjipuka 2012: interview).  
 
Multilateral economic diplomacy corresponds to Institutional Liberalism theory. The 
assumption of this theory is that institutions are there to regulate international activities, 
both political and economic (Richardson 2007: 48). To ensure that a regulatory 
framework for international trade which takes care of their interests is effective, states 
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would often turn to organisations such as the WTO and the ACP group, among others, to 
protect them from the imbalances in trade created by economic disparities. Burchill 
(2009: 67), too, supports the proposition that in multilateral organisations states are 
guided towards abiding to the rules of international trade and avers that, 
Institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance, 
enforcement where possible, and sanctioning cheaters and defectors. 
  
Proponents of Institutional Liberalism will, arguably, remain supportive of small states to 
join multilateral institutions in furtherance of their trade interests. 
 
6.5.2 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
 
Namibia is a member of the UNCTAD, which serves as an advisory body providing 
advisory services on trade and investment issues to member-states. Its objectives are to 
reduce trade gaps between developed and developing countries, with the ultimate aim of 
eliminating such gaps. UNCTAD also formulates policies on international trade and 
assist in providing advice on trade agreement negotiations (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 2013b). 
 
Namibia has benefited from capacity building activities of UNCTAD. In June 2013, for 
example, 11 managers from Namibian ports participated in the training programme on 
Modern Port Management. Port management is essential in the pursuit of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy, as Namibia’s ports serve as a gateway for import and exports of 
landlocked countries like Zambia and Botswana. It is necessary to train managers in order 
to maintain the efficiency of the ports and attract large scale use of Namibia’s port 
facilities (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2013b). This training fulfils the goals of the 
NDP 4 that advocated the competitiveness of the Walvis Bay harbour (National Planning 
Commission 2012b: 81). 
 
The technical assistance and advisory services rendered by UNCTAD is unique to 
Namibia. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (2013) states that support for capacity 
building on competition and consumer laws and policies that has been rendered to 
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Namibia has also been extended to other small or Third World states like Benin, 
Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the CAR, Comoros, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tomé and 
Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
Neo-liberals argue that institutions play greater roles to ensure that states are encouraged 
to comply with trade agreements (Sterling-Folker 2010: 126). The benefits that Namibia 
receives through her membership to UNCTAD are that through its advisory services. 
Through UNCTAD, Namibia will be advised, among others, to comply with trade 
agreements that she has concluded with other states or international organisations.  
Therefore, multilateral economic diplomacy towards UNCTAD is embedded in 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies. 
 
6.5.3 The Southern Africa Development Community 
 
Namibia acceded to SADCC, the precursor to SADC on 1 April 1990 (Du Pisani 1991: 
26). In 1992 she hosted the historic SADCC Summit, which transformed the organisation 
from a coordinating conference, SADCC, to a community, SADC, in terms of the 
Windhoek Treaty. Minister Gurirab informed the Parliament that the transformation was 
made to enhance southern African regional economic integration (National Assembly 
1993a: 73). At the end of 1993, Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Water and 
Rural Development, Dr Kaire Mbuende, was appointed Executive Secretary of SADC. 
He served in that position from 1994 to 1999. This means that most of the regional 
integration programmes were implemented, when a Namibian was at the helm of the 
regional organisation. The remainder of this section refers to specific sectors - fisheries, 
transport and energy - for regional integration where Namibia played a great role.  
 
At face value, Namibia’s economic diplomacy is significant within the SADC region, 
showing that she prioritises trading with fellow SADC-member states, especially in terms 
of inward trade. In the year 2012, the value of Namibia’s imports from SADC member 
states was N$ 44.6 billion, representing 68.96 percent of her total imports. Namibia’s 
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trade value for exports to the SADC member-states for the year 2012 stood at N$ 13.6 
billion, representing 23.88 percent of her total exports (Namibia Statistics Agency 2013). 
However, it is important to note that the imports come from one country, South Africa, as 
it will be discussed below. Another issue is that, in most cases, there is no value addition 
to the goods that are exported. 
 
6.5.3.1 Fisheries 
 
SADC was divided into coordinating sectors, with member-states assigned the 
coordination of the respective sectors. Namibia was entrusted to coordinate the SADC 
Marine Fisheries Sector.17 This is, arguably, because Namibia has better fishing 
infrastructure and has developed the capacity to curb illegal fishing. Core competence in 
this sector attracted interests from other states in the region (National Planning 
Commission 1995a: 190). As the Fisheries Sector coordinator, Namibia worked towards 
the integration of the fishing economy in the region. 
 
Namibia contributed to economic integration in the field of fisheries as the coordinator of 
the SADC Fisheries Sector. Mbuende (2014) states that Namibia was rated by 
international experts to have one of the sound management of the fisheries sector in the 
world. This follows a policy that she developed with the assistance from the Norwegian 
government. 
 
President Nujoma informed the Parliament during the State of the Nation Address, in 
1992, that the SADCC Fisheries Sector, for which Namibia is a coordinator, had 
developed the regional marine fisheries objectives and development strategies. These 
                                                 
17   These sectors include Angola (Energy), Botswana (Agricultural research, Livestock production 
and animal disease control), Lesotho (Tourism, Environment and Land Management Malawi 
Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife), Mozambique (Culture and Information, Transport and 
Communications), Namibia (Marine Fisheries and Resources), South Africa (Finance and 
Investment), Swaziland (Human Resources Development), Tanzania (Industry and Trade), Zambia 
(Mining, Employment and Labour), Zimbabwe (Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources).  
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were to benefit Namibia and Angola in the field of research and surveillance activities 
(Office of the President 1999a: 212).   
 
In 1993, Namibia hosted the first meeting of the SADC Fisheries Ministers and 
successfully spearheaded the drafting of the SADC Marine Fisheries Policy, which 
guides the fishing industry in the region.  The Policy was adopted at the second meeting 
of the SADC Fisheries Ministers, held in Angola, in 1995 (National Assembly 1994d: 
327 and National Assembly 1995b: 44). The SADC Fisheries Coordinating Unit, within 
the Namibian Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, further worked on 
harmonising regional fisheries policies (National Assembly 2001: 259).  
 
The SADC Marine Fisheries Sector formulated the SADC Fisheries Protocol, which 
regulates the sustainable use of the aquatic resources and ecosystem.  The Sector further 
supervised the Monitoring, Control, Surveillance (MCS) Project, which deals with the 
collection and analysis of fishing activities and the regulations, regarding the harvesting 
of fish and related resources. SADC member-states participating in the MCS Projects are 
coastal states of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa (National 
Assembly 2000: 142 and SADC 2004).  
 
Under the auspices of the SADC Marine Fisheries Sector, Namibia, Angola and South 
Africa launched the Benguela Environment Fisheries Interactions and Training 
(BENEFIT) Programme, in April 1997, which aimed to develop the capacity for the three 
states in marine science. The objectives of the programme were also the promotion of 
most advantageous utilisation of the ecosystem resources. This included developing 
human capacity and infrastructure for marine science and technology in the countries 
bordering the Benguela ecosystem, particularly in Angola and Namibia (BENEFIT 2004; 
National Assembly 1998: 226).  
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, argues that institutions have played a facilitating 
role to promote cooperation among states (Hayes, et al. 2011: 144). Given the atmosphere 
created by mutual support, states would venture into trade and cooperation in any area 
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that stands to enhance their respective developments. Accordingly, in the Fisheries 
Sector, which Namibia coordinated, SADC member-states found common grounds to 
cooperate in policy coordination, capacity building and technical support. 
 
6.5.3.2 Transport 
 
The SADC Transport Sector is coordinated by Mozambique. To facilitate intra-regional 
trade in SADC, it is imperative that there is effective transport network among member-
states. Namibia is arguably strategically located to link SADC member-states like 
Botswana with South Africa, Zambia with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
then South Africa, Namibia and Angola. In 1990, soon after her independence, Namibia 
sought to link her eastern road network with Botswana, to provide for transportation of 
goods via a shorter route between Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. This would 
reduce transport cost for goods that were previously transported via a longer route 
between Windhoek, Namibia and Johannesburg, South Africa, which passes through 
Namibia’s southern border post and Upington (African Development Fund 1999; 
Brundige, Dawson, Massey & Moore 2011: 7). 
 
Following the completion of the Trans-Kalahari Highway, the Namibian, Botswana and 
South African governments established the Trans-Kalahari Corridor (TKC), stretching 
from Pretoria in South Africa, through Mamuno, in Botswana and ending at Walvis Bay 
port, in Namibia. The aim of the TKC is, inter alia, “to increase the competitiveness of 
goods produced in the Southern Africa Development Community, for distribution in 
regional and international market” (Trans-Kalahari Corridor 2003). 
 
The TKC was established for the trade benefits of SADC member-states. It was, thus, a 
major transport project of multilateral economic diplomacy, at the SADC level. The TKC 
produced some achievements for multilateral economic diplomacy, espousing 
harmonised cross border procedures that boost regional integration. State parties have 
adopted common transit procedures and border operating hours in the evening. In 2000, 
 248 
commercial traffic was less than 5 percent, but it has since increased to 50 percent 
(Trans-Kalahari Corridor [sa]). 
 
To facilitate trade with Zambia and the DRC, the Namibian Government constructed the 
Trans-Caprivi highway, which facilitates the movements of goods from the Walvis Bay 
port through the Namibian-Zambian border to Lubumbashi, in the DRC (Brundige et al. 
2011: 7). The highway is part of the route called the Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi 
Corridor and is the SADC Regional Trunk Road (RTR) 30 (Office of the Prime Minister 
2000: 367).   
 
The road networks connecting Namibia to her neighbours are in line with the targets of 
Vision 2030, which advocates the provision of road linkages to neighbouring countries 
(Office of the President 2004b: 66). 
 
The cooperation in various economic sectors in SADC helped enhancing Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. The SADC road network in the form of Trans-Caprivi and Trans-
Kalahari roads facilitate the running of an interdependent economy within the region. 
Mbuende (2014: 250) states that the regional transport projects boost Namibia’s exports 
to neighbouring countries. Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, underscores the 
importance of interdependent economies (Richardson 2002: 6). It is, arguably, the 
concept of interdependence that drives countries together to cooperate. Namibia and other 
SADC member-states have interdependent economies that the transportation of goods 
needs a proper coordination in terms of road networking. With the democratisation of 
South Africa, all these countries espouse democracy which is one of the features of 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies. This commonality helps them to forge cooperation. 
 
6.5.3.3 Energy 
 
In 1993, President Nujoma told the Parliament, during the State of the Nation Address, 
that the Namibian Government was working on a SADC energy project, to upgrade the 
Zambian power supply line from Victoria Falls to Caprivi (Office of the President 1999a: 
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294). Accordingly, the Caprivi Link Interconnector was constructed and inaugurated on 
12 November 2010, by the Presidents of Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
The Caprivi Link Interconnector is part of the ZIZABONA Project, for connecting power 
transmission lines, for stable power supply in the sub-region. This is one of the priority 
projects of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), which is an umbrella organisation 
for regional state-owned power utilities, under the auspices of SADC. The Caprivi Link 
Interconnector, which was inaugurated at Katima Mulilo, is phase 1 of the project. Phase 
2 of the project will include transmission lines from Hwange, in Zimbabwe and 
Pandamatenga, in Botswana to the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. A switching station will 
be installed at the Victoria Falls, from where another transmission line will go to 
Livingstone sub-station, connecting with the transmission line that goes to the Zambezi 
sub-station in Katima Mulilo, Namibia (Die Republikein 9 August 2012: 18). 
 
At the inauguration of the Caprivi Link Interconnector, Namibia’s President, Hifikepunye 
Pohamba, stated that the presence of the Presidents of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
demonstrates that the four governments attach great importance to the project, which 
promotes regional integration and cooperation (Pohamba 2010). 
 
It is stated that the Caprivi Link Interconnector relieves congestion on the Insikamini-
Matimba interconnection between Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa, which occurs 
mostly during peak seasons. The Link further presents an alternative route to wheel 
power from the DRC and Zambia to South Africa and brings stability to the overall 
transmission system of the SAPP (NamPower 2007). 
 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, propounds that institutions, rather than states, play a 
role in cooperation (Hayes et al. 2011:149). The energy sector in SADC, too, could be 
contextualised in this proposition by Liberals. The SAPP has, through the ZIZABONA 
Project, played a role in energy cooperation among Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. State-owned power utilities in these countries, that are members of the SAPP, 
have taken a lead, rather than the governments, to integrate the energy sector of their 
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countries. Their initiative has, arguably, brought the issue of energy to prominence in the 
foreign relations of the four countries.  
 
6.5.3.4 Intra-regional trade 
 
Keane, Calì & Kennan (2010: 16) write that SADC has a relatively low intra-regional 
trade trend. Most of the products that are exported by individual states within SADC do 
not match the imports of other SADC members. Only South African and Mozambican 
exports match the imports of other SADC member-states. Accordingly, Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy in the region has not increased significantly. 
 
Lee (2003: 102 – 103) states that there is no significant SADC’s intra-regional trade, but 
rather more of South Africa’s exports to SADC member-states. He further states that 
South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are the only SADC members with industrial-
based economies and are, thus, able to export both primary and industrial products. The 
inequality of industrialisation poses a problem to intra-regional trade and regional 
integration, as the benefits accrued to member states are unequal. This is illustrated by the 
fact that Namibia is a net importer, as opposed to being an exporter to South Africa. The 
NDP 1, too, confirms that the southern African economy is dominated by South Africa 
(National Planning Commission 1995a: 27). Namibia, therefore, needs to devise 
economic strategies to become an industrial based economy like Mauritius and 
Zimbabwe, who, like Namibia are small states in the region. 
 
Keane, Calì & Kennan (2010: ix) further write that non-tariff measures in SADC works 
to the benefit of non-SADC exporters and larger economies in SADC. The small 
economies in SADC are disadvantaged by these measures. They list five tariff measures, 
namely (i) quantitative restrictions, (ii) non-tariff charges on imports, such as variable 
levies, border tax adjustments, (iii) government participation in trade, such as the use of 
subsidies and procurement policies, (iv) custom procedures and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), like packaging, health and sanitary measures (Keane, Calì & Kennan 2010: 19). 
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Trade imbalances in SADC intra-trade are further confirmed by Gibb (2007: 78 – 79). He 
avers that prior to South Africa joining SADC in 1994, SADC intra-trade stood at 5 
percent and rose to 17 percent in 1995, and thereafter has been over 20 percent. 
 
6.5.4 The Southern Africa Customs Union  
 
Following her independence in 1990, Namibia joined SACU. The major role of SACU in 
economic diplomacy is the promotion of intra-regional trade, trade between member-
states and the rest of countries in the world and investment programmes, among the 
member-states (Kuugongelwa-Amadhila 2013: interview). Intra-regional trade is 
promoted by, among others, removing barriers among member-states, that there is a free 
flow of goods and no duties are imposed on goods and services, once they enter the 
market in the region. Like in SADC, There is imbalance in intra-SACU trade as South 
African exports capture 75 percent of the SACU market (Gibb 2007: 79). 
 
Earlier it was stated that at the SACU Summit held in Maseru, Lesotho, in 1993, Namibia 
was influential in determining the formula used by the regional Union on revenue 
sharing, as she presented the draft paper on the SACU structure, which became the 
working document for setting the revenue sharing formula (see Chapter Three). Soon 
after joining SACU, Namibia re-negotiated some regulations which were averse to the 
development of her manufacturing industry (National Assembly 1990a: 138). When a 
member-state wants an amendment to regulations, it makes a proposal to the Council of 
Ministers, comprising Ministers of Finance and of Trade, which refers the matter to the 
Secretariat for consideration. The secretariat appoints a consultant to advise and make 
recommendations. The recommendations from the Secretariat are taken to the SACU 
Commission, comprising senior officials, usually Permanent Secretaries. The 
Commission then submit the recommendations to the Council for approval.  
 
Admittedly, SACU membership also posed a problem for Namibia due to the imposition 
of higher external tariffs by South Africa, for the purpose of protecting their economy. 
Furthermore, there were always feelings that the SACU rules favoured the large member-
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state, South Africa, while infant companies in other countries found it hard to develop 
(National Assembly 1993b: 77). The Minister of Trade and Industry, Hidipo Hamutenya, 
stated in the Parliament that Namibia became caught up in a predicament regarding her 
membership of SACU, while it was clear that she loses on industrialisation under the 
prevailing SACU rules. It was equally a matter of concern that if she withdrew from 
SACU, she could lose some of the benefits that she enjoyed under SACU (National 
Assembly 1993b: 78 – 79). 
 
To benefit from her membership of SACU, it was important that Namibia strives for, 
among others, an end to biased exports. The Namibian Government introduced, among 
others, tax incentives to counterbalance the effects on the manufacturing sector, arising 
from her membership of SACU. Corporate taxes, which were 42 percent at the time of 
Namibia’s independence, in 1990, were reduced to 35 percent. Manufacturers who 
wanted to import manufacturing equipment received incentives of 50 percent abatement 
(National Assembly 1995b: 81).  
 
Namibia’s Minister of Finance, Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila (2013: interview) asserted 
that there are numerous advantages accruing from regional economic diplomacy, in 
respect of SACU. The Custom Union’s market is larger as opposed to a market of a 
single member-state. The Union’s market, thus, attracts large customers. Goods from one 
country move unhindered when they are traded across the borders within the region. Like 
other multilateral institutions, SACU negotiates trade agreements from a stronger 
position as a regional bloc. This view is echoed by the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Dr Lindique (interview: 2012), who stated that Namibia’s 
membership of SACU provides her with an advantage to trade with a large state and an 
emerging economy like Brazil. Large states look to large markets. Accordingly, Brazil 
became involved in trading with a small economy like Namibia, through a trade 
agreement between SACU and the Mercado Común der Sul (Southern Common Market, 
MERCOSUL). This proposition is supported by former SADC Executive Secretary, Dr 
Kaire Mbuende (2014: 250), who states that the SADC market provides Namibia with an 
opportunity to attract foreign direct investment from various parts of the world. 
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There are, however, some concerns with regard to the trade among SACU member states. 
Erasmus (2014: 225) also asserts that with a dominant South African economy, intra-
SACU trade has not been significant. He maintains that when a middle power in the 
Customs Union has different interests, often it pursues them without regard to the 
concerns of small states. For example, South Africa agrees to common external tariffs 
which results in small SACU member-states, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland, bearing the burden of import costs. 
 
Erasmus (2014: 229) suggests that in order to address the challenges in SACU, Namibia 
who hosts the SACU Head Office should be proactive in strengthening the institution. 
There is a need to create structures like the SACU Tribunal and Tariff Board, so that a 
rule-based regime is institutionalised. 
 
SACU and Namibia’s participation in its activities, thereof, could further be 
contextualised in terms of Economic Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies. Mingst (2008: 
253) stated that multilateral trade organisations have regulatory functions on global trade 
and these functions are inclined to Liberalism. The rules and policies adopted by 
member-states serve to stabilise their economy and development, as opposed to hostile 
competition, which would otherwise be an inclination to Realism.  
 
6.6 Sino-SADC relations 
 
Temporary forms of diplomacy also include state-to-inter-governmental organisation 
relations (Du Plessis 2006: 140). This study adds to the proposition, by Du Plessis, that in 
this form of temporary diplomacy, it could be an inter-governmental organisation that 
reaches out to a state. Namibia took the initiative on this form of diplomacy, in 
establishing inter-governmental organisation-to-state relations, forging ties between 
SADC and China.  
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During the presidential tenure of President Hifikepunye Pohamba, as Chairman of 
SADC, from August 2010 to August 2011, he initiated cooperation between SADC and 
China. Accordingly, he undertook a working visit to China, from 3 to 5 June 2011, in his 
capacity as Chairman of SADC. The purpose of the visit was to market SADC as a trade 
and investment destination (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011c). 
 
It is important to state that this working visit, by President Pohamba, to China, was the 
first of its kind by a Chairperson of SADC. This initiative taken during Namibia’s 
chairmanship of SADC had not been done before, even when the position of SADC’s 
chairmanship was held by large states like South Africa or Angola, for example. It is, 
therefore, arguable that small states can excel in leading regional organisations beyond 
the expectation of small states performance and their smallness does not mean that they 
cannot take initiatives, beyond what large states can do. 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy, within the framework of SADC’s multilateralism, 
corresponds to the assertion made by Cross-Mike ([sa]: 6), in respect of small states and 
multilateral diplomacy when he writes, 
The multilateral institutional framework is deemed by many to be exceedingly important for small 
states. Within such institutions there is ability to engage alliance building between like-minded 
states to enhance diplomatic influence, especially in economic diplomacy. 
 
It was felt that forging economic diplomacy between SADC and China will bring one of 
the large economies in the world, to the southern Africa region, which comprises like-
minded states. In fact, bilaterally, Namibia maintains sound relations with China, as an 
emerging economy (see Chapter Five).  
 
 It is the proposition of neo-liberalism theory that states should devise new plans and 
approaches, creating cooperation platform for addressing new concerns. Through these 
types of interactions, states will derive maximum benefits for their developments (Steans, 
Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis 2010: 42). SADC had devised a new approach, creating a 
cooperation platform with China, which was not there before between the organisation 
and China, but rather cooperation between China and individual member-states. 
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6.7  Conference diplomacy as multilateral economic diplomacy 
 
Table 2 classifies types of conferences that are a form of temporary inter-governmental 
diplomacy. These are annual serial summits, ad hoc summits, conferences, and 
conference diplomacy on specific issues. These are similar to the conference diplomacy 
employed in the making of Namibia’s foreign policy and the conduct of economic 
diplomacy. Summits of SADC and SACU are serial summits that are held annually and 
attended by Heads of State and Government, where issues of regional economic 
integration are discussed. Economic diplomacy, in respect of these organisations, was 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Others are conferences on specific economic diplomacy, 
Smart Partnership Dialogues and the WEF, which are discussed here as illustrative case 
studies.  
 
6.7.1 Smart Partnership Dialogues 
 
The Smart Partnership concept was introduced in the fold of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy, when President Sam Nujoma visited Malaysia, where he attended the 1st 
Langkawi Dialogue, in 1995. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
developed this concept to reduce poverty, achieve economic growth and industrialisation 
(Angolo 2012: interview; Office of the President 1999b: 276). President Nujoma 
introduced the concept to the Namibian Cabinet which supported the idea. This resulted 
in the hosting of the Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID) in 1998. The 
participants in the Namibian Smart Partnership activities were the Government, private 
sector and labour unions. 
 
The idea of bringing Smart Partnership to Namibia was to introduce Smart Partnership 
for southern Africa, which will promote trade and develop businesses in the region. The 
objectives of SAID’98 were articulated by President Sam Nujoma, to be, inter alia 
(Office of the President 1999b: 323), 
 To strengthen networks among private sector organisations and enterprises in Southern Africa in 
order to enhance the flow of investment  into our individual nations and across the region. 
 To project Southern Africa to the international business community as a promising growth area; 
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 To enhance good working relations among governments, and among governments and the private 
sector, so as to facilitate  accelerated development and growth; and  
 To create opportunities for business networking between the region and other parts of the world. 
 
President Nujoma further explained that Smart Partnership was anchored in the 
philosophy of working together to attain mutual prosperity (Office of the President 
1999b: 389). This corresponds to the foreign policy principle of mutual beneficial 
relations, enshrined in the Namibian Constitution (Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting 1990: 53). 
 
Schoemans (2012: interview) states that Smart Partnership members have been involved 
in economic developments of the country, especially when the Namibian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (NCCI), was actively involved in the early 2000s. Smart 
Partnership benefited some small scale traders, like the Moses Garoeb Community 
Project, which exports local crafts to the UK. The idea of Smart Partnership is to link up 
small and large traders. Schimming-Chase (2011: interview) states that there is, however, 
a lack of coordination in the recent years on Smart Partnership issues. Further, people 
who attend Smart Partnership dialogues do not report back to other stakeholders.  
 
The Namibian Smart Partnership Hub was active during the second term of President 
Nujoma, but during the third term, which started in March 2000, Namibia’s active 
participation in the Smart Partnership Dialogues declined. Government Ministries were 
showing less interest in Smart Partnership activities (Angolo 2012: interview). Meetings 
of the national hub were no longer convened. Instead of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
and of Trade and Industry taking a lead on Smart Partnership activities, it was left to 
individual business persons, like Schoemans, to pursue such activities. The Permanent 
Secretaries of the two ministries did not demonstrate keen interests in smart partnership 
activities. Without government coordination, there was no public education carried out 
and there has, therefore, been little awareness among members of the business 
community about the Smart Partnership Dialogues. 
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President Pohamba (2011: interview) agrees that Smart Partnership activities in Namibia 
have decreased. He avers that the success of the Smart Partnership programmes depends 
on the leadership. President Pohamba, accordingly, states that the enthusiasm among the 
post-Mahathir Mahathir bin Mohamad generation of leaders in Malaysia, over Smart 
Partnership Dialogues, does not carry the same momentum as that of former Prime 
Minister Mohamad. This, arguably, had an effect on other Smart Partnership participating 
countries like Namibia. 
 
Schoemans (2011: 13) avers that Namibia’s participation in the Smart Partnership 
dialogues has not fully benefited the intended target group, unemployed Namibians, by 
creating employment opportunity for them. Further, many communities were excluded 
from attending the Dialogues.  
 
Efforts are being made to revive government’s active participation in smart partnership 
activities. The Smart Partnership week was launched by the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Marco Hausiku, on 25 August 2014. It had been resolved that a National Smart 
Partnership day should be designated and be commemorated annually. During such an 
event activities of the national Hub should be reported (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2014c). 
 
Multilateralism largely leans to Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies. This is because 
individual states bring together their interests and address them within the principle of 
cooperation (Viotti and Kauppi 1999: 218). The increased trade and interdependence 
among nations, too, resulting from the end of world war, paved the way for the 
development of the world economy. International trade and cooperation boost economic 
interdependence, such as the Smart Partnership Dialogues. States become more inclined 
to cooperate on issues of economic development, trade and investment. These trends 
correspond to Liberalism (Russet 2010: 98).  
 
 
 
 258 
6.7.2 The World Economic Forum  
 
The annual WEF brings together government leaders and private sector members to 
interact. WEF programmes include a series of discussions on the global economy and 
presentations on trade and investment opportunities in countries participating in the WEF. 
It is an opportunity for countries to showcase their competitiveness in trade and 
investment. WEF conferences are primarily beneficial to countries that host them, as 
investors will make use of the opportunities to explore business openings in the host 
country. However, it works differently for other countries attending. For example, at the 
WEF conference held in Tanzania, in May 2010, there was a slot for Namibia in the 
programme to market existing business opportunities but few investors turned up at the 
event.   
 
In May 1998, Namibia hosted the Southern Economic Forum Summit, of the WEF, under 
the banner ‘competitiveness in the 21st century’. At this conference, President Sam 
Nujoma called for the end to debt relief, with a view to put resources on industrialisation 
and other productive economic development programmes (Office of the President 1999b: 
372). It is unique for small states like Namibia to host meetings of the WEF, which in the 
southern Africa region has been customary held in a large state such as South Africa. 
Some years later, another small state in the region, Tanzania, followed suit when she 
hosted the WEF, in 2010. 
 
Namibia’s first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah (2011: 
interview), stated that it is mostly government politicians that are visible at the WEF 
rather than the private sector. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab 
(2010: interview), maintains that the WEF are a waste of time and money, as there is no 
through preparations when people go to the Forum’s conferences. However, Kalomoh 
(2011: interview) feels that the impact of attending the WEF is a long-term process. 
These conferences are attended by key decision-makers and the positive image that is 
built about Namibia matters to these decision-makers. The Forum further presents an 
opportunity to Namibian entrepreneurs to learn about opportunities in other countries and 
 259 
exchange other related information. Accordingly, this study propounds that it is not the 
number of investors who come across Namibian participants at the WEF that matters, but 
the impact that the interactions would make on the investors. One major investor in a 
prime sector such as mining, for example, could have a significant impact compared to a 
number of investors in small businesses.  
 
Conference diplomacy, such as the WEF, brings together governments and private sector 
leaders with the aim to promote trade and investment. The participation of the private 
sector in conference diplomacy, especially MNCs, is supported by the theory of 
Economic Liberalism, which argues that through the exchange of goods and services, 
there is mutual benefit to stakeholders. At the WEF, while governments play a role to 
bring businesses together, much of the networking and negotiations are done by the 
private sector, a trend that Liberalism , as a theory of IR studies, supports (Mingst 2008: 
250 – 251). 
 
6.7.3 An assessment of Namibia’s conference diplomacy  
 
There are some weaknesses regarding Namibia’s participation in Smart Partnership 
Dialogues and the WEF. Schimming-Chase (2011: interview) stated that a weakness 
regarding Namibia’s participation in the WEF, is that there is no feedback after attending 
these meetings. The Government and the private sector do not come together to assess 
what Namibia, as a country, has gained from participating in the WEF’s meeting. This 
study argues that the lack of a post mortem evaluation means that there is no proper 
strategy and evaluation to determine where emphasis should be placed, in terms of 
marketing Namibia, as a trade and investment destination. 
 
Vision 2030 states that Namibia will avoid reducing interests in international platforms 
for promoting trade and investment (Office of the President 2004b: 183). With the 
participation of the Namibian Government in the Smart Partnership Dialogues having 
gone down, the Government has, arguably, failed to live up to the objectives set in the 
Vision 2030 blueprint. It is important that the Government should make an assessment of 
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the impact of Smart Partnership on Namibia’s trade and investment and identify the 
effective role that the Government and the private sector can jointly play. In this respect, 
the Government needs to revive the Smart Partnership National Hub, where the 
Government and the private sector would be able to come together and map out the 
strategies, for deriving maximum economic benefits, for Namibia’s participation in the 
Smart Partnership programmes.  
 
There is, however, a positive aspect of Namibia’s conference diplomacy. Namibia did not 
only participate in the WEF meetings and Smart Partnership Dialogues but also hosted 
multilateral meetings of these organisations. This raised the awareness among the 
Namibian people and business community, in particular. Thus, businesspersons like 
Schoemans, continue to attend the Smart partnership Dialogues, even if there is no 
support from the Government. Conference diplomacy also promotes tourism. Brochures 
marketing Namibia as a tourist destination are distributed at multilateral conferences that 
are held in Namibia. Conference participants will, arguably, talk about Namibia when 
they return to their respective countries.  
 
6.8  An assessment of Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy 
 
Namibia’s multilateral diplomacy is founded on the principle of mutual beneficial 
relations, as laid out in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution (Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting 1990: 53). In conforming to this principle, Namibia pursued the EPA 
negotiations, striving for the end results that will be beneficial not only to the EU, but 
also to Namibia and other the ACP states at large. EU Ambassador to Namibia, Rual 
Fuentes Milani (2014: 285), too, acknowledges that Namibia’s role in the success of the 
EPA negotiations is vital in ensuring mutual beneficial relations.  
 
Namibia has been firm on her position and this influenced other members of the ACP in 
the overall negotiations. The techniques employed in the EPA negotiations correspond to 
‘influence’ as mode of diplomacy (see Figure 1). This is done by way of supportive latent 
persuasion, where she encourages other states to pursue negotiations. Supportive latent 
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persuasion became more effective, when the first consensus was reached on issues of 
concern in the rounds of negotiations that Namibia hosted in Swakopmund. 
 
As a small state, Namibia is not in a position even to use positive coercion, because she 
has limited resources to use. She can, therefore, not use rewards like development aid 
programmes in return for compliance with her demands by other states. Further, the 
extent to which small states can afford to use protectionism policies is through 
agreements, like the EPAs, whereby the EU as a large trade partner will allow small 
states of the ACP-EU to adopt protectionism measures for their infant industry, while 
accepting small states exports at prices favourable to exporters. This corresponds to 
Interventionist Liberals. 
 
Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy has a strong element of permanent form of 
diplomacy (see Table 2), as illustrated by the diplomatic missions accredited to the EU 
(Brussels) and the WTO (Geneva). These missions are involved in the EPA negations and 
WTO tariffs issues, respectively. Although Table 2 includes specialised diplomats only in 
bilateral missions, these diplomats are also found in Namibia’s multilateral diplomatic 
missions in Brussels and Geneva. 
 
Namibia’s multilateral diplomacy further has an element of temporary forms of 
diplomacy (see Table 2), illustrated by ad hoc summits and conferences, like the Smart 
Partnership Dialogues and WEF. This form of diplomacy brings more non-state actors in 
the fold of economic diplomacy practice. They create a platform for bilateral diplomacy 
too, as state-to-state, state-to-non-state, or non-state-to-non-state consultations take place 
there in the spirit of persons-to-persons contacts (see Chapter Four). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the President, Ministers, Government Officials and diplomats 
have been at the centre stage of permanent forms of multilateral economic diplomacy. 
This is in respect to international organisations, of which Namibia has been a member. 
The officials have been involved in the negotiations which are finally decided upon by 
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the President, Ministers and Parliamentarians. Accordingly, this type of negotiations is 
characterised by inter-governmental relations (see Table 2). 
 
Namibia has been a member of SADCC since 1990 and hosted the 1992 summit that 
transformed SADCC into SADC. Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Water and 
Rural Development, Dr Kaire Mbuende, was at the helm of the regional organisation 
from 1994 to 1999, when regional integration programmes were implemented. Further, 
under Namibia’s chairmanship SADC concluded a tripartite agreement with other 
regional economic blocs, SACU and COMESA. Driving regional organisations’ agendas 
is a role traditionally associated with large states. In the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), for example, that role has been left to Nigeria (Olaniyan 
1986: 131). 
 
Blaauw (2014: 406) states that in order to build economic capacity in a region, 
stakeholders like political elites, civil society and the market forces should have a role to 
play. He observes that in SADC, states drive the regional community agenda, thereby 
serving the interests of regional elites. The place of non-state actors in forging regional 
integration has not been provided. He, however, states that in terms of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy as a country, non-state actors are considered in the pursuing of 
economic diplomacy (Blaauw 2014: 399). 
 
Namibia’s effective role in the EPA and WTO negotiations, confirms the assertion made 
by Lee (2009: 195), that small states are now playing an active role in multilateral trade 
negotiations, contrary to a previous tradition of being vulnerable and weak. Benin, for 
example, has played a significant role in the WTO agricultural trade negotiations. The 
important role of small sate in multilateral diplomacy is further propounded by Hey 
(2003: 78 – 79), when he wrote about Luxembourg maintaining a prominent presence in 
the European Union, where she exerts some influence.  
 
Naeem (2008: 21) argues that small states do not only have a problem of human 
resources capacity, as is the case at the WTO offices in Geneva, but also at capitals, when 
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trade policies are to be formulated. With the negotiations at the WTO and EPAs, it is 
arguable that Namibia has no human capacity limitations in terms of skilful officials but 
rather in terms of the number of specialised skilful diplomats (see Chapter Seven). 
 
There is, however, a problem regarding post-conference networking, when practicing 
conference diplomacy. At the WEF, held in Tanzania, 2010, there was time allocated to 
Namibia to make a presentation, marketing business opportunities existing in the country. 
There was, however, no register at the entrance, to keep records of who are the foreign 
investors who attended the presentation. In the absence of the records about those who 
attended, there could be no follow up to determine whether investors who attended, have 
followed up with business missions to Namibia. 
 
The NDP 2 set a target for Namibia to open an office at the WTO by 2001 (National 
Planning Commission 2002a: 315). It is important to note that there was a slow 
implementation of this goal, that the office was opened in 2004, which points out that 
there is no urgency to implement important national policies. 
 
6.9 Summary 
 
Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy is at the level of international, regional and 
sub-regional in terms of ACP-EU relations, SADC’s regional integration and intra-SACU 
trade, respectively. Papadakis & Starr (1991: 429) write that small state theories expound 
their submission to large states in international relations. Generally, small states agree to 
the status quo and do not want to propose changes, in fear of antagonising the preferences 
of large states. Namibia’s pursuit of economic diplomacy, in the EPA negotiations, rose 
above the expectations of small states. She challenged the status quo and made strides in 
having some of her issues of concern agreed to during the negotiations. While it would be 
expected that small states play a minimal role in multilateral diplomacy, Namibia has, on 
the contrary played a significant role, both as a small and young state.  
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In SADC, Namibia has worked towards regional integration, adopting regional projects 
in the transport and energy sector, for example and coordinating the fishing sector and 
regional fisheries policies. She also geared herself towards regional cooperation with 
other regional economic blocks, where she played a major role in forging relations and 
thus, fulfil the aspirations of the NDPs. In terms of intra-regional trade, the region is, 
however, dominated by South Africa and Namibia exports very little in the region. This is 
partly due to the fact that Namibia has no industrial based economy, as envisaged in the 
NDP 2. Regional trade is marked by imbalances and only large economies and exporters 
from outside the region are advantaged by non-tariff measures adopted by the region. 
 
After the commercial Counsellor’s office was opened in Geneva, 2004, Namibia was 
able, henceforth, to participate actively in WTO activities and took leadership in the 
negotiations. Leadership was also assumed in the EPA negotiations, in terms of hosting 
rounds of negotiations and being the Chief Spokesperson of the ACP negotiators. The 
consistent and persistent stance of Namibia on EPA negotiations has been influential in 
the greater ACP group as far as EPA negotiations are concerned. Contrary to the 
assertion made by Bartora (2005: 8) regarding the dominance of large states on the 
international agenda, as stated in Chapter Two, Namibia did not allow herself to be 
subjected to the dictates of large states both in the EPA and WTO negotiations. Instead, 
she assertively defined her place in multilateral diplomacy and voiced her position on 
trade negotiations. 
 
Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy is not restricted to permanent forms of 
diplomatic establishments but she also embraced conference diplomacy, as a method 
through which she can pursue her economic diplomacy. This brought non-state actors, 
such as business persons, into the process of enacting economic diplomacy. Thus, her 
economic diplomacy corresponds to Liberalism, as a theory of IR studies, which supports 
the role of non-state actors in international relations.  
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Chapter Seven will summarise the findings of this study, pointing out the challenges and 
make recommendations on areas that need improvement. It will further indicate the 
knowledge created by the study and recommend areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The Republic of Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990, having been under 
German colonial rule from 1884 to 1915 and then under South African colonial rule, 
from 1915 to 1990. The Namibian Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
on 9 February, 1990. The Constitution serves as the supreme law and therefore, the 
primary source of foreign policy. It states that the Namibian foreign policy is based on 
the principles of: 
(i)  Maintaining non-alignment; 
(ii) Promoting international cooperation, peace and security; 
(c)  Creating and maintaining just and mutually beneficial relations among nations; 
(d)  Respect for international law and treaty obligations and 
(e)  Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting 1990: 53). 
 
In addition to the Constitution, the Namibian Government also adopted laws and policies 
that have become instruments of diplomacy that both state and non-state actors on the 
practice of Namibia’s economic diplomacy use.  
 
Two major laws, in this area, are the Foreign Investment Act and the EPZ Act. The 
policies adopted are the White Paper on National and Sectoral Policies (1991), the NDP 
1 (1995), NDP 2 (2002), White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management 
(2004), Vision 2030 (2004), NDP 3 (2008), and NDP 4 (2012). The aim of the study was 
to analyse the economic diplomacy of Namibia and the possible challenges of pursuing 
economic diplomacy. Then the study further looked at how Namibia, as a small state, 
realises the goals and objectives of the above-mentioned policies. 
 
Namibia had adopted both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The goals of Namibia’s 
bilateral diplomacy are to attract FDI to Namibia and secure a place for her commodities 
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in the world market. She imports products and secures major trading partners from 
Africa, America, Europe and Asia. Namibia focuses on specific commodities in a given 
market, such as trading beef in the UK and fish with Spain, for example. 
 
In line with the goals of multilateral economic diplomacy, Namibia actively participates 
in the negotiations for the trade agreement between the ACP and the EU. Namibia 
furthermore, a member of multilateral organisations that deal with regional and 
international trade such as SACU, SADC, and WTO. Part of Namibia’s multilateral 
diplomacy also includes conference diplomacy. 
 
7.2  Main research question and rationale for study 
 
The main research question of the study is: How does a small state, such as Namibia, 
successfully formulate and pursue economic diplomacy policies and how does she 
negotiate favourable trade terms, given the assumptions in IR studies that small states are 
constrained by institutional capacity?  
 
The significance of the study is that it will contribute to the academic literature on 
Namibia’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy, which at the moment is limited. 
Meanwhile, there are a number of sources on foreign policy of Namibia’s neighbour, 
South Africa, with whom Namibia shares historic and therefore, political and economic 
ties. The study further makes a contribution to the economic diplomacy of developing 
states generally and that of African states in particular, as this area is neglected by 
researchers. 
 
The study is of further important, as it contextualises Namibia’s post-Cold War economic 
diplomacy. This period is of interest to students of IR studies, for it coincides with 
changing foreign policies and emerging trends. Among them is globalisation, for 
example, which is characterised by increased connectedness and, thus, brought new 
dimensions to trade relations. The changing foreign policies of the post-War period also 
witnessed an increasing number of actors on foreign policy. It is, therefore, significant to 
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note the impact of actors on the practice of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, within the 
context of changing foreign policies. 
 
The literature is an essential tool of trade for stakeholders in the practice of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. The in-depth analysis of Namibia’s economic diplomacy and 
comparative study of small state foreign policy that has been made will enable policy-
makers to formulate policies and coordinate their activities. For example, the study 
recommended the coordination strategies among the government actors. 
 
The significance of the study is also to analyse Namibia’s economic diplomacy in terms 
of traditional small state theories. Namibia is a small state with a population of 2.1 
million. Having trade partners among middle and large economic super powers, the study 
gives an analysis of how Namibia, as a small state relates to large states, in the categories 
stated above. The study then further analysed whether the practice of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy is unique or whether it is typical of small states diplomacy. 
 
The fact that the researcher is among Namibia’s key foreign policy-makers being the 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, enriches the study in terms of originality. Further, the 
researcher has access to other key stakeholders like the President and Ministers and the 
study is, thus, based on information from primary sources. 
 
The study fills the gaps in the existing literature on Namibia’s foreign policy. For 
example, the role of non-state actors, on the practice of Namibia’s economic diplomacy, 
has not been previously documented. Although some literature sources state the role of 
non-state actors in foreign policy in general, the focus has been on political diplomacy. 
The private sector leaders were interviewed and their views are, therefore, included in the 
study. 
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7.3  Analytical, conceptual and theoretical approach of study 
 
 This study came up with a working definition of a small state, which is characterised by 
a population of less than 8 million. However, states with a population slightly over 8 
million have been included in the working definition of this study. This is because these 
states possess more than one characteristic of small states. In addition to the population, 
Namibia meets the characteristics of a small state discussed in the literature on small 
states, such as a poor economy, the way the state leaders and nationals perceive their 
state, participation in regional and international organisations, economic focus as a 
foreign policy aspects, and upholding a high level support of the international legal 
system. She has, however, gone beyond other perceived characteristics such as low level 
of participation in world affairs, and a limited scope of foreign policy. 
 
The theoretical approaches that have been used in the study are Liberalism and Realism. 
The study largely applied Liberalism as a theoretical approach to the study. With regard 
to the practice of economic diplomacy, Liberalism as a theory of IR studies calls for 
mutual advantages to both parties involved in diplomatic relations. Diplomacy as a 
domain of governments has traditionally been left to state actors. Liberalism recognises 
the role of non-state actors in internal relations as opposed to monopoly by governments. 
It argues that in addition to states, individuals, too, play a role in international relations. 
Modern Liberalism theory recognises the leading role of a state in international relations 
but it avers that non-state actors, too, have a stake in the practice of economic diplomacy. 
 
Realism propounds that states are driven by interests. Their economic diplomacy is 
characterised by competition with other states, where they contest for value-addition to 
local products. Realism advocates the pursuing of national interest, where states will 
adopt measures like infant industry protection, to safeguard their small industries against 
competitions from established foreign enterprises. 
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7.4  Summary of Chapters 
 
Four main themes were discussed in the study, namely the formative years of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy, actors on Namibia economic diplomacy, bilateral economic 
diplomacy and multilateral economic diplomacy. 
 
7.4.1 The formative years of Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
 
At independence, Namibia’s economic status signified a small economy and a colonial 
legacy of economic sanctions. With the lifting of sanctions imposed on South Africa and 
by extension, to Namibia, as her colony, Namibia captured new markets and her exports 
grew by 82 percent within the first five years of her independence.  
 
Namibia then adopted economic diplomacy as a tool of attracting trade and investment. 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy is anchored in the third principle, in article 96, of the 
Namibian Constitution, namely promoting mutual beneficial relations.  
 
To pursue economic diplomacy effectively, Namibia established permanent bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic missions, where she deployed diplomats. The Namibian 
Government further deployed specialised diplomats, the Commercial Counsellors, to 
complement the work of the diplomats in promoting trade and investment. Namibia also 
appointed eminent business persons and professionals as Honorary Consuls, to promote 
trade relations between Namibia and the respective countries of their residence. By 
opening diplomatic missions, Namibia thereby adopted a type of inter-governmental 
diplomacy, by way of state-to-state or state-to-international governmental organisation 
relations (see Figure 2). Other institutions dealing with economic diplomacy were also 
established under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These are the Investment Centre 
and the ODC.  
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7.4.2 Actors on Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
 
The development and growth of the Namibian economic diplomacy is a matter of interest 
to both state and non-state actors. Accordingly, the Government does not hold a 
monopoly over the pursuit of Namibia’s economic diplomacy.  
 
The state actors in Namibia’s economic diplomacy comprise of foreign policy executives 
such as the Head of State, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Trade 
and Industry and other economic ministers that include the Ministers of Finance, of 
Mines and Energy and of Agriculture, Water and Forestry. Members of Parliament, 
Namibian diplomats, regional councils and local authorities and SOEs, too, are among 
important state actors on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
 
In respect of the agency-structure debate of IR studies, President Nujoma, as an actor, 
drove and shaped economic diplomacy-making institutions. He made initiatives that 
culminated into economic diplomacy programmes of the Government, like the Smart 
Partnership dialogues, for example. President Pohamba stresses the importance of laws 
and policy documents like the Namibian Constitution and SWAPO manifesto, as guiding 
documents for government officials, in executing their duties. He consults with his 
Ministers and sometimes with his peers, especially within the SADC region. In respect of 
the agency-structure debate, it could, arguably, be stated that President Pohamba’s 
conduct of diplomacy is shaped by the environment and institutions under which he 
operates.  
 
Namibian diplomats are important stakeholders in Namibia’s economic diplomacy, who 
link the Namibian business community, to their counterparts in the world. During 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, Namibian diplomats provide valuable information 
to negotiators from the capital about the culture and attitude of their counterparts towards 
the negotiations. Specialised diplomats serve as an important links between the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and of Trade Industry, which is necessary in the coordination of the 
conduct of economic diplomacy. State actors further include SOEs and local authorities. 
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These operate within the framework of the government’s foreign policy principles and 
goals. 
 
Non-state actors contribute to the making of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. They form 
part of the high level and ministerial visits that discuss trade and investment matters. 
When the Namibian Government is involved in large-scale multilateral trade 
negotiations, it consults widely with the private sector. For example, the private sector, 
represented by the NCCI, constituted the Namibian Government negotiation team, for the 
tripartite agreement between SADC, COMESA and SACU. The ATF has been consulted 
by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public 
Administration, to present its views on the EPA negotiations. The ATF has further been 
consulted directly by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, on the issue of agricultural 
tariffs in respect of the EPA negotiations. The private sector was further consulted by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, when it convened a consultative workshop on the EPA in 
2013, to determine the national position and strategies, which at the time of writing 
(March 2015), is internal government information. 
 
7.4.3 Namibia’s economic sectors and bilateral economic diplomacy 
 
Namibia sets her bilateral diplomacy goals to attract FDI to Namibia and secure a place 
for her commodities in the world market. The sources of Namibia’s exports are 
predominantly mining, fisheries and agricultural sectors. Namibia imports products and 
secured major trading partners from Africa, America, Europe and Asia and further 
captured a market of over 100 countries worldwide. Namibia’s goals of extending 
horizons to markets in various parts of the world, increasing her trade network by 
acquiring new friends and reducing dependency, correspond to large states foreign policy 
ambitions. For example, Nigeria, a large state, was determined to diversify her trade 
partners, eliminate dependency and find new markets in Eastern Europe and Japan. 
However, her exporting of goods without value addition is typical of small states 
economic diplomacy. 
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Namibia’s construction industry and tourism sector contribute to inward investments. A 
large number of tourists come from Europe and within the southern Africa region. 
Investors in the construction industry are mainly from China and DPKR. They constitute 
70 percent of the construction industry. 
 
7.4.4 Multilateral economic diplomacy 
 
Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy covers her membership to SACU, SADC, 
ACP states and WTO. The performance of her multilateral diplomacy in these institutions 
will be discussed below. Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy is also pursued 
through UNCTAD, a UN specialised agency that provides advisory services to member-
states on trade, investment and negotiations. UNCTAD provided the necessary training to 
Namibians on economic policies and other issues related to the management of the 
economy. 
 
In 2010, Namibia opened a permanent mission to the UN specialised agencies in Geneva, 
which relieved the work load from the Commercial Counsellor. This shows that 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy conduct moved beyond the perceived small states 
diplomacy, which is characterised by little representation at multilateral negotiations, due 
to limited human and financial resources. 
 
7.5 Main findings 
 
The study has included some findings on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. These relate to 
the smallness of a state and Namibia’s bilateral and multilateral economic diplomacy 
practice. They further relate to the forms, types, agenda and goals of Namibia’s economic 
diplomacy. 
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7.5.1 Namibia’s bilateral economic diplomacy and small states perspectives  
 
Small states theories advocate that the smallness of a state makes it susceptible to failures 
and limitations. In their relations with large states, small states are unable to determine 
the agenda of such relations. It is further propounded that the foreign policies of small 
states manifest dependency. Accordingly, small states depend on foreign aid and supply 
of food and other materials from large states, than by having mutually dependent 
relations with large states.  
 
Having secured markets from over 100 countries in the world for her exports means that 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy is beyond small states assumption that says, small states 
depend more on receiving aid from large states than on trade. Namibia actually sets her 
goals in the NDP 1 that she will not depend on aid. To implement this goal, Namibia 
grew from developmental diplomacy to trade relations. However, deep pocket and 
cheque-diplomacy continue to impact Namibia’s economic diplomacy. She is, however, 
yet to develop an industrial-based economy and export processed goods. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry made a significant improvement on the issuing of 
import and export permits, when within the first year of Namibia’s independence, the 
value of import permits realised more than a fourfold increase, while the value of export 
permits almost tripled. These permits are fundamental to external trade and inward 
investment.  
 
Namibia’s exports and inward investments have increased in terms of direct trade with 
major partners. Exports value grew from N$ 6.69 billion, in 2008, to N$ 12.1 billion in 
2012, while imports value grew from N$ 3.49 billion, in 2008, to N$ 4.98 billion, in 
2012. This fulfils the objectives stated in the NDP 1 that Namibia will increase her trade 
and investment profile. Exports value for the EPZ, too, increased from N$ 4.9 billion in 
2008 to N$ 7.6 billion in 2012, while its imports value increased from N$ 2.4 billion to 
N$ 5.6 billion in 2011. However, the number of companies operating under the EPZ is 
small, as many companies that were granted EPZ licences have not come into operation. 
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7.5.2 Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy and small states perspectives  
 
Small states literature proposes that small states are inclined to multilateralism in order to 
benefit from collective security. They are, however, passive members who do not drive 
issues or shape decisions in multilateral organisations. They are further unable to 
influence terms of trade in the international economic system. The literature further avers 
that small states have no competent human capacity to effectively carry out negotiations 
that are beneficial to their respective states. They are, therefore, reactive rather than being 
pro-active, in international affairs. However, Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy 
is beyond the perceived trends for small states diplomacy, as illustrated below. 
 
Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy is pursued through regional and international 
organisations. She actively participated in important negotiations related to trade and 
investment. Namibia has achieved success in multilateral economic diplomacy because 
contrary to the traditional perceptions, that small states are passive actors in 
multilateralism, allowing large states to shape the agenda of multilateral institutions, 
Namibia drove agendas and spearheaded negotiations between the ACP-EU, in the WTO 
and SACU.  
 
Namibia’s Ambassador to the EU, Dr Zed Ngavirue, served as Chief Spokesperson for 
the ACP-EU trade negotiations and further served as Chairperson of the Committee of 
ACP Ambassadors, to the EU. Namibia stood firm against the EU’s coercive mode of 
diplomacy, included in Table 2. The EU threatens to close its market to ACP products if 
ACP countries do not sign the EPA, Namibia, however, asserted her sovereignty by 
calling for negotiations to be conducted in the spirit of equal partnership, rather than that 
of a large partner versus a small partner. While all other small states in the EPA 
negotiations signed the IEPA, Namibia was not cowed by the EU threats to sign the EPA 
and remained firm in her stance.  
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In the EPA negotiations, Namibia employed diplomatic strategies and techniques that 
include talking to other SADC member-states, in order to have Namibian issues of 
concern adopted as SADC issues of concern. This was an innovative tactic adopted by 
Namibia to win the support from the regional countries, to strengthen her case. Namibia 
further hosted a round of negotiations and adopted a coordinated approach between 
members of the Legislature and the Executive, to argue Namibia’s issues of concerns at 
international platforms and during their bilateral engagements with their respective 
counterparts. Namibia has been firm on her position and this influenced other members of 
the ACP in the overall negotiations. Issues of concern were resolved through the 
negotiations that she led. These are (i) export taxes, (ii) quantitative restrictions, (iii) food 
security, (iv) free circulation of goods, (v) MFN clause, (vi) rules of origin and (vii) 
definition of parties. 
 
In the WTO, Namibia successfully negotiated to bring down the tariffs to safeguard 
infant industries. At the WTO, Namibia was made the focal point for the Africa Group on 
the trade negotiations, on matters related to trade in agricultural products. She further 
chaired of the WTO’s Working Parties on State Trading Enterprise. Previously, SOEs 
from small states had unfair competition from SOEs from large states because the latter 
are subsidised by their governments. With Namibia at the helm of the Working Parties, 
new rules were formulated that guard against the monopoly of SOEs from large states in 
international trade. This study avers that having been at the helm of the negotiations at 
the WTO, SACU and EPA negotiations, a limited number of Namibian diplomats, 
specialised diplomats and officials have the capacity for high level negotiations.  
 
With regard to regional economic diplomacy, although Namibia is a small state, she has 
successfully worked for the development of instruments of regional integration in the 
fisheries sector. This includes the drafting of the SADC Marine Fisheries Policy, which 
guides the fishing industry in the region. The policy was adopted at the second meeting of 
the SADC Fisheries Ministers held in Angola, in 1995. Namibia further worked on the 
harmonisation of regional fisheries policies and the SADC Fisheries Protocol, which 
regulate the sustainable use of the aquatic resources and ecosystem. 
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Under Namibia’s chairmanship, SADC reached out to China to forge SADC-China 
relations. Further, SADC also concluded a tripartite agreement with other regional 
economic blocs, SACU and COMESA. As a member of SACU Namibia presented a draft 
paper on revenue sharing and this became the basis for the custom union’s revenue 
sharing formula. Although a new and small state, Namibia was not a passive member of 
SACU. Rather, she made valuable contributions.  
 
7.5.3  Forms and types of diplomacy 
 
Table 2 illustrates a typology of small states that serves as an analytical tool for this 
study. It states that there are permanent and temporary forms of diplomacy. Permanent 
forms of diplomacy are characterised by permanent diplomatic missions.  
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 illustrate that temporary form of diplomacy is characterised by high-
level and ministerial visits. Namibian leaders adopted this form in bilateral economic 
diplomacy. The Presidents paid state and official visits to a number of countries, 
including Namibia’s major trade partners. Both former President Sam Nujoma and 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba employed personal diplomacy, to forge cooperation with 
other states, during their respective presidential tenures. 
 
In Table 2, it is stated that the types of diplomacy include bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy, whereas the level of diplomacy is intergovernmental or non-governmental. 
Accordingly, diplomacy involves non-state actors. Non-state actors actually bring an 
element of domestic disagreement in the practice of Namibia’s economic diplomacy. 
They publicly complained that Chinese investors venture into small business that should, 
ideally, be left to local entrepreneurs. Although senior Government leaders have been 
defending Chinese investors, they could not completely ignore the plight of the public. 
More so, their defence become compromised by cheque-book diplomacy. Eventually, 
President Pohamba held talks with the Chinese Ambassador, expressing displeasure 
about the conduct of some Chinese investors. The private sector further makes a valuable 
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input, as it makes presentations during the induction programmes of newly appointed 
Heads of Missions. The private sector is further accommodated, in important economic 
advisory structures like the Namibia Trade Forum, which advises the government on 
trade matters. The views of the private sectors are, therefore, considered when trade 
policies and regulations are formulated. 
 
Among the forms of multilateral economic diplomacy on Table 2, is the type of inter-
governmental specialised conferences. In pursuing multilateral economic diplomacy, 
Namibia participates in specialised conferences that promote economic diplomacy, like 
the Smart Partnership Dialogues and the WEF. She also hosted the Smart Partnership 
Dialogue for southern Africa, and the Southern Economic Forum Summit of the WEF, in 
1998. Namibia further adopted specialised conference diplomacy that focuses exclusively 
on her trade and investments. The examples are the Private Investors Conference held in 
1991, which was attended by investors from many parts of the world and resulted in 
investment by, among others, companies from Spain, UK and the US. Another one is the 
Conference on Mineral Investment in Namibia held in 1993, which marketed mining 
opportunities and resulted in immediate investments in diamond mining by a Canadian 
company, Diamond Fields International. 
 
Figure 1 stated that various methods, such as diplomacy as influence, deterrence, 
coercion and utilising compulsion, are used in diplomacy as an instrument of foreign 
policy. Namibia’s economic diplomacy adopts influence as a mode of diplomacy, using 
active persuasion to achieve favourable trade terms. For example, Namibia influenced 
other SADC and later ACP member-states to adopt her position in the ACP-EU EPA 
negotiations. Namibia does not use economic statecraft against other states but uses 
influence as a mode of diplomacy, which is typical of small states diplomacy behaviours. 
 
The study fills the gap in Table 2. For example, it states that permanent forms of 
multilateral diplomacy is characterised by states sending their representatives to 
diplomatic missions, accredited to multilateral institutions. This study supposes that apart 
from having representatives at multilateral organisations, the joining of those 
 279 
organisations is in a form of permanent multilateral diplomacy. Permanent diplomacy is 
not manifested only by having a representation because some member-states of 
international organisations have no resident missions in the states where those 
organisations are hosted. Being a member of an international organisation a state engages 
in multilateral diplomacy specific to that organisation. 
 
Table 2 further excludes another form of permanent diplomacy, the regime-based 
diplomacy. Agreements concluded, bilaterally and multilaterally are permanent 
frameworks of cooperation. Since economic diplomacy, in most cases, is based on 
agreements, this study propounds that regime-based diplomacy is part of the permanent 
form of diplomacy. Negotiations for agreements, too, are left out in table 2. This study 
propounds that the EPA negotiations fall in the category of the long-term form of 
diplomacy. Since they are an ad hoc exercise, they are not a permanent form of 
diplomacy. They also do not fall under temporary diplomacy because they lasted for a 
period of over 10 years. 
 
Table 2 further leaves out trade fairs. Accordingly, this study propounds that trade fairs 
are temporary forms of diplomacy. They fall under the type of state-to-state relations 
characterised by expos to non-state multilateral relations. It is further important to note 
that while expos are arranged and coordinated between states, participants in the expos 
are non-state actors, like the business community. Trade fairs multilateralism stems from 
the fact that the business community from various countries who participates includes 
MNCs. 
 
7.5.4 Agenda and goals of Namibia’s diplomacy 
 
Figure 2 outlines Namibia’s economic diplomacy goals, to include the promotion of the 
manufacturing industry, promotion of regional trade and striving for mutual beneficial 
relations and maintain an influence in international economic relations. Regional trade 
remained important from independence till the time of writing this study (March 2015). 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy has a regional agenda, focusing on her neighbours in the 
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SADC region. This is illustrated by, first, the fact that in 1990 President Nujoma 
encouraged the Namibian private sector to focus on regional trade and his views were 
echoed by Minister Gurirab, who emphasised the importance of close co-operation in the 
region, within the framework of SADCC. Secondly, both Presidents Nujoma and 
Pohamba first paid official visits to a number of countries in the region before visiting 
other countries of the world, after assuming office during their respective presidential 
tenures. 
 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy agenda also includes re-circling diplomacy, in which she 
revisited pre-independence economic diplomacy programmes with former SWAPO’s 
allies in the Nordic countries. Namibia and the Nordic countries put in place cooperation 
programmes in economic areas of agriculture, fisheries and energy.  
 
7.6 Instances of ineffectiveness in the practice of economic diplomacy 
 
There are some areas reflecting a failure in the practice of economic diplomacy. These 
cover the issues of human resources development, priority areas and efficiency. 
 
While Namibian diplomats have shown skills in the EPA and WTO negotiations, she has 
not created a large enough base of expertise both for conventional and specialised 
diplomats. There are a handful of skilled diplomats. A few officials are exposed to 
specialised diplomacy. This is a result of concentrating knowledge in a few officials. For 
example, the Commercial Counsellors at the Namibian embassies in Belgium and India 
have been in their respective positions since 2003 and 2004, respectively. Further, the 
Commercial Counsellor at the Namibian embassy in Angola served in that position from 
2004 to 2014. The duration of specialised diplomats should be streamlined to that of 
conventional diplomats, who serve four years at diplomatic missions.  
 
The Namibian Government has not adequately addressed the issue of training of 
diplomats. About ten years after the adoption of the White Paper on Foreign Policy and 
Diplomacy Management, which provided for an institute on diplomacy training, such an 
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institute has not yet been established. Similarly, junior diplomats go on foreign posting 
without any induction. The induction programmes are arranged for the Heads of Missions 
only. The current practise of inviting entrepreneurs to speak to Heads of Missions at their 
induction should be extended to junior diplomats, too, since they are the frontline 
diplomatic officials who engage with possible investors and tourists. 
 
A tailor-made in-house diplomatic training programme should be developed. This 
programme should include visits to various trade and tourism areas in Namibia. This will 
enable diplomats to obtain sufficient information about investment opportunities and 
tourism attraction areas, so that when they market Namibia and existing business 
opportunities, they will be talking from an informed position.  
 
The Government has neglected specialised diplomacy. Commercial Counsellors at the 
Namibian diplomatic missions abroad, are not deployed at all strategic diplomatic 
missions. At the time of writing this study (March 2015), Commercial Counsellors are 
only in the Namibian Missions in Angola, Belgium, Germany, India, South Africa, 
Switzerland and US. There is a need to deploy Commercial Counsellors in the Namibian 
missions in emerging economies like Brazil, China and Russia, for example.  
 
Namibia underutilises Honorary Consuls. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not 
continuously engage Honorary Consuls, both those that represent other countries in 
Namibia and those that represent Namibia in foreign countries. With regard to Honorary 
Consuls representing Namibia abroad, the Government should regularise convening the 
Honorary Consuls Conference. The conference could discuss issues related to the 
challenges that Honorary Consuls face and overall performance in their conduct of 
economic diplomacy. With regard to Honorary Consults representing foreign countries in 
Namibia, there are no interactions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This situation 
needs to be improved, as these officials provide a link between Namibia and their sending 
states, especially in instances where there are no diplomatic missions in Namibia from the 
sending states of the Honorary Consuls.  
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There is a problem with in-depth analysis of the business environments, to provide 
adequate information on strategic business partners in foreign countries, where Namibian 
diplomats are accredited to. Such a challenge is also applied to the staff at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and other economic Ministries involved in the practice of economic 
diplomacy. This was illustrated by engaging in controversial projects like in the case of 
Pidico. Diplomats should be required to produce researched papers, making analyses on 
the relevance and challenges of Namibia’s economic diplomacy in their countries of 
accreditation.  
 
Bilateral Joint Commissions of cooperation are not held at regular intervals and there is 
no seriousness with regard to follow-ups on the issues agreed at the Joint Commission 
sessions. Thus, in many instances, issues that were discussed at previous sessions remain 
unresolved until the next sessions, without any action having been taken. There is a need 
to follow-up on economic diplomacy relations that are forged through conference 
diplomacy, bilateral discussions and signing of bilateral agreements. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, should have, a division dedicated to monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of what has been agreed at meetings and the implementation of 
agreements concluded with other countries. 
 
7.7  Significance of the findings 
 
The findings of this study have some implications. The significance of the study to the 
epistemology of IR studies is the findings on the capability of Namibia as a small state. 
With the successes that Namibia achieved in the negotiations at the WTO and ACP-EU 
negotiations for example, the capability of Namibia, as a small state, goes beyond the 
Realist assumption of limited capability in power-based relations. 
  
Namibia should, however, create a base of expertise both for conventional and 
specialised diplomats. This should be done by exposing as many officials as possible to 
specialised diplomacy. Currently, Commercial Counsellors serve at diplomatic postings 
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for too long a period, thereby, denying other officials an opportunity to be exposed to 
economic diplomacy.  
 
The study points out the issue of duplicate diplomacy in the practice of Namibia’s 
economic diplomacy. In order for foreign policy-makers to remain effective, there is a 
need to improve on the coordination of economic diplomacy among government 
Ministries. The deployment of the First Secretary for Economic Affairs, by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Commercial Counsellor, by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, in one diplomatic mission leads to a duplication of responsibilities. The 
resources spent on these officials could have been utilised optimally to further economic 
diplomacy activities in other missions.  
 
The study identifies the need to establish a permanent, inter-ministerial committee, 
chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprising officials from other economic 
ministries that are regularly involved in economic diplomacy and foreign policy matters, 
in general. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resource and 
Public Administration participates in international meetings discussing matters affecting 
Namibia’s economic diplomacy. Regular interaction with the Parliament on the EPAs and 
WTO matters, for example, should be maintained.  
 
7.8 Epistemological contribution of the study 
 
The epistemological scheme addresses the knowledge of IR as defined by major IR 
theories. The epistemological contribution that this study makes to the IR studies is the 
explanation of the global trade system and Namibia’s economic diplomacy in the context 
of the major IR theories, Liberalism and Realism. The study illuminates the forms of 
Namibia’s diplomacy and list in Figure 2 a new form of diplomacy. Both the forms, types 
and actors on diplomacy are contextualised in terms of Modern Liberalism theory, where 
the state and non-state actors contribute to the practice of economic diplomacy, with the 
state taking a lead. 
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Epistemology in respect of scientific realism propounds that there is no one scientific 
method that is applied to the study of the social world. Thus, the world should be studied 
in respect of both naturalism and social structure. It is these methods and approaches that 
enable us to provide grounds for explaining the perceived truths and beliefs about the 
world. This fundamentally differs from the ontological enquiry that propounds the 
difference in studying natural and social objects. 
 
7.9  Ontological contribution of the study 
 
The study raises some ontological questions about the behaviour of individuals. While 
Realists make an ontological claim that individuals are driven by self-interest, Namibian 
foreign policy-makers emphasise joint-ventures and mutual beneficial relations, in their 
practice of economic diplomacy. This means that they want Namibia’s trade partners to 
benefit, too. Accordingly, the ontological contribution that this study makes to the study 
of IR, is that individuals and the Namibian state as actors on economic diplomacy, seek 
to maximise the values that Namibia receive from her economic diplomacy practice, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally. In this context, Namibia does not only pursue her interests, 
but wants the interests of her partners to be considered, too. Thus, there is an emphasis on 
mutually beneficial relations. 
 
7.10 Recommended areas for further research 
 
As indicated in Chapter One, the area of Namibia’s foreign relations in general and 
economic diplomacy, in particular, has not been adequately researched. This study 
focuses on specific areas of economic diplomacy but could not adequately cover many 
aspects that could be relevant to policy-makers and scholars of Namibia’s foreign 
relations.  
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7.10.1  Inter-regional trade 
 
The SADC region discussed regional integration at a number of ministerial meetings and 
summits. It will be important to carry out research to determine what level of regional 
economic integration has been achieved. This will help the region to improve the current 
state of low level of inter-regional trade, resulting from, inter alia, lack of industrial-
based economies in the region. The study should further look at the impact of economic 
diplomacy in the region, making a comparative analysis with the impact made outside the 
region. Such a study will provide information on the cost-benefit analysis of trading 
within and outside the region. The study will, therefore, further be useful to the 
Government to determine the countries where it must deploy specialised diplomats. 
 
7.10.2  Namibia’s economic diplomacy with emerging economic blocs 
 
Currently, Namibia interacts with emerging economies as individual states, rather than 
collectively as the BRICS group. It will be important to carry out research on how other 
small states relate to emerging economies. During their meetings with their Namibian 
counterparts, Ministers from China emphasise on economic diplomacy based on true 
partnership and skills transfer. The research could, thus, comparatively analyse the 
relationship of small states with emerging economies and that of developed countries to 
see their approach to the concept of equal partnership. 
 
7.10.3 Conference diplomacy 
 
Conference diplomacy is an area of interest in the study of diplomacy. A study should be 
made on the benefits that small states derive from attending trade and investment 
conferences. The study will further guide the Government on important areas of focus 
when participating in conference diplomacy. The other focus should be on hosting 
conferences. The research could look at effective conference packaging, where the 
country does not only benefits through trade but on other areas, too, one of them being 
tourism. 
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7.10.4 The role of Honorary Consuls 
 
It will be important to research on the role of Honorary Consuls in the practice of 
economic diplomacy. It will be necessary to find out what drives Honorary Consuls to 
work for the promotion of trade and investment of sending states, when, they are in fact, 
citizens of receiving states. The research could also look at the advantages and 
disadvantages of employing the service of Honorary Consuls. 
 
7.10.5 Domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy 
 
Domestic disagreement on economic diplomacy will be an important area to research. 
This is to determine the extent to which public opinion matters to foreign policy-makers. 
The research on this subject will establish what informs domestic disagreements among 
state actors, between state actors and non-state actors and among non-state actors. The 
research will further address questions like whether public opinion in Namibia forms part 
of the agency-structure debate, in respect of shaping the conduct of foreign policy actors. 
 
7.10.6 Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations 
 
EPA negotiations have taken more than 10 years to conclude. Initially scheduled to be 
completed by 2007, the negotiations could not be concluded on time, as the ANSA group 
refuse to sign the IEPA before their issues of concern are addressed. Namibia had her 
issues, which she influenced other SADC and later ACP states to adopt. She has been 
persistent and firm on her stance. Accordingly, the study on EPAs will point out the 
major players and the techniques and strategies that they used in the negotiations, to date. 
It will further point out to the dynamics of small states in the negotiations. 
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7.11 Final comments 
 
With the Cold War having come to an end, trade and investment became essential when 
conducting foreign policies. Many countries from the East Bloc and West Bloc started 
forging relations. Namibia embraced both former friends and adversaries as the dynamics 
of changing foreign policies in the world unfolded. Namibia’s foreign policy was initially 
based on the ruling party, SWAPO’s, alignment with the East Bloc during the pre-
independence period and was, therefore, cognisant of this turning point. Applying the 
theories of IR studies, this study propounds that Namibia’s economic diplomacy is 
largely Liberalism-oriented, but it has also some trends that are inclined to Realism. 
 
As discussed in chapters Three to Six, this study rebuts the assumption of small states 
diplomacy, in respect of the conduct Namibia’s economic diplomacy. Despite the fact 
that Namibia was a new and small state, she formulated policies and adopted laws that 
could stand her in good stead in the international economic system. Namibian diplomats 
and officials possess the necessary skills and drive negotiations in multilateral economic 
diplomacy, winning the support of both small and large states. The study, therefore, avers 
that Namibia is not a typical small state that is:  
 Constrained by human capacity to engage in the conduct of both the bilateral and 
multilateral economic diplomacy 
 Unable to influence terms of trade in the international economic system. 
 Maintaining a narrow scope of foreign policy. 
 Subjected to dependency to large states, rather than maintaining trade and 
investment relations. 
 
However, as propounded by the literature on small states, Namibia did not use economic 
statecraft, such as sanctions, which is used by large states as a mode of diplomacy.  
Namibia needs to grow an industrial-based economy to export processed goods. Further, 
Namibia maintains only a few diplomatic missions abroad as propounded in the literature 
on foreign policies of small states. With the achievements in bilateral and multilateral 
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economic diplomacy that have been stated in the study, Namibia’s economic diplomacy 
in the future will be way above the economic diplomacy of a number of small states. 
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THE RESEARCHER’S BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 The researcher served as Desk Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996 – 
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 Deputy Chairman (2005 – 2008) and later Chairman of the Parliamentary 
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NAMIBIA AND SPAIN 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013i). 
 
Agreement on Basic Co-operation between Namibia and Spain, 1995 
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Memorandum of Understanding between the Regional Council of Caprivi Region and 
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NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA 
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TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATED AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013f). 
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NAMIBIA AND THE US 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013h). 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013j). 
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